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MIND

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A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

PROF. G. F. STOUT,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, AMERICAN EDITORIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND OF PROFESSOR WARD, PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON, DAVID MORRISON, M.A., AND OTHER MEMBERS OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

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I.—LAWS OF THOUGHT.

BY J. S. MACKENZIE.

1. *Meaning of Laws of Thought.*—That, in some sense, thought is subject to certain fundamental conditions is obvious. In particular, every one must recognise that, if our thinking is not consistent with itself, there must be something fundamentally wrong with it. Hence attempts have been made to formulate the fundamental laws that are necessarily involved in all thought. The laws that are most commonly stated are those of Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle, and Sufficient Reason. That in some sense these laws do condition our thinking can hardly be denied; but in what sense we are conditioned by them, is by no means so apparent. In order to see what the exact sense is, it may be well to notice first certain interpretations of them that appear to be definitely incorrect.

(a) They are not to be interpreted psychologically, *i.e.*, they are not to be regarded as laws of the subjective processes of our thought, in the sense in which the principle of association may be said to be such a law, or in the sense in which the use of images or of some form of language may be said to be a general condition of thinking. Psychological conditions such as these influence our thinking in the sense that it is difficult, or even impossible, to carry on any process of thought without observing them. This can hardly be said to be true of the fundamental laws of thought. It is quite easy to think inconsistently. The difficulty is all in the opposite direction. Not only does it seem clear that untrained minds are apt to fall into contradictions. Writers of high repute, such as Emerson or Carlyle or Nietzsche, may almost

be said to glory in their inconsistency; and even systematic writers on logic, such as J. S. Mill, seem pretty obviously to be guilty of self-contradiction or inconclusiveness on several occasions. It may be said, no doubt, that this is due to want of thought; but this appears to be true only in the sense that the thought has not been sufficiently clear and persistent. In demanding that thought should be clear and persistent, we seem to be asking for more than that it should simply be thought. Moreover, there are some difficult problems, such as motion, time, freedom, in which it seems to be true that the more strenuously they are thought about, the more liable we are to fall into contradiction with regard to them. There is nothing parallel to this in the case of laws that are of a purely psychological character. It seems clear that the Laws of Thought are objective, rather than subjective, in their character.

(b) Yet they are not to be interpreted as conditions of reality. It may be true that nothing that is real is self-contradictory; but it does not appear that we are entitled to affirm this without investigation and discussion. If reality be understood in the sense of simple existence, it has been definitely affirmed by some—*e.g.*, Dr. Bosanquet—that some things that exist are self-contradictory. This may be false, but it is not obviously absurd. Things that seem to have a certain colour, when looked at in a particular way, seem to be without it when they are differently regarded. This apparent contradiction may be removed; but it seems clear that we are led to remove it, not by the appearance of the thing, but by our dislike of contradictory affirmations. Again, if reality be understood in a different sense, as opposed to mere appearance, it is not at once apparent that reality in this sense must be self-consistent. We cannot assume that the actual is rational, though we may take it as a working hypothesis, or even be able to prove it by an elaborate course of argument. Parmenides may on the whole be regarded as the first philosopher who definitely sought to maintain the rationality of the actual; but Zeno, his chief disciple, was apparently only able to defend his position by urging that any other view led to difficulties and contradictions that were at least quite as great. Plato, largely by reflexion on the work of Parmenides and Zeno, was led to a fresh effort to maintain the rationality of the actual; but he maintained it by the method of dialectic—*i.e.*, by showing the contradictions that are involved in any way of thinking that does not grasp reality as a whole. This line of thought was, in more modern times, elaborated, with German

thoroughness, by Hegel; and, still more recently, it has been reinforced, in a more tentative way, by Mr. Bradley and others. According to any view of this type, the self-consistency of the whole involves the contradictoriness of all partial views of it. If a doctrine of this kind is correct, self-consistency can only be established as an ultimate result of thought about reality, not assumed as a fundamental presupposition. It is, moreover, very difficult to establish a view of this kind in such a way as to make the coherence and self-consistency of ultimate reality thoroughly clear; and, until such a doctrine is definitely established, it cannot be held that there is any inherent absurdity in the views of those who doubt or deny that ultimate reality can be apprehended as a self-consistent system. Such doubt or denial may either be set forth in a definitely sceptical form, such as that of Gorgias, or it may simply be stated as an objection to the view that the nature of reality can be intellectually apprehended. It may be supposed to be apprehended by some form of intuition or faith, rather than by clear thought. Heraclitus, for instance, seems to have maintained that contradictoriness lies in the essential nature of things; and it appears to have been largely in opposition to him that Parmenides was led to formulate his doctrine. Plotinus, again, partly following Plato, held that reality can only be grasped by intuition, not in a definitely intellectual way; and, in our own time, a similar view has been set forth by M. Bergson, and, in a somewhat different way, by Mr. Balfour, with a great deal of eloquence and persuasive power. Kant also urged that, in attempting to form a coherent view of the universe, thought falls inevitably into self-contradiction, and that ultimate reality must be held to be incomprehensible. He did not, however, recognise the possibility—at least for human minds—of any intuitive apprehension of reality, but only urged that certain views about it might rightly be entertained on the basis of moral faith, as fundamental postulates. He recognised, moreover, that the views entertained on this basis were self-contradictory, and hence incomprehensible by the human mind. The utmost that we could hope with regard to them—*e.g.*, with regard to the postulate of freedom—is that we might ‘comprehend their incomprehensibility’. Now, we are not at present concerned with the truth or falsity of any of these doctrines. But it can hardly be maintained that they are *prima facie* absurd; and hence we are hardly entitled to assume, as a fundamental presupposition, that reality is self-consistent. Fundamental laws of thought must not, therefore, be based on the nature of reality.

(c) It is more legitimate to regard them, with Kant, as being of the nature of ideals or regulative principles. But even this view is subject at least to some qualification. In thinking about reality we are trying to grasp its essential nature. If this essential nature is not self-consistent, it cannot be, in any final sense, an ideal for thought that it should be so apprehended. It would seem best to say rather, as Mr. Bradley does, that the effort after self-consistency is a 'rule of the game' of thinking. But of course this is a somewhat playful way of expressing what is meant. The attempt to apprehend the nature of reality is not a game. It is rather the most serious business of life; and, even those who doubt the efficacy of thought as the instrument of such an apprehension, have to recognise that it is the only instrument that human beings possess in any definite form. It might be best, therefore, to describe what are called the fundamental laws of thought as the chief implications that are involved in the use of this instrument.¹ Accepting this as a general statement of what is to be understood by these laws, we may now proceed to consider more definitely how they are to be interpreted. In doing so, it will be convenient to consider separately the implications of conception, the implications of judgment, the implications of reasoning, and the implications of belief.

2. *Implications of Conception.*—The essence of a conception lies in the definiteness of its meaning. Until it has been clearly defined, we can hardly be said to apprehend it at all. In the case of numbers, for instance, it can hardly be doubted that even an animal is more or less aware of the difference between a large number of things and a small number. Some savage peoples do not appear to have a much more definite apprehension of numerical relations than this. Most civilised people, on the other hand, are able to count things and calculate their relations. But it is only the trained mathematician who has a clear apprehension of number as such. Similarly, there are but few people who can be said to know definitely what is meant by life, art, religion, morality, government, truth, reality, value, and many other concepts; although almost every one is able to make some use of them for practical purposes, and even to

¹ I need hardly state that I am not here admitting that thought can be properly described as an instrument. My point is that, even if we say, with M. Bergson, that the intellect is only an instrument that has a certain value for practical purposes, we have still to recognise the conditions under which that instrument works. The less we ascribe to thought, the better may we be able to see the irreducible minimum of its implications.

think about them in a vague way. It is only when they are clearly defined that they acquire a fixed meaning; and even then further reflection upon them may lead to some modification in their definition. But they cannot be employed for the purposes of exact thought until their meaning has been at least provisionally fixed. When this is done, the concept has a certain permanence, and is distinguished from every other concept. The concept of a circle, for instance, can be clearly grasped, and marked off from that of an ellipse or any other curve. Every instance of a circle is an instance of one definite type, and not of any other. There are thus involved in all cases of clear conception the aspects of identity and difference; and it is here that we see the significance of the first of the so-called laws of thought. A meaning is identical with itself, and distinct from every other. This does not, of course, involve that the meaning may not be changed. There is perhaps no term that is not liable to have its meaning changed in some degree from time to time. Even in mathematics this occasionally happens, and in the more concrete sciences—especially those that are concerned with human life—it happens with considerable frequency. But when the meaning is changed, we are no longer dealing with the same concept, though we may be dealing with a closely related one. Clear thought is not possible unless we continue to use our terms in exactly the same sense. We cannot make any definite statements about unity, motion, redness, sweetness, pain, or any other concept, unless we are able to assume that every time the term is used it conveys a meaning that remains identical with itself, and is distinct from any other meaning. If we mean by religion sometimes one thing and sometimes another—even if the two things are very closely related—our thinking about religion is almost certain to be, in some degree, fallacious. It was this, I believe, that Parmenides had in mind when he first formulated the principle of identity. Being, he urged, must always mean being, and must always be distinguished from non-being. Plato, in like manner, contended that a definite meaning must be assigned to rest and motion, likeness and unlikeness, one and many, justice, knowledge, beauty, goodness, and every other fundamental concept. Otherwise there can be no clear thinking. It is important to observe—and it was fully recognised by Plato—that the fixity and eternity of these concepts does not imply that the particular objects to which these concepts may be applied have any similar fixity. Nor does it imply that an object to which one concept is applicable may not also have another concept applied

to it which is different and even opposed in meaning. A thing that, from a certain point of view, can be regarded as one, may also be regarded as many, from a different point of view. The earth may be at rest with reference to us, and in motion with reference to the sun. What we *mean* by one and many, by rest and motion, is not affected by such applications.

It is important to bear in mind, further, that, in recognising the element of identity in the concept, we are not excluding the aspects of difference that go along with it. In fixing the meaning of a concept, we are at the same time marking it off from every other concept. Red is red, and it is not blue. Moreover, we have to remember that every instance to which a concept can be applied is distinguishable from every other instance. Every instance of redness is distinguishable from every other instance. But each instance is identical with itself. The redness of this fire at this moment is that particular case of redness, and not any other; and every time we refer to that particular redness, we are referring to the same identical object. The meaning of the particular instance does not change, any more than the meaning of the general concept.

If this interpretation of the principle of Identity is correct,¹ it enables us to see more clearly what is to be understood by a law of thought. It is not the statement of a psychological fact. Few people do have or retain such definitely fixed meanings as are here referred to, except in mathematics and some other technical subjects in which accuracy is important. Neither is it a statement about existent things. A particular redness may disappear as soon as it is observed, and may never recur again. Even a class of animals or plants may gradually be transformed. Nor is it a statement about ultimate reality, which may be as changeable as the flux of Heraclitus or of M. Bergson. Nor, again, is it an imperative that we are bound to obey. It is quite possible to maintain that it is a mistake to try to determine either general concepts or particular instances in this definite way. It might very well be contended, for instance, that it is misleading to seek for a precise definition of religion. It might be urged that this is only a convenient term for grouping together a number of facts that have certain affinities with one another, but to which no one definite meaning can be applied—just as the term 'heretic' may be used to group together people who may differ as much from one another as they do from

¹ See below for some further consideration of it, in relation to judgment.

some recognised authority. Similarly, it might be urged that a definite conception of the State—say, that held by Treitschke, for instance—is highly misleading and even mischievous; and that it is much better to content ourselves with some vague conception that is sufficiently serviceable for practical purposes. Or it might be held that it is better to have no conception of God—or only a vague and variable one—than such a clearly fixed one as that of Calvin. Again, it may be urged—as by Bergson, Nietzsche, and the Pragmatists—that *all* definite concepts have this misleading character, and that for any final truth, if there is any absolute truth at all, we have to rely on intuition.¹ Even so, however, it would seem that we ought at least to have some clear conception of what is meant by truth, by intuition, by misleading, by mischievous, by better and worse. If we are to think at all, we must have *some* concepts that have a definite and fixed meaning. The law of thought, in this case, is simply a statement of what is involved in anything that can be regarded as a definite thought. It may sometimes be wise not to think definitely, or not to think at all. There may have been wisdom in Goethe's Witches.

Die hohe Kraft der Wissenschaft
Der ganzen Welt verborgen;
Und wer nicht denkt, dem wird sie geschenkt,
Er hat sie ohne Sorgen.

Still, thinking is thinking, and it has its implications. Similarly, a picture is something that can be seen. It may be a poor thing. It might be much better if it could not be seen; but, in that case, it would hardly be a picture. It might even be better—as Plato sometimes seems to suggest—that there should be no pictures at all. This is a question of values. And so it is in the case of concepts. A concept, if it is to be a concept at all, must have a definite meaning; and this is true, even if we grant that it would be better not to have concepts at all, or that they have only a provisional value. The question of values does not concern us at this point. We are only concerned with what is implied in having a concept; and it would seem that this is all that we need understand by a law of thought in the present case.

Having thus seen how a law of thought may be interpreted in relation to concepts, we may now proceed to consider its significance in relation to judgments.

¹ The dialectic of Plato and Hegel, by which the inadequacy of certain conceptions is shown, is of course very different from this. The conceptions have first to be made clear and definite before their inadequacy can be brought out.

3. *Implications of Judgment.*—A judgment, like a concept, is a meaning, but a meaning of a somewhat different kind. The judgments ' $2 + 2 = 4$,' 'Green is not blue,' 'If a triangle has two sides equal, it has two angles equal,' 'He either fears his fate too much or his deserts are small,' all convey definite meanings; and the affirmation of these meanings implies the rejection of others. The statement ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' would have no meaning at all if it might equally well be said that ' $2 + 2 = 5$ '. Every judgment may thus be regarded as both affirmative and negative. It asserts something, and negates everything that is inconsistent with that assertion. The principle of Contradiction is thus implied in all judgment. Here again we have to bear in mind that we are not at present concerned with the truth or falsity of judgments, nor with the question of the value of the act of judgment. It may be the case, as some maintain, that all judgments are more or less false. The injunction 'Judge not' may have a wider application than is commonly supposed. These considerations have no relevance to the present inquiry. We are only concerned with the questions What does a judgment mean? and What does that meaning imply? And even with these questions we are concerned only in a limited way. We are not inquiring into the significance of different types of judgment, but only into the kind of meaning that attaches to every judgment, and the immediate implications of that meaning. It is very important for our present purpose that we should limit ourselves strictly to these two points.

When we thus confine ourselves to what is strictly relevant, the significance of the principle of contradiction becomes clearly apparent. Every judgment may be regarded as the answer to a question, *i.e.*, it is the statement of a meaning in a case in which other meanings are conceivable. The statement 'This leaf is green' answers the question, 'What is the colour of this leaf?' Other answers might conceivably have been given. The judgment gives one answer, selected out of other conceivable answers, and excluding these other answers. The judgment may be a false one. The leaf may not really be green at all, or it may be only partially green, or may only appear green in certain lights. But the judgment asserts that it *is* green, and, in so doing, denies that it is *not* green. And what the principle of Contradiction calls attention to, is that every judgment contains the implication of such an assertion and such a denial. It thus plays a similar part in relation to judgments to that which is played by the principle of Identity and

Difference in relation to concepts. It makes the meaning definite, and brings out its positive and its negative aspect.

The principle of Excluded Middle serves simply to lay further emphasis on the definiteness of the judgment. The assertion 'This leaf is green' excludes the assertion 'This leaf is not green'. They cannot both be true and they cannot both be false. Of course they may both be inadequate. The leaf may be partly green and partly yellow. Also the attribution of colour to the leaf at all may be open to question. Perhaps the statement ought to have been, 'This leaf appears green in parts when looked at in a certain way in certain lights'. There would thus be a sense in which it is green and also a sense in which it is not green. But the point is that it cannot be green in the same sense in which it is not green; and that, in the sense in which either assertion can properly be made, either the affirmative or the negative must be true. Otherwise both judgments would be meaningless. Meaninglessness, as Mill urged, lies between truth and falsehood. But the essence of judgment is meaning. To say that it is meaningless, is to say that it is not a judgment. With what qualifications its meaning is to be understood is a question of interpretation. 'This leaf is green' may only mean, 'In normal lights the colour that is predominantly apprehended in connexion with this leaf is green'. All that has here to be maintained is that, whatever the meaning of the judgment may be, it excludes its opposite; and that one or other of them must be true. The significance of this, however, will become more apparent when it is considered in relation to belief.

It will be observed that I have not included the principle of Identity as one of the fundamental implications of judgment. It has of course frequently been so regarded, being usually stated in the form A is A , and being supposed to express the essential identity of subject and predicate. The unsatisfactoriness of this has often been pointed out; and recently Miss Constance Jones, in her interesting essay on 'A New Law of Thought,' has proposed that the principle of Identity should be dropped, and that the principle of Identity in Difference should be substituted for it. But it is difficult to see that any definite law is provided in this way. A formula of this kind does not seem to throw much light on the very varied relations between subject and predicate that are expressed in different types of judgment. I am prepared to allow, however, that what has been called the Law of Significant Assertion is a fundamental implication of judgment—i.e., the general principle that there is a definite

meaning in referring one thing to another (*e.g.*, a quality to a substance, or an object to a class). But, as Prof. Stout has pointed out, in his Preface to Miss Jones's Essay, this hardly seems to be a substitute for the principle of Identity. On the whole, it seems best to say that the principle of Identity applies to the concept, rather than to the judgment. What the judgment may be said to bring out, is, that the Identity of the concept is not so hard and fast as to prevent it from being brought into some sort of unity with other concepts. This does not conflict with the principle of Identity, as explained in the previous section; and perhaps it is right to say that this further implication of its meaning comes out in the interpretation of judgment.

Another way in which the principle of Identity has been interpreted in relation to judgment, is summed up in the statement that 'what is once true is always true'. But to apply this to any ordinary judgment requires a great amplification of its meaning. To show that 'This leaf is green' is always true, we should have to interpret it as meaning something like this—What is indicated by a certain person at a certain time as 'This leaf' presented the appearance which is recognised by normal vision in normal light as greenness. Even when it is thus expanded, some doubt might still be raised as to the sense in which it can be said to be eternally true. The whole problem of the meaning of truth is raised by such an interpretation; and I think it is hardly right to maintain that an ordinary empirical judgment implies a definite theory of truth. Any statement that would be definitely rejected as untrue by many of the leading writers on philosophical subjects could scarcely be described as a necessary Law of Thought. In the case of those principles that I have ventured to set forth as being entitled to stand on that proud eminence, I have endeavoured to make it clear that, as here interpreted, they are compatible with the most diverse theories of Truth and Reality. The same applies to the other principle that remains to be noticed, as being implied in Inference and Belief—the latter being distinguished from Judgment.

4. *Implications of Inference.*—Inference is entirely a matter of implication. It consists in making explicit what is implied in some meaning or combination of meanings. The fundamental presupposition of this is that one meaning is implied by other meanings, which serve as its ground. We are thus led to the principle that was referred to by Leibniz as that of Sufficient Reason or Ground. But before this can be properly dealt with, it seems necessary to refer

to a still more fundamental principle, which may be best characterised as that of Objective Order. The possibility of inference depends on the fact that one meaning is intimately connected with others. The judgment ' $2 + 2 = 4$ ' readily yields the judgment ' $4 - 2 = 2$,' because it is not an isolated judgment, but one that falls within the general numerical system, within which the relations represented by $+$ and $-$ have their meaning. Similarly, 'blue is darker than yellow' gives us at once 'yellow is lighter than blue,' because the meanings with which we are dealing fall within the general scheme of colours, in which darker and lighter signify places in a definite order. So also 'A is before B' yields 'B is after A,' because the reference is to the general system of time order. 'A is to the right of B' yields 'B is to the left of A,' because we are dealing with a definite order of space relations. 'A is the husband of B' yields 'B is the wife of A,' because we are dealing with a definite form of human relationship. 'A is better than B' yields 'B is worse than A,' because the reference is to a definite order of values. 'A is greater than B' yields 'B is less than A,' because we are concerned with a definite order of magnitudes. 'A is the cause of B' yields 'B is the effect of A,' because we are referring to a definite order of causal relations. 'Man is an animal' and 'animals are mortal' are two judgments which yield 'man is mortal,' because the former judgment refers man to a definite class arrangement, to which a special characteristic has been ascribed. This last form of order was the only one that was definitely recognised by the Aristotelian logic, and it still forms the basis for the greater part of the treatment of inference in modern formal logic. But it seems clear that it is only one case of the kind of order that furnishes a basis for inference. The general basis of all inference is the recognition of some form of Objective Order. This is the case even with inferences of a simpler type, in which we appear to proceed by simple identity, as in the admirable illustration that is given by Dr. Bosanquet. The two judgments 'His first penitent was a murderer' and 'I was his first penitent' yield at once the judgment 'I was a murderer'. But evidently this depends on the recognition of an order of penitents and the continuity of the individual life. Similarly, it is very obvious that the principle commonly referred to as the 'uniformity of nature' is simply the recognition of definite order in natural phenomena. It is needless to elaborate this. It seems clear that there could be no inference of any kind without the recognition that the meanings expressed in judgments fall within systems of Objective Order.

Here again it is important to bear in mind that we are not at present concerned with the reality of such Orders, but only with the fact that they are implied in inference. The uniformity of nature may be subject to many exceptions. The causal order may be broken by Contingency. Time may not run on continuously.¹ The man who was the first penitent may really have become a different person. All that we are concerned to urge is that, so far as any of these negations of order are true, inference becomes invalid or uncertain. It is only in this sense that we seem bound to maintain that the principle of inference is that of Objective Order. Obviously this connects closely with the principle of Sufficient Ground; but it seems better to consider this in connexion with belief.

5. *Implications of Belief.*—The difference between a belief and a proposition or judgment² is that, while the latter is simply the expression of a complex meaning, the former is the acceptance of that meaning as true by some particular person. This, of course, raises the question, What is Truth? but with that we need not at present concern ourselves. There may be no such thing as truth; or it may be only a name for what is generally believed. All that is important for our present purpose is that the meaning expressed in a judgment may be accepted or rejected; and that for this acceptance or rejection there are certain grounds. It would seem that we can distinguish five kinds of ground on which belief may be based. (a) We may believe something simply because we choose to believe it; (b) We may believe something because we have been taught to believe it; (c) We may believe something because it appears to be self-evident; (d) We may believe something because it is a valid inference from something else that we believe; (e) We may believe something because it appears to be a necessary assumption for the establishment or explanation of other beliefs. It is sometimes difficult to make a sharp distinction between these grounds of belief. Often beliefs are entertained on the cumulative force of more than one ground. But, in general, the

¹ I am of course not admitting that any of these doctrines can be maintained, I am only urging that they may, for our present purpose, be regarded as irrelevant.

² Some prefer to make a distinction between proposition and judgment, and to treat judgment as equivalent to belief. It seems to me better to regard a proposition as the expression of a meaning, a judgment as the meaning that is expressed, and a belief as the acceptance of that meaning by some person or persons. With the psychological analysis of belief we are not at present concerned; nor are we here considering how the truth of beliefs is to be interpreted.

distinctions seem sufficiently clear. The following illustrations may help to bring out their meaning. A man may believe that he will succeed in a particular enterprise that he has undertaken, because he very much wishes to succeed, and failure is 'unthinkable'. In the language of William James,¹ he 'wills to believe'. The ground here is purely subjective; though, of course, it will generally be the case that grounds of a more objective kind are mixed up with it. When a man chooses to believe something, he generally looks round for some circumstances that will justify it. But the subjective ground is real, and sometimes it has a certain value in practice. In war time, for example, the 'will to win' is recognised as an important element in national psychology. *Possunt quia posse videntur*. But sometimes it is only a source of blindness. Most people in this country chose to believe that a great continental war was almost impossible, in spite of all the warnings that they received, and all the evidence of preparation for it. This did not make the catastrophe any the less real, or enable them to meet it more effectively. Nor do optimism or pessimism with regard to its outcome—often based largely on individual temperament—have much direct influence on the actual result. But it seems clear, from such instances, that the ground of our beliefs is often a psychological ground, and that occasionally the entertaining of beliefs on such a ground may be justified. On the other hand, beliefs may be based rather on social pressure than on individual inclination. The weight of custom and tradition is often greater than that of personal bias. It is inevitable that we should accept many things on the authority of experts or on the general ground of the trustworthiness of human testimony. A man may believe that he is immortal, not merely because he wishes it, but because it is one of the doctrines of the Church to which he belongs. The Church may have other grounds for its doctrine; and the individual may have other grounds for belonging to the Church. But in both cases it may be true that the explanations are historical and psychological, rather than logical. Again, a man may believe that 'the whole is greater than its part,' because it seems to be self-evident. He may believe that if he steals he will be punished,

¹ William James explained afterwards that by 'the will to believe' he meant only the *right* to believe; but apparently he still meant the right to *choose* our beliefs without definite objective grounds. It seems clear that all believing is choosing. The question is only, What constitutes a sufficient ground for such a choice? Perhaps if James had been content to claim the right to *hope*, he would have been less open to criticism.

because it is a valid inference from what he knows of the social order. He may believe that there is a uniform three-dimensional space, because without this conception he cannot deal with the problems of Euclidean geometry.

Now, the first two of these grounds do not appear to call for any special comment at this point. They could only be properly dealt with by a general consideration of the development of choice and the influence of the social factor upon it. The fourth also need not further concern us. To accept a judgment or a number of judgments is to accept what can be logically inferred from them. The third and the fifth grounds, however, raise the problems of Axioms and Postulates or Hypotheses, on which some remarks appear to be necessary.

6. *Axioms*.—This term has been applied to judgments of very different types. The simplest kinds of axioms are those that merely unfold the implications of certain conceptions. A few illustrations from geometry may serve to make this clear.

(a) 'A whole is greater than its part.' This simply brings out what is meant by 'whole' and 'part' in extensive magnitude. A foot is made up of inches, and the foot is greater than the inch. As soon as we go beyond magnitudes that are purely extensive, the axiom becomes doubtful, and may be false. A chain, for instance, is not stronger than its strongest link: on the contrary, it is only as strong as the weakest. The same applies to a chain of reasoning. Similarly a heated surface is not as a whole hotter than its hottest point. The vitality of a plant is not necessarily diminished by pruning; nor is the strength of an army necessarily increased by the addition of inefficient troops. The Greek proverb that 'the half is greater than the whole' (πλέον ἥμισυ πάντος) calls attention to the fact that a magnitude which is extensively greater is often less in power and value. Even in knowledge the piling up of a mass of material does not necessarily mean more insight. The saying of Hobbes is sometimes worth remembering, 'If I had read as much as others have, I should have known as little'. But, as applied to magnitudes that are purely extensive, the axiom admits of no doubt, because it simply explains what is to be understood by such a magnitude.

(b) 'Things that are equal to the same are equal to one another.' This, again, simply makes more clear the meaning of equality. If A is equal to B, B is equal to A. If A is equal to B, and B is equal to C, A is equal to C, and C is equal to A. Similar axioms might be stated with regard to

other relations. If A is before B, B is after A. If A is before B, and B is before C, A is before C. If A is to the right of B, B is to the left of A. If A is to the right of B, and B is to the right of C, A is to the right of C. If A is an ancestor of B, B is a descendant of A. If A is an ancestor of B, and B is an ancestor of C, A is an ancestor of C. Axioms of this kind simply bring out the meanings of certain relations and orders.

(c) 'Two straight lines cannot enclose a space.' This is a little more difficult. A simpler way of stating it is 'Two straight lines can only meet at one point'. This follows from the meaning of a straight line, which is perhaps best interpreted as a definite direction in space. Now, in a uniform Euclidean space, every direction is completely different from every other. Two straight lines from one point mean two entirely different directions from that point, and have consequently no other point in common. This simply brings out a characteristic that is involved in the meaning of Euclidean space, and does not necessarily apply to other conceptions of space.

Such axioms as these present no real difficulty. They are analytical, in the sense that they simply serve to bring out the meaning of conceptions. Some of the axioms that are set forth by Descartes are similar, if they are strictly interpreted. 'A being who can do what is more difficult can do what is easier' is analytic, if we add the words 'for him'; for it then simply explains what is meant by easy and difficult. But, without this addition, it involves the questionable assumption that what is easy for one being is easy for another, and what is difficult for one is difficult for another. Emerson's squirrel says to the mountain—

If I cannot carry forests on my back,
Neither can you crack a nut.

It was probably easier for Napoleon to lead an army than to write 'Faust': for Goethe the reverse might very well have been true. Hence the axiom of Descartes is a very questionable one. Similarly, his axiom that every moment in time is a distinct existence from every other, involves a theory, and a very questionable theory, about the nature of time. Axioms of this kind, if they are to be admitted at all, are better characterised as Postulates.

7. *Postulates*.—What are called Postulates in mathematics are not always very clearly distinguishable from axioms. The postulate that a straight line can be produced indefinitely seems to be involved in the conception of a straight

line as a direction in a homogeneous space, and consequently involves simply the same presuppositions as those contained in the statement that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. The difference seems to lie merely in the relative simplicity or complexity of the assumptions that are involved. Sometimes the assumptions are very great, as in Descartes' assumption with regard to the nature of time, or in Kant's Postulates of Practical Reason. Such assumptions are made on the ground that, without them, it is impossible to give a satisfactory account of certain facts. Kant thought, for instance, that, without the Postulates of Freedom, Immortality and God, we could not give a satisfactory account of the moral life. What are sometimes called 'Working Hypotheses' in physical science are of a similar character. Even the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy seems to be essentially such a working hypothesis. The difference between these and such axioms as have been referred to in the previous section, is that the latter are involved in the meaning of the conceptions with which we are dealing, while the former are only required for explanation, *i.e.* for bringing the particular facts with which we are dealing into relation to some more comprehensive order. But, as every judgment implies the recognition of some kind of objective order, it may be urged that the difference is one of degree. It depends on the extent to which it may be held that we are obviously entitled to take some kind of order as self-evident or intuitive. This is a point that calls for further explanation.

8. *Intuitive Belief.*—There are some things that it is hardly possible to doubt. We can hardly doubt, for instance, the validity of the mathematical operations by which the relations between numbers are established; and we can hardly doubt that numbers are applicable to objects. When we think of three points, three triangles, the three sides of a triangle, three petals, three sheep, three men, three nerves, three judgments, or the three persons of the Trinity, it seems clear that there is an intelligible sense in which triplicity can be ascribed to each of these objects; and that whatever can be shown to hold of the relations of three to other numbers will be applicable to these objects, so far as they are properly described as three. How far they are rightly so described is of course another matter. In some cases the units appear to be separable in a sense in which others are not; and in some cases they appear to be homogeneous in a sense in which others are not. But still there is a clear meaning in characterising them as three; and, so

long as we adhere definitely to that meaning, we can say that they are one more than two, and one less than four; and we can go on to apply various other numerical relations to them. There are, however, important qualifications. If there are three triangles or three men, one may be removed, and two will be left. It is not in the same sense possible to remove one of the sides of a triangle or one of the petals of a flower or, we may suppose, one of the persons of the Trinity, without altering the whole character of the object. Nor can any of the objects referred to be divided into fractions, as a brick or a cheese might be, without altering or destroying its character. Apart from such qualifications, however, it seems clear that numbers have definite meanings which can be applied to objects of the most varied types. Similar remarks may be made about equality. A number of peas or eggs may be said to be all equal, and so may a number of men, provided that we confine our attention to certain purely quantitative aspects. And even things that are not quantitatively equal may be recognised as equivalent or 'fungible' for certain purposes. A coat and a pair of boots, for instance, may be recognised as being exchangeable, though they are very different in size, number, and appearance, and in other respects adapted for very different purposes. So men, as 'food for powder,' may be treated as equivalent, though one might be hardly distinguishable from Caliban and another might be the author of 'The Tempest'. So with words. In speaking of the motion of a bird's wing, we may call it 'beating' or 'flapping'; but when John Bright, at the time of the Crimean War said, 'The angel of death has been abroad in the land: we can almost hear the beating of his wings,' the substitution of the word 'flapping,' as was noted at the time, would have led at once from the sublime to the ridiculous.

What appears from such instances is that we very readily make use of conceptions, such as number and equality, and apply them to particular objects, and can hardly doubt that they are applicable, when they are used in certain easily recognisable ways; but that their use becomes doubtful, and requires careful consideration, as soon as we pass beyond such simple applications. The same applies to our use of time relations, causal relations, and others. That in some sense one thing is before another, and that in some sense one thing is the cause of another, is often so obvious that it would hardly be possible for any one who was not mad to doubt it. Our belief, in such cases, is sometimes said to be instinctive; and there seems to be a sense in which it is

hardly possible to doubt that many of the animals have such beliefs—if they can properly be called beliefs. Birds are probably unable to count; but it is pretty certain that they recognise some difference between one egg and two eggs. Most animals also act habitually in ways that seem to imply some apprehension of equality, greatness and smallness, before and after, cause and effect, and similar conceptions, as applied to particular objects in particular circumstances. But the ability to do this is very different from the ability to apprehend clearly the meaning of these conceptions, and to understand the qualifications with which they are applicable to different types of objects. The fact, however, that we have such instinctive or intuitive beliefs before we discover their full meaning and implications, and the qualifications with which it is right to apply them, is not merely of practical importance—in the sense that, otherwise, it would hardly be possible to carry on our lives at all: it has also a theoretical significance as serving to show that our use of conceptions is not an arbitrary game, but has its foundations in the nature of the world that we apprehend. This, however, is not a point on which we need dwell further at present. What I have rather sought to bring out, is that such intuitive beliefs, though in some sense hardly capable of being rejected, stand in need of criticism before we can be sure that we know the exact sense in which they can rightly be accepted.

9. *Foundations of Logic.*—What has now been urged about the meanings and implications of conceptions, judgments, inferences, and beliefs, should enable us to see more clearly what is the basis and significance of logical doctrine. If we define logic as the science of implications, we shall not, I think, be departing widely from what it has generally been taken to mean. But there are different ways in which implications may be considered; and these give rise to different types of logical doctrine.

In what is commonly called Formal Logic, only one kind of implication is dealt with—*viz.* that involved in the conception of classes. From the point of view of modern thought, this is little more than a game. It was not a game for its founder, Aristotle, because he regarded classification as the great aim of science. The formal treatment of thought can, however, be extended, as it is in modern mathematical logic, so as to deal with other relations than those of classes. The treatment of fallacies is, moreover, often combined with the study of formal logic; and, in dealing with these, the implications of language have to be considered in a more concrete way. The study of the methods

of the special sciences, in the more empirical types of logic, involves the consideration of some of the chief forms of objective order, notably that of causation. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, seeks to deal with all the fundamental conceptions that are used in thinking, and to bring out all their implications. Thus it seems right to say that implication is the one subject with which every kind of logic is concerned. It is confusing to mix this up with psychological inquiries into the processes of thinking, or with discussions about the general nature of knowledge, or with the meaning of truth and reality, except in so far as questions may arise about the implications of different conceptions of knowledge or truth or reality. The one aim of all logic is to make our meaning clear, and it would be well if it could confine itself to this. No doubt in doing this it is incidentally helping us to discover truth—at least if truth is something that can be made clear. At any rate, the laws of thought, with which we have here been dealing, would seem to be simply the fundamental conditions of clearness. How far such clearness enables us to gain a genuine insight into truth and reality, is another question; but at least we can hardly hope to gain such insight without it.

II.—BERKELEY'S REALISM.

By PROF. J. LAIRD.

IT has been the practice, in recent times, to call attention to certain passages in Berkeley's writings which imply, if they do not explicitly state, something closely akin to the doctrine which is now called realism. Thus Prof. Alexander, in explaining the basis of realism, writes: "The obvious distinction of the mental act from what it is about would obtain if the object were merely a mental content or presentation; and it is implied by Berkeley himself when he declares that mountains and trees exist in the mind not by way of mode but of idea. What the statement means, is, that the object of the mental act is a distinct existence (or subsistence) from the mental act."¹ Prof. Dawes Hicks, again, lays emphasis upon the same passage to the same purpose,² and we may quote the passage itself, with a view to a more general discussion of the whole subject. The opening sentences, then, of paragraph 49 of Berkeley's *Principles* run as follows: "*Fifthly*, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists.—I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it;—that is, not by way of *mode* or *attribute*, but only by the way of *idea*. And it no more follows the soul or mind is extended because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else."

Berkeley repeats the same explanation in the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*³ in very similar language, and

¹ *The Basis of Realism*, p. 5.

² *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1911-1912, pp. 167-168.

³ *Berkeley's Complete Works*. Fraser's four-volume edition, vol. i., p. 455. "It is therefore evident there can be no *substratum* of those qualities but spirit; in which they exist, not by way of mode or property but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it." My references to the text of Berkeley are to this edition, and I shall indicate the page in vol. i. of it, e.g. (480), (334), etc., unless I state otherwise.

we may therefore presume that the explanation itself was not a mere *obiter dictum* which he would have been willing to withdraw had a critic been disposed to take it too seriously. Moreover, it has been interpreted in a manner somewhat analogous to Prof. Alexander's even in the days when less was heard of the fundamental character of the distinction between act and object. Prof. Campbell Fraser also cites § 49¹ to show that Berkeley was not a subjective idealist, and that he did not regard sensible things as subjective modifications of the mind, but as presentations given to the individual mind, distinct from it, and accepted by it. It would be absurd, of course, to try to base an interpretation of Berkeley's general theory on a single reply to an objection, even if that reply is repeated; but if presentations are 'in mind' only in the sense of being 'before mind,' and if, as Berkeley certainly maintains, the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth consist really and truly of nothing but presentations, then it would seem very hard to distinguish the main presuppositions of Berkeley's theory of physical reality from certain realistic accounts of the nature of the external world, or even from such a doctrine as that of Mr. Russell in his recent Lowell Lectures.

Indeed, although it may savour of wilful paradox to claim that Berkeley, also, is among the realists, it is clear in itself that there is no necessary conflict between realism and idealism unless these terms are much more strictly defined than is frequently the case, and that theories apparently divergent may really have very close affinities. Berkeley certainly claimed that he was both a realist and an idealist, though he did not say so in precisely these words; and his claim, as certainly, was a just one on some acceptations of the terms. He regarded himself, we may say, as an idealist because he could offer (as he thought) a convincing proof of the truth of immaterialism and because he endeavoured to demonstrate that the entire system of things depends on a supreme and benevolent mind. Again, we may say that he gloried in being a realist because he affirmed and proved the full reality of what any sane man regards as real, just as he regards it before he allows himself to become debauched with learning. If Berkeley were driven to certain '*ambages*, and ways of speech not common' in defending his views, that he believed to be an affair of words, after all, and of words only. Indeed, it would scarcely be possible to conceive of a system which, in its intention, was more thoroughly

¹ Berkeley's *Complete Works*, vol. iii., p. 405.

realistic than Berkeley's. When the ghost of that inert, unthinking *substratum* called matter had once been laid, mind, he thought, must come into its kingdom, and could trust both itself and its objects. "What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of *Immaterialism*" (480). When once the principles of his philosophy had been grasped, everything became intelligible without residue and without correction. Sensible things must be what they appear to be, since their appearance is the only possible reality they can claim or require. *Because* they appear they are fully known as they appear, and to perceive a sensible thing is therefore to be aware of all that it is.

And Berkeley's realism goes deeper still. Not merely does he defend the full reality of sensible things, but he is able to show that all other realms of reality are also, in essence, known as they really are. The mind, which is neither a thing of sense nor like one, is known to us, through 'reflection,' as it really is, and the principles on which we rely for philosophical explanation are known with the same certainty as that with which sensible things are known. There is no substance save spirit, "with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined" (334). There can be no cause save the will of a spirit, and the world itself is sustained by the self-same creative principle that we experience daily and hourly when we raise an image in our minds. As an image, though feebler than an idea of sense, can be observed to have the same stuff in it, so the Will which imprints ideas of sense on our minds is of a piece with the activity we experience when we create an imaginary scene. Everything that is, is concrete; and we have only to look into our minds and their objects to find what concrete reality means. If this be not realism, what is realism?

Berkeley's intention, then, was to be a realist of the strictest sort, because he was also an idealist, and this, in one way, is the intention of every idealist. For no one is an idealist unless he believe that his theory faithfully expresses the being of things. But in that way every philosopher is a realist, whether idealist or not, since all philosophers, except perhaps the sceptics, believe that they can show what reality is, so far as we have means to discover it, and that these means do not fail us utterly. We must therefore inquire whether Berkeley was a realist only in the sense in which every philosopher is a realist, or in some narrower and more

distinctive sense, and whether the character of his idealism has any bearing on this question.

What, then, was the type of Berkeley's idealism? Clearly, his idealism was not that of the Absolutists if, indeed, it had much in common with Absolutism. Berkeley insisted on the full reality of every appearance as it appears, and just because it appears; and the Absolutists deny this. He maintained, again, that finite minds are fully real as they appear, and he neither asserted nor implied that reality is a perfect whole in the metaphysical (not the ethical) sense of perfection. Nor was he an idealist merely because he was a theist and sought to prove that the whole universe exists in order to serve the righteous ends of the Creator, and the convenience of man's estate. For in that sense the orthodox view of Creation (which, despite Berkeley, admits the creation of matter) is idealistic in its purpose. The orthodox doctrine may indeed be cumbrous and unintelligible in parts because it is not of Berkeley's mind on this question, and it might be simplified without any ill effects if theologians came to agree with Berkeley in denying the existence of any matter save that which is, through and through, a sensible thing. But orthodox theology is plainly not idealistic in the usual sense of the term, and yet it insists on the divine purpose that underlies everything. Was Berkeley, then, an idealist just because he asserted the truth of immaterialism? It would be rash to suppose so, for it is very doubtful whether immaterialism, by itself, can possibly be regarded as idealistic. The intelligent layman in philosophy, it is true, believes these theories to be synonymous, but idealistic theories usually mean so much more than immaterialism that the intelligent layman might very well be mistaken. Berkeley himself considered his proof of immaterialism but a step in the more important demonstration of the theistic conception of reality, and his system as a whole unites, and is framed to unite, the two principles of the divine purpose and the immaterialistic constitution of reality. This union of ideal and of idea, of value and mind-dependence is probably requisite for any form of idealism. It is certainly present in Berkeley's theory.

Is Berkeley's idealism, then, inconsistent with realism, as realism is now interpreted? We have no right to maintain so, unless we can carry our analysis much farther than we have done up to the present. Modern realism rarely insists on the value of the universe, still less does it maintain that value is essential to the constitution of *any* universe, but such a view is not necessarily incompatible with realism, and might

conceivably be proved by special arguments to which the realist could not possibly take exception. And although modern realism is not immaterialistic in all senses, it might, for aught we know at the present stage of our argument, be immaterialistic in Berkeley's sense. According to Berkeley matter is only an abstract idea, and, indeed, the most abstract of all ideas; for it is the mere idea of being in general which, in all its abstractness, is yet regarded as the (unintelligible) *substratum* of concrete ideas. These ideas are 'in mind' and cannot possibly be 'in matter' in the same way; yet philosophers suppose that they are. Unless, then, the modern realist interprets matter after the fashion of the 'philosophers' against whom Berkeley contended (and we may be sure that he does not) it is possible that Berkeley's conception of extended and movable things might agree with his. If, on the other hand, the modern realist so interprets matter as to imply that whatever is immediately perceived by sense is literally part of its being, and that the sensible avouch of eyes and ears deserves a confidence as implicit as Hamlet gave them, then it seems possible that Berkeley might be fully in accord with this realism.

What are the cardinal presuppositions of modern realism? The foundations of the theory are laid in a certain analysis of knowledge, in the widest possible sense of that word. Whenever there is knowledge two things must be distinguished, the act of knowing and the object which is known. The act is never identical with the object, and need not share any of the characteristics of the object, except those which may be implied by the fact that both belong to the same universe. While the act must always exist at a definite time, and in connexion with other psychical acts, the object need not exist at all, and, if it exists, may exist at a different time from that of the act. There is an instance of the first if I now think of the number '2,' and of the second if I think to-day of the battle of Actium. Even when act and object are contemporaneous in date and duration, as they probably must be in sense-perception, the two are, none the less, existentially distinct. That is one part of the theory, and it implies, when more fully developed, that the mind consists of various acts (not necessarily of knowledge only), that these acts are not primarily objects of knowledge (if they ever can be), but belong to a different order. To admit this, however, is only a step towards realism, and not the whole of it. The truly realistic part of the doctrine lies in the further assumption that when an act refers to an object, the object is really and necessarily what it is directly for the

act. There is, in the end, no other evidence for the nature of anything than this. The object is revealed to the act as it actually is, whether it be a universal, or a sense particular, or anything else. It need not, of course, be merely what it appears to be, since it may be much more. But the act of knowing neither distorts nor infects the character of the object; and if there is more in the object than appears to the act, that is only a proof of the limitation of knowledge, and not, in any way, a proof of its falsity so far as it has gone. Similarly the mind may be more than its acts (whether these acts can be known through another set of cognitive acts of introspection or are only 'enjoyed' *i.e.*, felt intuitively but not as objects), but it must consist really and truly of these acts, whatever else it may contain. This theory, then, is realistic, in the end, because of its interpretation of the relation between act and object in cognition. The relation is one of direct acquaintance and reality is always revealed in such acquaintance, unless, of course, in the doubtful case of error. And error is so difficult to explain on any theory that realists may be pardoned if they are sometimes unfortunate in their accounts of it.

Now if Berkeley's argument be examined in detail, we find many striking resemblances to the spirit, and sometimes even to the letter, of these contentions; and if we remember the debt which the majority of modern realists owe to the great English philosophers of the eighteenth century, we must admit that there is no intrinsic absurdity in supposing a very close resemblance indeed, however novel the doctrine of neo-realism may appear to be. The question is how far these undoubted resemblances ought to weigh with any one who also considers the respects in which Berkeley and the new realists do not agree; and this is the question I desire to consider in this paper.

The modern realist could scarcely agree with the whole outline of Berkeley's argument, for, to mention no other reason, he would certainly dissent from Berkeley's theory of universals. Berkeley maintained that a universal is either an abstract idea, and therefore an absurdity, or else, like virtue, a thing of the mind. The new realist, on the contrary, regards a universal as an object, having being though not existence, and as real as any other object. But a modern realist need not deny the substance of Berkeley's account of the nature of the things perceived by sense. *Their esse* may be *percipi* in the sense that their apparent nature, without any qualification, is their real nature, and that they exist only when perceived. It would be difficult for any one to agree

with Berkeley's further contention that our sense-presentations exist eternally in the mind of God, and are imprinted on our minds by his will. A permanence of this sort is quite out of keeping with the presuppositions of his argument. If he proves anything concerning sensible things he proves that the reality of what I perceive through sense is its *percipi for me*, and his psychology can furnish no evidence of the direct apprehension by any one mind of the presentations of any other mind, or of the creation of any idea in our minds by the act of a will other than our own. Direct experience *must* be wanting in these cases, and Berkeley's account of the manner in which sensible things may be supposed to exist in the mind of God is too inconsistent to be credible. God, he says, perceives nothing by sense as we do (459), he cannot suffer pain (458), or have sensations that are in any way corporeal as ours are. While, then, the archetypes of colours, shapes and sounds may exist in God's mind, their reality for him cannot be the same as their reality for us; and sensible things, as we mean and intend them, must be shown to be real in their own right if their reality can be proved at all. But if this part of Berkeley's theory is inconsistent with the rest, the rest may still be consistent with modern realism.

Indeed Berkeley's insistence, frequently reiterated, on the reality of sensible things in the form in which they appear and just because they appear seems a statement of the theory of neo-realism that colours, shapes and sounds must be accepted at their face value whatever the difficulties. And if sensible things are in the mind *only* in the sense that they are the direct objects of mind, it would be hard to look for a fuller measure of agreement between two theories widely separated in time and in form of expression. Again Berkeley's view of what common sense is pleased to call one thing is (except, for the nominalism of it) identical with some neo-realistic accounts. Take the following passage, for instance: "Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual, the endless number or confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they

refer to one name, and consider as one thing. . . . My aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances? It will not thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else; except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to speculation" (463-464). Let nominalism be superseded by a more adequate conception, and there is a very short step from such a theory as this to the view that a thing is a class or a construction of sensibles, or that its sameness can be explained on a less rigid, but quite intelligible, theory of identity.

It would be absurd, of course, to try to construe Berkeley's theory as if it contained all that is valuable in modern realism both in expression and emphasis. No philosopher can anticipate others in that way, and no historian of philosophy can reasonably look for more than a general agreement in a tendency. When we examine more carefully, however, we find that this partial agreement in certain conclusions does not necessarily indicate the same measure of agreement in the principles on which the conclusions are based, and this is the fundamental question.

To begin with, although Berkeley's repeated assertion of the radical distinction between the nature and type of existence of unthinking things, or ideas of sense (whose *esse* is *percipi*), and the nature and type of existence of thinking things (whose *esse* is *percipere* and *velle*), seems in itself very similar to the contentions of the new realists, especially when considered in conjunction with his denial, already quoted, that ideas of sense are modes or attributes of mind, it is very doubtful whether this resemblance is as close as it appears, at least with regard to the interpretation of mind, and the psychology of perceiving. Unfortunately, however,

this important question is not very easy to answer, since there is considerable obscurity in Berkeley's account of these matters, and any interpretation of his meaning is liable to the perils of conjecture. Indeed, his analysis of spirit is in itself perplexing. In the opening paragraph of the *Principles* he seems to make an exhaustive survey of the objects of human knowledge, and to declare, like a dutiful follower of Locke, that these are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses (ideas of sensation), or else the ideas we have when we attend to the passions and operations of the mind (ideas of reflection), or, lastly, ideas of memory and imagination. But in a later part of the same work (§ 86) he declares roundly that human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads,—that of ideas and that of spirits, and subsequently (§ 89)¹ amends this division still further by admitting relations also. This is an astonishing divergence, unless we adopt the impossible interpretation that spirits are merely ideas of reflection; and the discrepancy is a serious hindrance to a useful comparison with any other theory whatsoever. Nor is the obscurity lessened by Berkeley's admission that we cannot have an idea of spirit except in a large and general sense (336), or by his belated, and in many ways verbal, distinction between *notion* and *idea*.² Still there is a real difficulty, as well as a verbal one in this connexion, and modern realists feel the difficulty themselves when they raise the question whether introspection can properly be regarded as the contemplation of an 'enjoyment'. Acts of mind are primarily enjoyed and not contemplated, and if they can be contemplated in a large sense only, if at all, that, after all, is precisely Berkeley's problem.

Again we should not, perhaps, lay very much stress on the extremely ambiguous account of 'reflection' that the *Principles* affords. It is confusing, no doubt, to be informed that spirits, passions, and relations are all known through reflection (257, 307), except in the case of the spirits or passions of others, and also that we have, and can have, no idea of spirit; and I shall return to this point. But we need not find a difficulty in the opening paragraph of the *Principles* unless we choose to make one. It is curious psychology, certainly, to consider sensible things, passions and images

¹ This amendment was not introduced until the second edition of the *Principles* (307).

² Berkeley's doctrine of notions (whose objects are spirits and relations), also appears as an amendment in the second edition. In the first edition he does not distinguish between notion and idea, and uses the terms indifferently.

as objects of knowledge in precisely the same sense. Sensible things and images have the same relation to the mind (if their cause is ignored), and Berkeley is probably right in regarding both as made of the same stuff though differing in regularity and in the way in which they arise. The modern realist, at all events, will not cavil at this interpretation. But while sensible things and images are primarily objects for the mind, the passions and operations of the mind are not, but are essentially states or acts of mind; and this distinction is of the essence of neo-realism. Berkeley, however, may not have meant to assert more in this opening paragraph than the plain matter of fact that the passions and operations of the mind are in some sense or other capable of being considered 'by reflection'.

However that may be, there is undoubtedly a serious divergence between Berkeley and the modern realists with regard to the interpretation of the operations of the mind. For the modern realist an act of cognition, or any other mental act, is a real entity having a distinctive subsistence. Berkeley's theory takes no account of this. He makes no attempt at classifying the operations of the mind and merely says that spirit has the power of willing, thinking and perceiving ideas. If willing, thinking and perceiving are therefore to be understood as operations of the mind, we have no more particular account of what they are, although, perhaps, we are entitled to conjecture that while these operations of mind, or some of them, are, strictly speaking, ideas of reflection, spirit itself, though known through reflection, is not an idea at all. We cannot, therefore, infer from Berkeley's explanations that there are such things as particular acts of mind, still less can we look for an explanation of their *esse*. His introspective analysis of the mind proceeds on quite different lines. "*Thing or being*," he says (307), "is the most general name of all: it comprehends under it two kinds, entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing in common but the name, *viz. spirits* and *ideas*. The former are active, indivisible, incorruptible substances: the latter are inert, fleeting, perishable passions or dependent beings; which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances." This is the sum of the doctrine of spirit which Berkeley, apparently, obtains through 'reflection,' and it is repeated with equal emphasis and greater detail in the *Hylas*: "I know what I mean by the terms *I* and *myself*; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind,

Spirit or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts and perceives. I say *indivisible*, because unextended; and *unextended*, because extended, figured movable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea" (447-448).

It is very doubtful whether the former of these passages can be reconciled in any way with neo-realism, and it seems in hopeless conflict with the supposed denial, in § 49, that ideas are attributes of mind; for it asserts both that ideas are passions of the mind, and that mind is the substance of them. This question may be postponed for the moment, but it is clear, at least, that the new realist's analysis of act and object is very differently described in Berkeley's account of spirit. We may argue, indeed, that Berkeley's view of spirit agrees fundamentally with that of the new realists because of his insistence on the ultimate distinction, as a matter of analysis, between that which thinks and that which is thought: and that the discrepancy is only an unfortunate legacy of the Cartesian *Cogito* and of Locke's unqualified acceptance thereof, combined with an extremely meagre, and indeed untenable, doctrine of substance. But this exposition takes a great deal for granted, and seems particularly hazardous in view of a certain discussion in the *Hylas* which, at the beginning at least, has a very modern flavour.

This discussion (405-408) is too long to quote in full, and a summary must therefore suffice. "The sensation," Hylas remarks, "I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which there is something perceived; and this I call the *object*. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip"; and Philonous appears to understand this statement in its modern sense. "If I take you right," he says, "you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not . . . and this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing; but whatever beside is implied in a perception may?" He proceeds, however, to turn the edge of the objection by insisting that nothing except a volition can properly be called an act; and although Hylas does not scruple to accuse him of 'artfulness' at an earlier stage of this very discussion, he does not seem to find any lack of candour in the final definition of the meaning of an act. Philonous is therefore able to prove that neither *smelling*, nor *seeing*, nor *feeling pain*, nor *any other perception* are actions, since none of them is a volition, or in-

cludes any element of volition. All are equally passions or sensations in the soul.

It would be easy to lay undue emphasis on this passage; for Hylas was not enough of a prophet to see the uses that might be made of his distinction, and neither he nor Philonous seemed able to realise that an act of mind may be *adynamic* and neither active nor passive. Still the passage itself is noteworthy, and we might wish that Philonous had allowed Hylas to press his point a little farther. Granting that ideas are inert or passive, mere objects on which the mind can operate, what are we to make of perceiving, on on Berkeley's own theory, if the only possible activity be that of volition? Spirit, he tells us, is that which thinks, perceives and wills, and it is essentially an active substance. Is the perceiving and thinking, then, passive as well as the idea, or is it not? To say that all perceptions are passive, and to cite as instances smelling, seeing and feeling seems certainly to ignore the distinction between perception and percept, the seeing and the seen. If ideas are passive because imprinted on our minds (*i.e.* on account of their origin only), is the perceiving of them also passive and also imprinted? And when we contemplate ideas which, like images, are summoned by our own acts of volition, what then? Are the images passive and also the imagining of them, while the creative volition alone is active: or is the imagining active as well as the volition: or are all three active: or is there really no distinction between imagining and image? Berkeley did not consider these questions, and naturally supplies no answer. But he certainly seems to be inconsistent in regarding perceiving as an operation of the active substance mind, and at the same time declaring that the seeing of the tulip as well as the shape and colour seen are passive and 'in the mind'. One wonders whether Philonous did not heave a sigh of relief when Hylas ceased to ply him with such very awkward questions.

Even if Berkeley's theory of spirit, however, is very different from the new realist's account of the mind, there may still seem to be sufficient agreement to make it possible to argue that there is no essential difference between the two theories with respect to the *status* of sensible things. The obvious objection that realism insists on the independence of such objects whereas Berkeley asserts that these are necessarily 'in mind,' may cease to be insuperable when the meaning of 'independence' and of being 'in mind' has been more fully considered. Neo-realists give somewhat different accounts of what they understand by the sensible world, but

these differences do not necessarily result from a different interpretation of independence. Indeed 'independence' need not mean more than the assertion that the object of a cognitive act is distinct from that act, given to it and not made by it, appearing as it really is and not clothed upon by the cognitive act itself. Independence, in this sense, seems to be fully consistent with Berkeley's system. It is compatible with the view that a percept, for instance, varies with each individual mind and with the same mind at different times, and thus seems to depend, and, in some ways, actually does depend, on the mind of an individual subject. What we perceive may be the joint product of an individual mind and some other cause, or, again, something in the specific constitution of each individual mind may have the effect of compelling every particular mind to select a slightly different object of perception from an unlimited array of possible sensibles. The new realist may welcome either of those alternatives, provided always that if the objects of sense are in some ways dependent on individual minds, they are not so dependent in so far as the act of cognition itself is concerned. And it is instructive to notice that both these alternatives may claim support in the *Principles*. The ideas of sense which we call things are certainly, on Berkeley's theory, joint-products of the will of God which imprints them and of the individual mind which accepts them passively (unless, indeed, the mind is so completely passive in this matter as not to count at all, which is very realistic indeed), so that they need not be actual except when they appear, and are actual just as they appear. But if it be maintained that such ideas (not all ideas, of course) must also have a more permanent existence than that of being the potential objects of divine volition and human acceptance, then Berkeley's theory that these ideas are known permanently by the divine understanding may be cited in support of this view without any apparent implication of any further assumptions that are inconsistent with the new realism.

It is clear, however, that the mental character of the direct objects of perception may be understood in a sense which is altogether inconsistent with any form of neo-realism, and one important problem is whether Berkeley's explanation of the way in which ideas are 'in mind' does or does not involve this sense. If the analysis of knowledge itself implies that the objects of knowledge, just because they are objects of knowledge, must themselves be regarded as parts, or elements or aspects, in the knowledge of them, then it is impossible also to hold that these objects are independent of

knowledge in any real sense. And similar arguments hold if the analysis, not of any knowledge, but of some particular kind of knowledge (*e.g.* sense-perception) is in question. If the new realist admits that in fact certain objects only exist when perceived, or are in some other ways peculiar to individual minds, he cannot regard the analysis of any form of knowledge as a proof of this. His theory of knowing or perceiving does not in itself imply any sort of limitation to the independence of the objects which are known or perceived, and dare not have such an implication. The limitations to the complete independence of the mind on the part of its objects, if they exist, must be due to quite special reasons, to which the character of the act of knowing is wholly irrelevant. As Berkeley never considered this question in precisely this form we can only guess at what he might have said regarding it.

It would certainly be a mistake to argue that Berkeley supposed every possible object of knowledge to be mind-constituted or mind-dependent just because it must enter into some relation with mind when it is known. There is no evidence that he believed that our own minds, or the mind of God, as we know them, are in any way constituted or modified by our knowledge of them. There is a relation in such cases and any object which is known is therefore in one sense relative to mind. But Berkeley has no consistent theory of relations, and we cannot maintain that he considered them merely subjective, although he certainly regards relative terms like great and small as subjective because relative (263). Accordingly, the fact of the existence of a relation need not be decisive in our interpretation of his meaning. But what of our knowledge of unthinking things, or ideas of sense? Is it part of the analysis of a knowledge of *them* that they are 'in mind' in a way that is inconsistent with neo-realism?

Berkeley frequently defines what he means by 'in mind' and 'out of mind,' and, on the whole, does so consistently. It is true that he sometimes shows a tendency to confuse this metaphorical 'inness' and 'outness' with a literal spatial interpretation. Thus he thinks it necessary to maintain that distance or 'outness' is never directly perceived (279-280), and in the *Theory of Vision* states explicitly that the primary and immediate objects of vision 'neither are nor appear to be without the mind or at any distance off' (150). It is hard to see why he should have gone to such extreme and (as most would think) absurd lengths had he not supposed that this extreme was implied in his theory; and it is plain that if ideas are extended at all it is irrelevant whether they are extended

in two dimensions or in three. In either case the extension cannot literally belong to that unextended thing which is the mind. 'In mind,' to be brief, cannot mean 'in the body' when the body itself is an idea among other ideas (421). But apart from these occasional lapses (if they are lapses) Berkeley consistently interprets 'inness' and 'outness' in a sense in which spatial implications are ignored, just as etymology is very properly ignored in the modern use of words like attention, apprehension, or combination. "Look you, Hylas," he exclaims, "when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself" (470). This passage explains briefly what Berkeley reiterates again and again. Ideas of sense (though not ideas of reflection or of imagination) are external to the individual mind in one way since they are caused by the will of the deity; but they are internal as they are perceived because, when they are perceived, they are the ideas of that particular mind, or belong to it.

If this explanation of the phrase 'in mind' means *only* that these ideas are perceived by the mind, then nobody ought to object to it, since no one in his senses can deny that ideas are perceived, and Berkeley asserts so frequently that this is the sum of his meaning that it would be very hard to maintain that his analysis of sense-perception, in itself, implies anything that the new realists are unwilling to admit. On the other hand it would not be very easy to show that his analysis does not conflict with theirs, especially in view of the parallel cases which he mentions to illustrate his argument.

Although Berkeley shows wonderful fertility, patience and resource in proving, expounding and defending his theory, he never conceals his belief that the issue itself is extraordinarily simple, and can be shown to be intuitively certain 'in a line or two'. This intuitive certainty, then, must be considered the ultimate foundation of his theory to the best of his knowledge and belief, and the phrase 'in mind' must be interpreted in the light of it. Have the new realists a similar intuition, or have they not? If they have, it is fair to claim that Berkeley agrees with realism in principle; if they have not, this claim must, on the whole, be disallowed, despite appearances to the contrary. It would still be true, no doubt, that many of Berkeley's statements

express all that the new realists desire or intend, and it would be possible to argue that the differences depend upon mere misunderstandings which subsequent reflection might easily remove; but the fact would still remain that part of Berkeley's expressed intention was incompatible with modern realism, and that this part must be considered fundamental.

What Berkeley proclaims as an intuitive certainty is, like most intuitions, expressed most clearly in its negative form. He argues repeatedly and emphatically that the *absolute* existence of sensible things is a manifest contradiction, a 'direct repugnancy'. Such things must be the ideas of a knowing mind, and cannot exist unless they are in such a mind. The new realist, on the other hand, seems to maintain precisely the contrary, for he asserts the independence of such things, and denies that the act of perceiving is in any way relevant to the question, whether or not, for other reasons, the direct objects of sense-perception exist in fact when not perceived. Is it possible to reconcile these views?

An intuition cannot itself be proved, and must either be accepted or rejected; but arguments about it are permissible both with a view to defining its scope and meaning and to inducing a readier acceptance of it. And the mention of analogous cases is the best way of securing these ends. This is the course which Berkeley pursues. He points out that the majority of 'ideas' are indubitably things which permit only of a mental existence. "That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term *exist* when applied to sensible things" (258-259). There is a certain difference, he admits, between those classes of ideas, but the difference is irrelevant to the issue. Ideas of sense are caused, in part at least, by something other than the mind, but their nature is not necessarily affected by their origin. "I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without resembling them" (267). And the other distinctive peculiarities attaching to ideas of sense, such as their coherence, orderliness or intensity, are also irrelevant to the problem of the mental *status*

of all ideas, though they are important in many ways. Can this intuition, then, read in the light of these analogies, be accepted by the new realists?

It must be admitted that images are objects of the mind in precisely the same sense as percepts are; and the new realist therefore concludes that both are independent. Berkeley, on the other hand, concludes that because images are 'in mind' beyond dispute, percepts must also be 'in mind' after the same fashion. Is not this a plain difference, and one which depends on the analysis of knowledge? It certainly would be if the intuition referred to sensation and imagination as species of knowing, but the intuition, as is plain from the context, refers to the ideas, *i.e.* to the objects and to the meaning of *their* existence. And this may be enough to permit the abstract possibility of reconciling Berkeley's position with that of the new realists. At the same time we must also remember that if the intuition refers only to the characteristics of certain objects, the ideas of reflection are also stated to have these same characteristics, and, therefore, we would seem to be justified in concluding that Berkeley supposed it to be intuitively evident that ideas of sense are 'in mind' precisely as the passions and operations of the mind are, and from the same necessity. Now it is evident to any reasonable psychologist that feelings are 'in the mind,' because it is intuitively evident that they are 'of the mind'; but if ideas of sense are comparable to feelings in this respect, the principles of realism are directly controverted.

Modern psychologists distinguish feeling from sensation, and one of the principal grounds of distinction is that a sensation (or, more strictly, a sense-presentation) is primarily an object of cognition, while feeling, if it can be attended to, is not primarily such an object. It is a way of experiencing, not something experienced. But Berkeley was not a modern psychologist, though modern psychology is deeply indebted to him, and it would be unfair to read distinctions into his expressions which he did not explicitly realise, especially in view of the fact that he took but little pains to define what he meant by 'reflection' or the ideas thereof, and, indeed, scarcely did more than repeat what Locke had already said. At the same time we cannot ignore the passages in which he seems to identify feeling and sensation, and we cannot deny that the passivity of ideas, which is an essential element in his exposition of them, is most naturally interpreted to mean that they, like feelings and passions, are *passive states of mind*. Let us, then, consider these questions briefly.

As we have seen, Berkeley includes the passions and operations of the mind under the term 'idea,' as well as ideas of sense and images. Now the passions and operations of the mind are parts of the mind, and the inference would seem to be that sense-ideas and images are also parts of the mind, and that it is intuitively evident that all have the same kind of being. This inference may certainly be disputed on the grounds that Berkeley also asserts that unthinking things are in mind only in the sense that they can be contemplated by the mind, and that he need not mean more in his classification of ideas than that the passions can be attended to as well as sensibles and images, and that, when they are attended to, they show very similar characteristics. But if the inference may be disputed it is certainly suggested. Again we must remember that the essential similarity of sensation to certain forms of feeling is prominent in many of Berkeley's arguments. Philonous in his argument with Hylas begins by asserting that extreme heat is identical with extreme pain, and that pain is indubitably mental, and proceeds to apply this argument to cases where moderate pain or pleasure occur. The illustration is less important than it seems since *physical* pains and pleasures are in question, and these are manifestly organic sensations and not really comparable, except in their effects, to the *psychical* experiences which we also call pains and pleasures. They are bodily, and not mental except in the sense, if there is one, in which all sensibles are mental. But Berkeley, at least, did not contemplate this distinction, and the new realist must.

The same conclusion is suggested by the implications of the passivity of ideas on Berkeley's theory of them. It is true that this 'passivity' need not mean more and perhaps does not mean more than the assertion that these ideas are (1) neither created nor controlled by us, and (2) cannot directly affect one another. But the most natural interpretation is that ideas are passive states of mind, and 'in mind' as a passive condition of that substance; and that we attend to them in the way that we attend to any other states of mind. Such a view implies subjective idealism, and it is clear that Berkeley did not intend to be a subjective idealist, and was a very inconsistent one if some of his arguments can scarcely be interpreted in any other light. For that reason it is fair to emphasise those of his arguments and explanations which have a radically different tenour, both as regards his general theory of knowledge, and his theory of sense-perception; and some of these arguments have close

affinities to modern realism. But it is likely that he would have answered the realists much in the way that a distinguished opponent of realism has answered them. "When I am told that the content of sense or object of thought may therefore be something quite non-mental or even physical, I am, to speak plainly, inclined to feel myself the victim of sophistry. It seems obvious at first sight that a blue is as psychical as a pain or an inferential transition. And though you may argue at length that it is nothing but an external object, I feel all the time that I am being defrauded. You have put the vital character of a certain experience into what you call an act, and I admit that it is specially observable in connexion with a certain function. But now you tell me that the main thing in an object, what I value in it and what I want it for, is removed and abolished by the distinction, and the experience as such is left for dead."¹ I wish Berkeley had not meant this, for I should feel defrauded if it were so; but I am afraid he did, on the whole.

Accordingly, Berkeley's intuitive certainty that every idea must be 'in mind' implies an interpretation of 'idea' which is foreign to neo-realism; and, since both views depend upon a certain intuition of the nature of knowledge and of its objects, we can scarcely deny that there is an inconsistency between the two intuitions. Moreover, although Berkeley may not have been sensible of all the consequences of his theory, it is clear that he believed that ideas were 'in mind' because they were necessarily *in a substance*, and because spirit was the only possible substance in which they could be. He did not suppose, indeed, that this fact affected the content of ideas in any way, or was relevant to their being what they declare themselves to be, extended and movable objects to which the mind can attend; but he certainly asserted that mind was the substance of them, and that they were 'in mind' for that reason. His proof that ideas of sense cannot exist without a mind demands the assumption that they must exist in something, so that, if they did not exist in mind they would have no existence at all (260, 261). They require a *substratum*, and, being ideas, they cannot have an unthinking *substratum*. "It is acknowledged on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hands.

¹ Bosanquet, *The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects*, p. 30. "Non-mental," "external" and "physical" must be understood on a realistic analysis as referring simply to characteristics which directly appear in sense.

So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or support wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of their *reality*, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances, or *spirits*, which act, and think and perceive them" (308). Minds are the substances of all ideas.

It is a far cry from this to modern realism. In the modern analysis these 'ideas' are themselves substances, or parts of substances, and not only can, but do, exist in their own right; and Berkeley never seriously realised this possibility, though some of his expressions, taken by themselves, appear to point in this direction. We may argue, indeed, that this portion of Berkeley's theory is inconsistent with his denial of paradox, and his belief that he was interpreting the mind of the vulgar. But we cannot deny that such was his theory, nor that it was the principal basis for his certainty that ideas could not be in matter, *i.e.* that the philosopher's account of matter implied that an unthinking substance could *have an idea*.¹ And it is a plain consequence that Berkeley was not a realist in the main outlines of his theory. Are we to suppose, then, that his explicit denial that the objects of sense-perception are *modifications* of the mind is simply an inconsistency which he had not recognised, or desired to conceal? It is an inconsistency, though the inconsistency is not by any means so flagrant as it looks, when the context is considered. The concluding sentences of the paragraph where this denial occurs run as follows: "As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition 'a die is hard, extended and square,' they will have it that the word *die* denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard, extended and square is not to attribute those qualities to a

¹ Cf. Reid, *Inquiry* (Hamilton's edition, p. 131): "Their paradoxes were only an abuse of words; for when they maintain, as an important modern discovery, that there is no heat in the fire, they mean no more than that the fire does not feel heat, which everyone knew before". Also *Intellectual Powers* (*ibid.*, p. 316): "The philosopher says there is no heat in the fire, meaning that the fire has not the sensation of heat".

subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die." Berkeley's meaning, therefore, is that ideas are not modes of mind, because a mode is itself unintelligible, and the corresponding passage in the *Hylas* is readily interpreted in the same way. The so-called modes of a die are just the die as it is, and nothing is gained by calling them modes. Ideas are not the modes or attributes of anything, because there are no modes or attributes; and therefore they are not modes or attributes of mind. It follows that he should have meant no more by calling the mind a substance than the meaning he supposed he could obtain through introspection. But if he had realised this fully his argument would have taken a different form.

It is true that any theory which maintains that ideas require a mind to be their substance and support, and yet are not 'modes, or attributes, or properties' of that substance is expressed in a peculiar fashion. It sounds like an assertion that such and such an article was not rejected by the editor of *The Economist*, but that the editor of *The Economist* regretted he was unable to make use of the communication. But Berkeley never attempted to think out the implications of substance, and it does not require a portentous strain on the imagination to suppose that his colleagues in Dublin, when once they had grasped the notion that ideas, on his theory, were modes of mind and not of matter, were so crabbed, stubborn, and scholastic in their objections that Berkeley, in self-defence, refused to argue in terms of mode and subject at all. If he had seen that the question was not merely verbal he might have remodelled his theory, somewhat in the direction of the new realism.

III.—THE PLOT OF PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*.

(Continued from p. 176.)

BY P. S. BURRELL.

VII.

WE must now return to Plato's actual doctrine as regards the analysis of society. He accepts the criterion, accepted also by the sophists, that that conduct is to be chosen which enables a man to do well and to fare well. He takes the point of view that fundamentally man seeks what is best for himself: that man is a bundle of wants which he desires to satisfy as well as he possibly can: that his good is the satisfaction of *ἐπιθυμία*, and that he wants to have the greatest amount of good possible. How then is this programme of life to be best realised? The assumption is that human nature is wholly absorbed in the satisfaction of the most imperious needs, and, in the first instance, in the satisfaction of those needs which are most elementary, and most fundamental to his life—food, clothing, shelter. And it must be remembered that the claims of the *individual*, according to the sophistic point of view, are paramount. What each man has to decide is what is the best line for *each individual* to take for *himself* independently of all other considerations. Each man must be regarded as dominated by one single principle, the desire to do absolutely the best for himself. With such assumptions to start from the intrusion of any ideal, or altruistic elements, existing alongside of self-regarding impulses, would have been obviously out of place. The sophists had taken their stand on self-love pure and simple, and Socrates must do the same. As Glaucon had said, let us put on every man's finger the ring of Gyges, and see where it will take him. We shall see every one taking precisely the same road. The sophist said all would be found to be pursuing *πλεονεξία*. Socrates similarly assumes that every one is pursuing the same end, but his business is to show that it will lead men in a direction diametrically opposite to that declared to be the only one by the sophists. By the

enunciation of his principle (οἶόμενος αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι, p. 369) Socrates says in effect, Let us regard each man as the incarnation of self-love, or selfishness, in the sense of being desirous to satisfy his own individual wants in the best conceivable way, and let us see where this principle will take him, what will 'become' of him (*cf.* the method of looking at the *genesis* of society (γίγνομένην πόλιν, p. 369). What 'becomes of him,' as Socrates and every one else must admit, is a state of community or society (γίγνεται τοῖον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ ἀντάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἶε ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν; οὐδεμίαν, ἦ δ' ὅς, p. 369). Human nature, being what it is acknowledged to be by every one—and the universality of the admission seems to be suggested by the words ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, for the truth is recognised by every one who will adopt the method of Socrates, reflection and strive to 'know himself'—these are the necessary results. Given the conditions, the result must inevitably follow.

Socrates then, starts with universal principles as his *ὁμολογούμενα*, which are assented to by his opponents and indeed by every one else who will take the trouble to reflect. Man has many wants; he cannot satisfy them properly by his own unaided exertions. If he is not to leave them unsatisfied, his only alternative is to supply them by somebody else's exertions. But others will not work for him, unless he also works for them. Further, when a number of persons are working together to supply the general needs they will achieve their end best, if their activities are well organised, *i.e.* if each puts forth his best efforts in the best way. A very little experience shows that a man will produce more work, if he sticks to one kind of work; that practice will facilitate his work as well as improve it. He will produce more and better work and with greater ease by so doing. Besides, different persons are naturally endowed with different capacities. One man can do one kind of work better than another. The condition of success for the most elementary kind of society conceivable is that each should labour for all, and that it is only in a society thus organised for mutual help that each does the best for himself. In any other way, there is less produced, it is of an inferior quality, and it is obtained with a greater expenditure of labour. Consequently, the amount available for the satisfaction of any given individual's wants would be less than it might be. Society then is a coming together and a working together with a view to the satisfaction of each individual's wants in the best manner.

In what particular way does society confer this benefit? Thus. A must not only work for himself, but must also work for B, C, D, . . . and similarly B must work not only for himself but for A, C, D . . . as well, and so on *ad infinitum*. But in so doing, it must be noted that A, B, C, etc., are not making *sacrifices*, each of his individual welfare. Each is promoting it in the best way possible. Each is doing what he thinks best for himself. It is only by working for B, that A is working in the best manner for himself, and *vice versa*. In fact, to supply his own wants as well as he can, a man must also supply the wants of others as well as he can. The best way of working for yourself or your own interests, is to work for others and their interests to the utmost of your power. This, one may say, is the paradox of society, the truth of which is obvious on the most elementary plane of social order. But it is not so obvious, as society develops in complexity; and the object of the *Republic* is to show that it is nevertheless true all through, right up to the highest plane, and to bring the truth into clear light. Give and take, it is argued, is the essence of society; and this exchange is recognised to be good—the good of every individual. One man exchanges with another, because, as Socrates says, “he thinks it is better for *himself*” (p. 369). Exchange—mutual help,—mutual supply of needs—is the good of all and the good of each: and these goods cannot be disentangled. Thus the idea or principle of good is operating at the beginning of society, is, in fact, creating it, making it ‘become’ (*cf. γίγνεται πόλις*). Society, *i.e.* the satisfaction of individual good, comes into being by partaking of the idea or principle of good, and it comes into being in the best possible manner, *i.e.* is ideal, or ‘natural’ (*κατὰ φύσιν*), if it participates in the idea of good in the highest degree, *i.e.* if the principle of good is absolutely unimpeded in its operation.

Again the resulting good, in which the interest of each is absolutely *identical* with the interests of every one else, in which each secures his own profit by securing the profit of all others, depends on the continuous and unimpaired operation of an all-important principle, *viz.*, that each man must do the kind of work which he alone can do or which he can best do. The excellence of the good which results from the co-operation of individuals is exactly proportioned to the degree in which this principle is put into practice. If it is observed to the full, an ideal, perfectly ‘natural’ state of things comes to pass. If it is violated, the excellence of the state diminishes according to the degree of its violation; if it is not observed at all, society dissolves altogether. After delineat-

ing the state which would grow up according to nature if the individual's search for his own best good were conducted under the direction of the principle that each should do his own proper work, Socrates proceeds later to describe the principal deviations or perversions which result from departing more and more from the principles of 'nature'. When the state has reached its full development, this principle is recognised as the principle of justice, the working of which has been observed in the concrete life of the state. And so justice turns out to be the principle of life and health and strength in the social organism. And then it becomes ridiculous to ask whether justice is good and profitable. You might as well ask whether health is good and disease evil. When the justice which animates the ideal state—the state which would result if every one whole-heartedly and with clear insight pursued his own best good—is seen to be "beautiful and strong," the problem of making a choice between it and injustice disappears.

These then are the first principles, the ἀρχαί, with which Socrates starts: first, that society comes into being, because each one 'thinks it is better for himself' to co-operate with his fellows; and, secondly, that each man shall do to the best of his ability the work for which he is best fitted by nature. If he can secure acknowledgment of them, and prove that they lead to conclusions precisely the opposite of the views held by his opponents, he must win his case. All depends, therefore, on the beginning, and it is desirable to show how subtly he has turned his enemies' guns on their own position. It might be objected that his argument has only subjective validity, being an argument ἐξ ὁμολογίας and that such arguments have cogency only for those who make the admissions; that they possess only the validity of the *argumentum ad hominem*. But the objection falls if the things admitted are things which every one must admit, are, in fact, first principles, which are self-evident to all upon reflection. Now what Socrates has done is exactly this, that he has adopted as his starting-point principles or truths which every one would recognise. The criterion πᾶς ἄν εἶποι is at the root of his 'dogmatic' constructive argument no less than it was at the root of his destructive criticism of the moral formula of Cephalus (p. 331). But his argument has special cogency against his sophistic opponents, for he has adopted, though he has turned it to very different account, the very doctrine of self-love and self-interest, which was the sheet anchor of ancient sophistic ethics.

VIII.

Having shown that Socrates has obtained a firm principle for the foundation of his argument, let us now observe how he uses and develops it. We shall see that the principle is responsible not only for the very existence or beginning of society, but also for its expansion and development, and that it is always resorted to as the means of overcoming the objections that may be raised at important stages of the argument. A summary of the various applications of the principle will serve to make this clear.

(1) Through its operation the original city of three or four men expands into the *ὅλην πόλιν*. Socrates then stops and reviews the kind of life obtaining in such a community, with a rudimentary, healthy, animal existence. Glaucon is not satisfied with such a state, but he has nothing to say against the principle which brought it into being, and which he tentatively identifies with justice. But the only way to get beyond the uncivilised state is by a further development of the principle. Just as society begins because man has elementary wants to be supplied, so society advances because he has further wants. To reach a more civilised condition it is necessary to fill out the city with more callings and professions. Thus the transition to the *τρυφῶσα πόλις* is effected (p. 373).

(2) But such a city will get involved in war through being compelled to take a slice of territory from its neighbours. This will bring the states into conflict, and for self-defence another addition to the population—an important new class—is required. The idea of a professional army, specially trained to fight and defend the country, takes Glaucon by surprise, and he asks if the citizens will not be sufficient and will not be able to fight their own battles themselves. Socrates disagrees, a lengthy passage is devoted to proving the necessity of a special class and the way he does so is to bring up his *ἀρχή*, and show that it is all the more important to follow it, just because of the unique value of the guardian class. We see then that the state can neither spring into existence, nor maintain itself, nor continue growing, unless the principle, which is ultimately revealed to be justice, operates. The state, however, must be considered not only in its internal, but also in its external relations, and of course its internal growth necessarily affects its external relations. And it is found that the state cannot preserve its life from external injury any more than it can maintain its internal health, without the application of Socrates' first

principle. Hence the ἀρχή, pursued to its logical consequences, calls into existence the distinction of classes, more especially the fundamental distinction of (1) the ruled and (2) the rulers.

This passage furnishes a good example of the method of Socrates and the mastery he secured over his opponents by obtaining their acknowledgment at the start of principles which they cannot gainsay. All that Socrates has to do is to reveal to them the consequences which they have thereby implicitly admitted also. As soon as they object to an application of the ἀρχή which sounds at first sight novel or paradoxical, Socrates casts it in their teeth, and makes them submit. Thus when the city goes to war, a new want arises, *viz.*, defence against the enemy. How then is this to be supplied? Exactly as before. A special class of skilled defenders must be formed. Otherwise you contravene the principle, which is so clear in the case of a simple and elementary *κοινωνία*, that a cobbler must cobble and not stray beyond his last. On precisely the same grounds, a guardian must guard and do nothing but guarding. If he has other irons in the fire, if he lapses into a busybody, the city will be unable to resist attack and expose itself to general disintegration. So then Socrates deals with the guardians precisely in the same manner as he dealt with the husbandmen, the shoemakers, and the builders in the first nucleus of the state.

Meanwhile the importance of the principle becomes clearer as the city develops in complexity. Considering the importance of the business of self-defence and rule, it is of the greatest moment that the guardians must stick exclusively to their duties; and in order to avoid any mistakes it is as important to select them as to train them. For what is the alternative? The city enters on the road to ruin. To find what we want, we must know what to find. And so the question arises, What exactly is a guardian, strictly so called? What is the real meaning of the word? What sort of nature and character should a guardian have, if he is to do his proper work? Clearly, therefore, the long discussion in the education of the guardians is no mere digression, but a direct and necessary consequence of the ἀρχή originally admitted. It is a mistake to suppose that the rest of the *Republic* is little better than a framework for a theory of education. The latter occupies a large part of the work, because the sophistic theory of politics and morals involved the all-important question of the right relation between the ruler and the ruled—in other words, the question of the

right use of power and the relations between might and right. And this question cannot be decided unless it is determined what sort of person a ruler ought to be—what 'ruling' means in a πόλις κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθείσα. The answer to the question is an integral portion of Socrates' constructive theory, and accordingly furnishes him with the opportunity of developing the ideas which he only hinted at in Book I., in repudiating the notion that the function of the ruler is to be a wolf in the fold and to fleece the sheep (p. 374).

(3) The training of the guardians is fairly plain sailing at first, being such as is inevitable for those whose philosophic nature and θυμός are to be developed in due proportion in the early stages. But a difficulty arises when the stage of literary training as such is reached. The question is whether imitative literature is to be allowed to exercise influence upon the guardians. And the answer is found by applying the same principle. "We must go where the wind of the argument carries us. Does not the answer follow from what we have said already, that each man can practise well one profession but not many, and that if he attempts more and meddle with many, he will fail in all to attain creditable distinction." "The same man cannot imitate many things as well as one" (pp. 394-397).

(4) Similarly the principle is applied to the question of doctoring (p. 406), but perhaps (5) its most impressive application is at the end of Book III., where the special manner of life of the guardians is described, and at the beginning of Book IV., where the objection is raised that the guardians cannot be happy, because, though omnipotent, they do not use their power for their own selfish aggrandisement. At first sight, and in the abstract, the objection might well seem serious; but Socrates has no difficulty in disposing of it, and he does so simply by reminding them that they have already admitted the principle that each man has a special function, a rule to which the guardians can constitute no exception. If the principle holds good once, it must hold good always. Unless, therefore, the objectors are prepared to pull their definition of guardianship to pieces, they must drop their objection. If they are prepared "to abide by their admissions," the objection falls to the ground self-condemned as inconsistent. There could not be a better instance of the method of definition and general notions, ascribed by Aristotle to Socrates. It is nonsense, Socrates seems to say, to define and then to tear your definition to pieces. That would not be "playing the game" (p. 421).

(6) Next the principle is applied to justify the transfer of

children from one class to another, in order to preserve the unity of the state. For "the other citizens as well as the guardians must be set each to the task for which nature has fitted him, one man to one task, that each citizen doing his own peculiar work may become one man and not many and thus the whole city may grow to be not many cities but one" (p. 423). Thus the principle which creates distinct classes in society contains in itself the cure for the evils to which class distinctions, if absolute, would give rise.

(7) And before long the principle is expressly identified as justice itself, when at last the latter is discovered. "For at the beginning when we were founding our city the principle which we then stated should rule throughout was, I think, justice or at least a form of it. We stated surely and, if you remember, have often repeated our statement that each individual should pursue that work in this city for which his nature was naturally most fitted, each man doing one work (p. 433 A). So far then from 'nature' prescribing injustice as Thasymachus and the sophists and the multitude held, it does precisely the opposite; it prescribes justice or the universal rule of action (*ὁ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐθέμεθα δεῖν ποιεῖν διὰ παντός, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατωκίζομεν, τοῦτο ἐστίν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἥτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη*, p. 433). So far from every one following the path of the unjust, if full liberty were given to pursue his own good to the uttermost, they would do exactly the opposite. And the identity of the original principle of specialisation of function with justice is emphasised again in page 441. "But surely we have forgotten that the city was just by reason of the three classes within it each doing their own work."

(8) When the analogy of the state and the individual is applied, the principle is then shown to operate in every individual soul, for "The just man does not allow the different principles within him to do other work than their own . . . thus moulding the many within him into one" (p. 443).

(9) When the proper position and functions of women come up for determination, care is taken not to misapply the principle, at any rate according to Plato's conception (pp. 453-454).

(10) Finally the principle is applied to justify the obligation of the guardians to bear rule in Book VII, which echoes in its very language the twin principles propounded respectively in Book II. and Book IV.; first that the principle leads to individual happiness; and secondly that it leads to the common happiness. "You have forgotten again that it is not the law's concern that any one class in a state should live

surpassingly well (*cf.* p. 421). Rather it contrives a good life for the whole state, harmonising the citizens by persuasion and compulsion and making them share with one another the advantage which each class can contribute to the community" (*cf.* p. 369).

This summary of the principal applications of his ἀρχὴ at important stages of the argument shows that Socrates in this constructive part of the dialogue is only following out the principles on which he insisted in Book I.—the critical part of the dialogue, and which he upbraids Thrasymachus for violating, *viz.*, that argument is impossible, unless people are prepared to stick to their admissions. Socrates, in fact, thoroughly endorses by anticipation the epigram of Talleyrand. "I do not ask that my opponent should be of my opinion; but I may fairly expect him to be of his own."

Having considered the way in which Socrates finds his first principle and the use which he makes of it, we are in a position to appreciate the skill with which he wins the victory over the champions of sophistry. They had said in effect: "Dig down to the real nature of the individual, of any and every individual; tear off every rag of convention and tradition, and you will find him exactly like Gyges. He will turn out to be the incarnation of selfishness, and ride roughshod over his fellows with brutal cynicism. Released from the bondage of convention, he will no longer act under compulsion like a slave, but boldly perform what he wills freely as his good" (ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτόν ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμὴν, p. 359), and again, οὗτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ ἑτέρου ποιοῖ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταῦτόν ἴοιεν ἀμφότεροι· καίτοι μέγα τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίᾳ ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν (p. 360). And Socrates replies: "You have appealed to nature. To nature I will go. I do not agree with your account of what goes on in the breast of every individual or what would go on there in certain hypothetical circumstances. And as long as we try to decipher the small indistinct letters of the individual soul, we shall never agree about their interpretation. We shall be driven to and fro in the misty region of subjective empirical psychology. We must make our appeal to the large clear writing which we can all decipher, the meaning of which we must both acknowledge, because they are clear for all to see who will look steadily at them. In the sphere of conduct you place all individuals under one category without distinction. Very well, let us examine the motives

of all individuals, and see what they must do if they follow their nature without wavering. You have examined the abstract individual; but we ought to examine him in his concrete situation. We never find the individual except as a member of a *κοινωνία* or *πόλις*. This is the permanent and fundamental truth about human nature. We have then to discover what this great fact means. To solve the psychological problem—what is the natural, permanent, fundamental motive of the individual, we must not be satisfied with subjective psychological analysis of human character, but must study mankind in the mass, and drag to light the meaning of this great fact of the *κοινωνία*. Society is not an arbitrary institution forced upon men, which they can get rid of, if they like; it is something which *naturally* arises in response to the desire of each individual for his own good. That is the essential fact about the individual, and if we follow out its implications faithfully, we shall come to the real truth about human nature. Having thus secured from his opponents the admission of a principle which implicitly destroys their psychological and moral theories, he has so to speak captured his enemies' guns, and turns them upon him, by revealing to them step by step the consequences of their original admissions. The *ἀρχή* having been once embraced, the sophistic champions are helpless before him, they are kept perpetually on the run, and driven, in the Platonic phrase, as irresistibly as a ship before the breeze.

We are also in a position to see the error of Gomperz's view that the development of the city of pigs in the *δευτέρα πόλις* is a transition from 'what is' to 'what ought to be'. Plato's *Republic* does not begin as a picture of the actual and then by some mysterious and illegitimate process take on the colours of the ideal. It is ideal all through from beginning to end. It represents what would happen, what would become of mankind, if everybody sought his own good with complete singleness of purpose. The development of the commonwealth which he portrays is the evolution of a simple ideal or 'natural' state into a more complex ideal or 'natural' state; it is the growth of the embryo into the mature organism, the principle of life remaining identical from the first stage to the last. There is no wavering in Plato's point of view, as Gomperz's criticism seems to suggest. Just as the fall of a pebble into a pond produces an ever-widening circle, so the principle of justice, which generates society, gradually spreads it over a wider area. But as in the former case the principle of circularity remains the same, no matter how extensive the circle ultimately becomes, so the principle of justice remains

unchanged, no matter how extended becomes the sphere through which it operates. The state, as already observed, is ideal throughout, just because the principle which it exhibits is a *natural* (*κατὰ φύσιν*) principle. It represents what society is in itself, in its idea, or real nature, what the association of individuals must develop into, if the principle of its being and life is allowed unimpeded exercise. It is in effect the working out or realisation of an idea, in the Platonic sense, as the cause of existence, the state being really a state in proportion as it is a complete or perfect (*τέλειος*) expression, participation or imitation of the ideal principle. Socrates was challenged to prove the superiority of perfect justice and in order to do so he describes a perfectly good state (*τελέως ἀγαθή*). Now a thing is good if it fulfils its function well, and accordingly a perfectly good state is that which fulfils its function best. Socrates must therefore, according to the terms of the argument, portray a society which is the perfect and absolute embodiment of the social principle—justice. The final standard must be ideal, anything else would either involve the operation of another principle alongside of the social principle or, which comes to the same thing, a failure of justice, a deviation from it or the negation of it. It follows accordingly that injustice comes into being when justice is violated or fails to exert itself, as is shown later on, and degrees of injustice correspond exactly to degrees of departure from the social ideal, which is the manifestation of justice. Whereas in the just state the pursuit of individual good and the good of others are absolutely identical, in the unjust state there arises an antithesis between these two goods, which goes on ever widening until the principles of 'nature' become practically extinct.

The sophistic appeal to nature has, therefore, turned out to be a double-edged weapon. It was assumed that nature if once it can be truly revealed, must be followed, because the ways of nature must be right, and because man must obey his nature so soon as he sees what it is. It was assumed in short that the discovery of what man is by nature settles the question of obligation. In this attitude, the sophists were in hearty agreement with the dictum of Bishop Butler: "Your obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature" (Sermon III.). Hence they are left speechless, when Socrates, so to speak, ironically asks them: "But what if the law of your nature, as we have proved by principles which you adopt yourselves, turns out on strict examination to be precisely the opposite of what your superficial analysis makes it out to be?"

In the history of moral philosophy the task of the moralist has usually been to attempt the reconciliation of opposing principles, *e.g.*, egoism and altruism, conscience and self-love, duty and pleasure, or honour and utility, or whatever they may be called. And in the actual experience of life, there does seem to be a struggle between such principles. But Plato reminds us by his investigation into the nature of justice, that there are not two principles in the sense of independent forces, one of which is to obtain the mastery; but that there is one principle—justice—which is either realised or falls short of being realised; that moral defeat is moral defect; that moral delinquency is deflection from the moral standard, that injustice is simply the negation of justice, and its existence is equivalent to the non-existence of the latter—the being of injustice is the non-being of justice. In the real ideal world, therefore, the world of 'nature,' the world as it ought to be, there is nothing to reconcile; there is merely the unimpeded operation of a single principle, the principle of justice, 'the doing of one's own things' by every single individual, the fulfilment by each of his own real nature. It was therefore not without a touch of irony that Socrates suggested at the commencement of his exposition: "If in our argument we were to watch a city in the making, should we not see its justice and injustice in the making also?" For as long as you follow out the constructive principles of society, 'you can never find anything but justice only: you can only find injustice when there is a falling away from these principles: Injustice appears not in the *γένεσις*, but in the *φθορά* of society. Goodness is the *prius*, and evil can only be recognised by contrast with the good.'

There is, moreover, another opposition which Socrates shows to be a mere illusion. The Sophists made a sharp antithesis between *φύσις* and *νόμος*. The former, they urged, made people seek *πλεονεξία* as their good, and every one would follow the road to it, if law did not compel them to turn out of the way (p. 359). Injustice, therefore, was what every one would will to do, if he had the power to act without any fear of public opinion, whereas justice would never be done willingly by any one, but only under compulsion because it was not his own private good but other people's good (*οὐδείς ἐκὼν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὥς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδία ὄντος*, p. 360). What Socrates has to show, then, is that in the just man there is no opposition between free will and necessity, between what he must do and what he freely chooses. And he accomplishes this quite simply,

with the approval of the company, at the very commencement of his inquiry. Man is compelled to form a state or society, in order to supply his needs. This is what he *must* do, and this means that every one is under an obligation to share the products of his own labour with every one else. But such a proceeding is not irksome to him; for this is just what he thinks best for himself. It is a course of action which, every one would acknowledge, any and every man with full knowledge of the situation, as described in the account of the *πρώτη πόλις*, would deliberately and willingly adopt as the best. And not only so, he recognised that for complete efficiency and happiness for both himself and his fellows it is not any sort of work which he may arbitrarily select that he must do, but the work for which he is fitted by nature. It is justice, therefore, not *πλεονεξία*, which, if a man had full liberty of action to do exactly as he thought best, he would practise both by the necessity of his own nature, and with absolute free choice. Justice, accordingly, is no mere subjective thing, but belongs essentially to the objective order of things. It is something which belongs to and is *determined* by the nature of things; and at the same time no less something which the individual himself determines of his own free will to do. Justice, one might say, is the faculty (*δύναμις* in Glaucon's language) by which a man exercises the talents with which he has been gifted by nature, and the use of his talents is not a burden, but something which he likes and wills to do. In the moral sphere, then, necessity is perfect freedom. This truth, which is implicit in the first admissions in discussion, completely undermines the antithesis that lies at the bottom of the sophistic moral theory. So simply and clearly does Socrates set forth the meaning of self-determination.

IX.

At the beginning of our inquiry it was pointed out that for various reasons the essential unity of the *Republic*, alike as a work of art and a work of thought, had escaped the notice of a number of critics. Our aim was to demonstrate its essential unity and to show that the search for justice necessarily involved the delineation of an ideal state, and that these two things indicated no wavering in working out a design but are really one and the same problem. Now one reason why the unity of the plot was missed is the inability on the part of some critics, at least, to understand Plato's conception of justice. It seems worth while, therefore, at

this point to illustrate such misrepresentations, and state what we conceive to be the true account of the matter. Considering the frequency and the emphasis with which Plato strove to make his conception absolutely clear and definite, it is certainly remarkable that he has been so seriously misconstrued. On page lxiii of his introduction to the dialogue Jowett makes the following observations:—

Each of the first three virtues correspond to the three parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the state, although the third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two . . . and so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the *Republic* can with difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be a virtue of a part only, and one of the three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole soul. Yet, on the other hand, temperance is also described as a sort of harmony and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to differ from temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the harmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by which all natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the right place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice, again, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues and therefore from Plato's point of view the foundation of them, to which they are referred and which in idea precedes them.

Here we have the following errors: that the three virtues correspond to the three parts of the soul; that there is a confusion in Plato's mind between temperance and justice; that justice, because more abstract than the other three virtues, is therefore the foundation of them.

Gomperz, again, is of opinion (*Greek Thinkers*, vol. iii, p. 75) that "the boundary between temperance and justice is blurred almost beyond recognition, and that the latter virtue tends to be confused with virtue in general is a defect of logical rigour plain for all to see"; and he considers this defect to be closely bound up with the still deeper fault of the whole investigation, the insufficient severance of individual from social ethics, and "accordingly the true content of justice—the sum of the demands which society makes upon us—a concept which has nothing in common with that of individual psychic hygiene—is sometimes passed over in silence, sometimes introduced without justification".

Such are the conclusions arrived at by critics who refuse to take Plato at his word or suppose that he did not mean what he has said in perfectly clear language. A careful reading of Plato shows quite clearly that there is no confusion at all between temperance and justice. The former certainly extends more widely than wisdom and courage, being spread through the whole state, and not residing in any particular

part (p. 432 A), and consists in a concord (*ὁμόνοια*) of opinion between the "naturally worse" and the "naturally better" as to which should rule both in the city and in each individual. Nevertheless it is quite distinct from justice. That there is a mutual agreement, *e.g.* between a ship's captain and his crew, that the former should command and the latter obey his commands, is a quite different thing from the understanding that each member of the ship's company, whether captain or sailor, shall each do his own work as well as he can. The power or principle by which each can do so is justice, and is naturally prior to a state of concord between the 'naturally better' and the 'naturally worse' classes. It is true that it comes last in the order of discovery, like all first principles, but it is prior in the order of nature, and it is therefore simply putting the cart before the horse to say, as Pater does, that justice "supervenes" on the other three virtues. So far from doing so, it is their foundation or presupposition. As Plato says expressly, it makes them possible. It is "the virtue which enabled all of them to find a place in the state and, after they have appeared, preserves them so long as it is present in the city" (p. 433). Moreover, it is present "in every child, woman, slave, freeman artisan, ruler and ruled, making each do his own work and not be meddlesome" (p. 433). This account agrees exactly with the account of the *ἀρχή* which we have attempted to give in what has preceded. This principle is present from the very beginning, and most emphatically is so in that "innocent world," the city of pigs, where Pater fails to find it, and it is because it is there that that rudimentary state can either be at all or develop into a more complex, fully organised state with the other virtues differentiated and manifest. It is the root of which they are flower and fruit. Unless there were a steadily increasing stream of tradition in favour of all men doing their own work, there could be no possibility of the differentiation into separate classes exhibiting appropriate forms of virtue and mutual concord. In fact, society can never organise itself, unless it first possess the principle of organisation. It can never become perfectly good (*τελέως ἀγαθὴ* or *ἀρίστη*, p. 434) in its mature development, unless it starts with being good in its simple, embryonic state. It cannot end well, unless it also begins well. It is, in fact, absurd to confuse justice with temperance or to think of it as 'supervening' on the other virtues. For the structure of an organism must first be differentiated into separate organs together with the specialisation of functions, before the question of either co-ordination or subordination,

or, for that matter, insubordination, can arise. You cannot have temperance, *i.e.* the concord between the higher and the lower classes, till both have been generated, and they cannot be generated except by the operation of the principle of justice—"the power of each doing his own work" (p. 433)—which therefore "literally," as Plato says, "makes the other virtues possible". To confuse temperance and justice is, in short, equivalent to confusing its products with the principle of development.

Justice, then, is logically and naturally prior to the other three cardinal virtues—the primary, fundamental, and universal principle. It is, however, also, from another point of view, the crown of all the virtues, the highest of them because it includes them all. Not only does it make them possible, but its full worth does not become evident till it has brought them into existence. In the rudimentary state we have only an image or faint outline or shadow of justice (*εἰδωλόν τι*), but in the finished state—*κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα*—we have the finished picture in all its fullness and detail. And the same thing occurs in the case of the individual. At the lower limit there is the producer performing the function for which he is marked out by nature, and so producing the best possible both for himself and his fellow-labourers. At the upper limit we have the picture of the just man in his complete development.

The just man does not allow the different principles within him to do other work than their own, nor the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with one another; but in the truest sense he sets his house in order, gaining the mastery over himself; and becoming on good terms with himself, through discipline, he joins in harmony those different elements like three terms in a musical scale—lowest and highest and intermediate and any others that may lie between these—and binding together all these elements he moulds the many within him into one, temperate and harmonious (p. 443 E).

As soon, then, as it is grasped that the truth Plato is endeavouring to make clear is that the pursuit of good prescribes necessarily a definite rule or law or order of behaviour amongst the seekers of it, imposes in fact a limit (*πέρας*) so that they will not like the sophists' unjust man "stop at nothing," there is no difficulty in understanding the conception of justice as set forth in the *Republic*.

X.

The next portion of the *Republic* which has proved a stumbling-block—perhaps the greatest stumbling-block—to

the critics is the central group of Books V.-VII. But before discussing its precise position in reference to the plot of dialogue, it is desirable to point out the skill with which Plato connects it with the preceding portion and emphasises its subordination to the main thesis.

The education of the guardians takes up by far the larger part of the description of the ideal state, so much so that it seems almost to occupy a disproportionate part of the entire treatise. Socrates is accordingly careful to give due warning that it is not an irrelevant digression. The reason for the prominence of this topic is, of course, the fact that Plato believes the good or evil of the state is determined entirely by the character of the government or legislative element. The question of direction or rule—the ruling element being the characteristic element in human nature—was the point at issue between Plato and the sophists. Hence he says that it does not matter very much if a cobbler changes places with another workman, but that it makes a world of difference if the cobbler turns guardian or *vice versa*; and he shows afterwards that the abuse of power by the tyrant is the greatest evil for society. The use or abuse of power, then, being all-important for the state, there is ample reason for discussing the education of the strong men—the rulers—at such disproportionate length, as it may seem at first sight. And certainly for the time it draws off the attention from the organisation of the state as a whole. Accordingly, to remind his readers that he knows what he is about, he puts in little touches like this: "We have been unconsciously purging the city, which we said just now was in too luxurious a condition," says Socrates. To which it is replied: "And we have done wisely". "Come then," replies Socrates, "let us finish our purgation" (p. 397 E), thereby dropping a reminder that he is discussing the ideal state, in its most vital organ, and preparing to bring back our thoughts to the state as a whole. Further, he sums up the whole account by the myth of the earth-born men which, like the allegory of the cave, comes in to subserve a double purpose. It sums up what has gone before, and provides a link with what is to come. The long discussion of education had seemed to lead away from the original question to which it is necessary to return. In the myth Socrates emphasises the importance of class distinctions—a new aspect of the division of labour—with the necessary qualifications, and sets forth the relation of the guardians to the rest of the community and characterises the life they lead. This prepares the way for the inevitable objection that guardians living such a life cannot be happy.

And this gives Socrates a fresh opportunity to 'rub in' his original ἀρχή and to bring back attention to the state as a whole. The question, he says, is not that of the happiness of a particular class—more particularly of the ruling class, which has the power, but he is describing a state composed of citizens, each with specific functions to perform, not a collection of holiday-makers. The guardians, accordingly, like the other classes, must be good at their occupation of guarding. The objection is thus overruled "by travelling the same road as before". The aim is to make the whole state as happy as possible, for only thus could they find justice (p. 420 B). And so Plato gets back to the original question, and having discussed the various elements of which the state is composed, he returns to the consideration of the whole. Furthermore, the insistence on the abstinence of the guardians from material wealth and privacy of life is not only an anticipation of the more elaborate discussion of communism later on, but it naturally suggests the general question of wealth, etc., in the state as a whole. By using again his original principle that society comes into existence to supply needs, and that its welfare depends upon the loyal discharge of his own function by each and every citizen, Socrates points out that while wealth destroys the stimulus to work, poverty produces bad workmanship and meanness, and that therefore both encourage innovation. Wealth and poverty alike put a state out of condition, spoil its fighting trim and efficiency. There are, therefore, two alternatives open: a self-sufficient state, or one which consists of wealthy and poor. But the latter is not really a state at all, and ought to be called by "some grander name," for, being disunited, it is not *one* state.

Thus we have been led naturally to consider the question of the proper limits to the size of the state, and the same discussion that raised the question has also brought to light its solution—*viz.*, the standard of unity and self-sufficiency; and we are reminded once again that this matter is settled like the rest by the application of the original ἀρχή (p. 423). The unity of the state, then, is all-important, and its preservation is one of the foremost duties of the guardians, which they will discharge successfully, if they attend to the education and rearing of children, which will enable them to see their way through all these questions as well as others which "we pass by for the present," *e.g.*, the possession of wives, marriage and children, in which cases "community" will be the guiding principle.

We may note here as a passing indication of the integrity of the *Republic* and the propriety of Books V.-VII. to the

general plan that the unity and self-sufficiency which are so essential are said to mean all these things: (1) that it must be neither too big nor too small; (2) the division of labour; (3) the division and interchange of classes; (4) the organisation of the family (wives and children); (5) communism. All these characteristics are brought together in a single passage (p. 423 E) and their juxtaposition seems to suggest they were, at least in Plato's mind, logically connected. And indeed, how can the guardians control the size of the state, unless they exercise control over the population question by determining its quantity and quality—or, as we might say in modern terminology, take up, in a large sense, the problem of 'eugenics'. The passage occurring so early in Book IV., at least suggests very strongly that Book V. is neither an interruption nor an afterthought, but is simply kept waiting until it can come on the stage at the proper time.

But it may be objected, why then does Plato postpone the treatment of the subject? Why does he not finish off the organisation of the state at once and have done with it before justice is finally discovered? The answer is, that such postponement is quite in Plato's manner. He just keeps things till the time is ripe for dealing with them, though he is accustomed to give notice of what is in store. He fully intends to deal with these questions, but he has been long enough occupied with the fundamental principles of state organisation and developed it quite far enough to justify a search for justice without more ado. The outline is sufficient for his purpose; nay, most suitable for his purpose. It would have been clumsy to have postponed the search till after Book V. or Book VII. The halt at the covert side breaks the monotony, and the discovery of justice in the state enables him to turn from the large letters to the small, from the state to the individual soul. Further, Plato must have been conscious that whereas he had so far laid down an organisation which is non-controversial, communism, etc., are controversial in the highest degree. Hence, if he had deferred the search for justice till after the treatment of property and marriage, the principle would certainly have seemed to be coloured by controversy, which is exactly what he wanted to avoid. Having found justice, he can, without prejudice to it, proceed to discuss a series of very thorny topics, and he can use them as bridges on which to pass over to a perhaps still thornier topic—the position of philosophy in the state, thus healing one paradox by another. With similar tact he places his condemnation of imitative poetry,

which he also felt to be controversial and for which he almost apologises, between the vindication of justice on earth and the description of its rewards hereafter.

With the discovery of justice as the principle of order and health in the state and in the soul, and the consequent recognition of its self-evident superiority to injustice, it might appear at first sight as if the argument was practically ended, and that, if anything else were wanted, it could only be the companion picture of injustice as the negation of justice. And this is what some critics have hastily assumed. Jowett, for instance, has picturesquely accounted for Books V.-VII. by alluding to them as the higher light of philosophy which breaks through the regularity of the Hellenic temple; while other critics have thought these books were a later addition or an insertion in a revised edition.

Now it might be argued that Plato's expression at the end of Book IV. of his intention to survey the four varieties of perverted states seems to support such a hypothesis. But it derives no support from a careful examination of Plato's manner. If we recognise that Plato's method is always to hint at what is coming and to refer back to what has gone before, the postponement of the description of four perverted societies will cause no surprise. Much earlier, at the very beginning of Book IV., page 420, he remarks, "Presently we shall examine a state of the opposite kind". Yet he has evidently no intention of hurrying on to the proposed examination at once, and no difficulty has been raised by criticism over the fact that he has not done so. He does precisely the same thing in regard to the problems of communism, etc., which are mentioned a little later (*ὅσα νῦν παραλείπομεν*, p. 423), but are not treated for a considerable time. Similarly, he defers the description of the longer way mentioned on page 435 till page 524 in Book VI., and though on page 414 he says that the education of the guardians is only *outlined*, he does not set about filling up the outline till page 503. We may compare, too, his manner in tracing the growth of justice. He is always raising hopes of finding it out, but deliberately defers the final hunt for it till the end of Book IV., his aim being obviously to familiarise his readers thoroughly with the principle in its concrete operation, before it is explicitly revealed in its full reality and significance. These instances are perhaps sufficient to show that Plato is essentially deliberate in his methods—being, as Pater truly describes him, "so provident a writer".

The fact then that he proposes to describe states which departs from the ideal and yet does not immediately fulfil

his purpose need cause no difficulty or give rise to the supposition that the intervening books are an after-thought or an interruption, foisted upon the original scheme. The best way, however, of realising the cardinal importance of the central books, is to accept the theory of the critics provisionally and cut them out on the ground that they break the continuity of the argument. What would be the result? And how should we like it? In the first place, there would undoubtedly be an impression of monotony. After two and a half books devoted to the rise and growth of justice, it would certainly be wearisome, if they were followed immediately by an account of its decline and fall. In the next place, it would be hard to account for the fact that Books V.-VII. form a background for many things in Books VIII. and IX., and provide a basis for their advanced psychology, which otherwise would, to say the least, be less intelligible.

Plato, then, we may safely conclude, does not mind waiting for the proper time and occasion for discussing the various topics that come up for treatment in their turn, and he does this without confusion, because he is always careful at each fresh stage to mark both the transition from and the connexion with what precedes. In a word, he articulates the plot of the *Republic* with great care and clearness.

How then are we to explain the decided pause at the end of Book IV. and the beginning of Book V., without resorting to the critical hypothesis of discontinuity? First, we may call to mind a literary characteristic, which is repeatedly proclaimed by his critics—*viz.* the dramatic power displayed in the *Republic*. The work being a real drama is split up, so to speak, into separate acts, and the intervals are clearly marked. They seem to be marked especially by the reluctance of Socrates. At the beginning of Book V. he is reluctant to discuss communism, just as he is reluctant at the beginning of Book II. to discuss the real nature of justice. In both cases he pretends to think that he has done with the argument. We ought therefore to explain each passage in the same way. In Book V. Plato is entering on the very thorny subjects of communism and philosophic rule. He regards them as essential to the fully developed ideal state, as corollaries of his original principle of justice. He states this most distinctly on page 464. But he is also aware that he is going to defend very paradoxical doctrines. Before he does so, he wishes to bring out into clear relief the really positive non-contentious conclusions he has already reached, which, if not exhaustive of their subject, are sufficient as far as they go. If they had been deferred to a later stage

they would inevitably have taken on a controversial colour. But coming where they do, they appear irrefragable. Again, by introducing the controversial topics afterwards, he builds a bridge, as it were, between the questions of the ideal and its realisation. The paradoxical character of his conclusions in Book V. at once raised in a most acute way the question whether the ideal is practicable. And this brings up the second question of moral philosophy. The first is, What is the good? The second is, How can this good be realised?

Book V. then introduces an integral part of the argument. "What a large question," Socrates says, "are you again raising, as if we were beginning *anew* on our commonwealth. I was rejoicing in the idea of having already done with it and was only too glad that these points should be let alone (cf. Book II. *init.*). You little know what a swarm of questions you are rousing by calling for these topics." And again: "You are stealing a *whole section* and *that a very important* one of the argument" (p. 450). It seems evident, therefore, if we are to take Plato at his word, that Books V.-VII. are as much an integral part of the *Republic* as Books II.-IV., being introduced in exactly the same manner. And reflection assures us that Plato is right, for after all it would be a very meagre and inadequate philosophy of politics which neglected to deal with the problem of the relations between the sexes, the family and the population. Education is, of course, of the utmost importance; but no less important is the regulation of the supply of the persons who are to be educated. Similarly, whatever may be thought of the value of Plato's communistic system, there can be no doubt that he would have been shirking a real and vital question, if he omitted to discuss the proper distribution of wealth, and it is noticeable that Aristotle treats the very same question, though of course Plato set him the example. Instead, therefore, of considering the apparent break as an introduction to an after-thought it is better to consider it as an example of Socrates' "accustomed irony". Plato exhibits the same ironical reluctance in regard to the possibility of the ideal. In the course of the discussions started in Book V. he illustrates his method of looking backward by supplying a direct answer to the objection raised at the beginning of Book IV. with regard to the happiness or otherwise of the guardians; but at the same time he looks forward also by mentioning the questioning of the possibility of the ideal state. He postpones this question, however, until he has discussed the usages of war. But at last the

question can no longer be avoided. On page 471 D Glaucon pulls up Socrates sharp, saying:—

If you be permitted to go on in this way, you will never recollect what you put aside some time ago, before you entered on all these questions, *viz.*, how this state is possible,

and again,

As I fully admit the presence of all these merits and a thousand others in this constitution, if it were brought into existence, you need describe it no further. Rather let us try to convince ourselves of this that the thing is practiceable and how it is practiceable, leaving all other questions to themselves.

And as usual Socrates defends himself by saying that he has been led to this point by the inquiry into justice and injustice, which is as much as to say that the ensuing discussion of the rule of philosophy is part and parcel of the original problem.

XI.

It is usual to put the dividing line in the *Republic* at the end of Book IV., because justice and its profitableness have been revealed, and it is proposed to look out from the watch tower of this conclusion upon the four varieties of vice. It seems, however, far more satisfactory to place the division in the middle of Book V., where the question of the realisation of the ideal, as distinct from its desirability, comes up for definite and final treatment. As this differs from the usual analysis of the dialogue, and has some bearing upon the comprehension of its plot, it seems desirable to go somewhat fully into the matter.

It is clear that the argument has entered on a new phase. Hitherto Socrates has been developing the consequences of the justice-principle, of which the first series are such as would be generally acknowledged without hesitation, and at the end of which, therefore, he reveals his principle fully, whilst the second series are too paradoxical to be generally admitted and require to be sanctioned, as it were, by the prestige of the now fully revealed principle. But whether he is discussing controversial or non-controversial positions, he is doing the same thing all along—he is describing the ideal. Now, however, he undertakes to show how this ideal can be realised in practice. In this procedure Plato is merely following the traditions of moral philosophy in Greece, the aim of which was always intensely practical. It was not content merely with getting to know "reason

and the will of God," but strove also "to make them prevail". It was a way of life, as well as an exercise in speculation. And one sometimes thinks that much ethical inquiry would lose its barrenness, if the example of Greek philosophy were followed.

Moral philosophy has in fact three questions to answer, (1) What is morality? and this involves (2) What is the ideal? and this again involves (3) How can the ideal be realised? or, to put it another way, It is necessary (1) to realise that there is an 'ought' or a 'must,' (2) to realise that this 'must' or 'ought' is admirable or beautiful (*καλόν*), and (3) to realise that this 'must' or 'ought' has to get to work in practice. Or again the sequence of ideas might be expressed thus: (1) We have to see the highest, (2) we must needs love it, (3) and we must realise it in practice. These are all aspects of the same problem, and the *Republic* does justice to them all. And we feel that Glaucon expresses the common sense of mankind, when he insists that moral philosophy is not merely a theoretical inquiry into the existence of the ideal, or the painting of its portrait. He says, quite properly, that you can if you like go on for ever cataloguing its merits. But the really practical and important thing is to get it realised. It is this fact, that man has not merely to approve, but to do, and to do, because he approves, a fact which comes home inevitably to every consciousness—to which Plato does justice in these central books of the dialogue. The cynic may deny the existence of morality; the moralist may demonstrate its existence and even go into raptures about it. But the toil and the trouble is to get it to work. Or again, to express the situation rather differently, just as the sophist denied both the *existence* and the *operation* of the moral principle, so Socrates affirms both. And the line he takes is that you have first got to see that a thing exists, and then you can see that it must work, and how. For it is ridiculous to say that a thing exists and has a true nature, and yet think of it as an inoperative, as if it made no difference to the actual world. It is therefore not inappropriate that the question of the practicability of the moral ideal should be settled in close connexion with the problems of knowledge and reality. The realisation of justice and the just state involves the recognition of the ideas or 'forms' of the good. The sophist cannot discern them and he accordingly denies their reality or their capability of being realised. But the true philosopher can discern them, and immediately recognise his obligation to realise them in practice. To Plato's mind the connecting link between the ideal and the

possible was φύσις—true nature. The ideal is possible, he thinks, because it is natural. It is only a question of realising or actualising a δύναμις which is part of the nature of things. As he says on page 456: "Then our legislation has not been an impracticable dream, seeing that we have made our law in accordance with nature? (οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ περ κατὰ φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον). Present conditions which depart from this are evidently much more a departure from nature." The ordinary facts of moral experience corroborate the correctness of the order of ideas in Plato's mind. It is only those who have the full consciousness or the true idea of what morality means who feel the deepest obligation and take the most pains to realise it in practice. Consciousness of moral distinctions, that is the knowledge of the reality of morality, implies the consciousness of obligation and of duty. The two things are inseparable. In the language of Socrates, knowledge of the good gives power to do the good. 'Know thyself' is equivalent to 'Be thyself'. The *Republic* in fact is one long discourse on the familiar Socratic formula, "Virtue is knowledge". Virtue has first to be acknowledged as belonging to the nature of things; its reality must be known, and then, it goes without saying, it must be practised. For Socrates held that when you see a thing to be reasonable, you decide upon it. "Act so" means "think so," as Mr. Bradley expresses it, and "think so" means "it is" (*Appearance and Reality*). It is not strange, therefore, that, in the portion of the dialogue which treats of the relations between the ideal and the practicable, Plato also deals with the relation which is at the foundation of them, viz. the relation of knowledge and reality. For if a thing does not exist, it cannot be known; and if it cannot be known, it does not exist and cannot therefore produce any effect on conduct. Plato was perfectly sure that a full discussion of ethics necessarily involved metaphysical inquiries, for unless the conception of the "ought" is grounded in reality, in the nature of things, it could not possibly have any claim upon men's allegiance. It was, therefore, by a necessity of thought that the inquiry into the nature of justice should run up into an inquiry into the known reality—the idea. Accordingly, those who propose to exclude the central books from the original plan of the *Republic*, practically assume that Plato was not in the first instance aware of the metaphysical implications of moral inquiries. We prefer to believe that he knew better than his critics.

It has seemed desirable to dwell on this aspect

of the *Republic*, not only because it is not generally recognised, or at least brought into sufficient prominence, but also because it is expressly repudiated by so eminent a scholar as Dr. Thompson. In his introduction to his edition of the *Gorgias* (p. xx) he says: "The dogma that virtue is knowledge was one of the Socratic prejudices from which he (Plato) gradually emancipated himself, as his ethical views matured," and notes its absence from both the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, in which, he says, is developed the theory that virtue is order, harmony, proportion. The weakness of such a criticism is the assumption that Platonism is a thing of shreds and patches, and changes colour like the neckties which a man may wear successively and discard. It wholly ignores the organic or systematic character of Plato's thought—the fact that it presents a permanent, characteristic attitude to the universe. The truth seems to be that Plato from first to last held a particular set of views, which he illustrated differently from time to time according to circumstances and the nature of the particular subject he happened to be discussing, and in spite of the labours of Prof. Jackson in the opposite direction this view seems to be gaining ground. The Socratic element in Plato's thought is more and more recognised. And it is not a little remarkable that the very passage which illustrates most brilliantly the famous Socratic moral aphorism should be excluded from the first design of the *Republic* as pure Platonic metaphysics.

So far is this dialogue from having got beyond the thesis that 'virtue is knowledge' that it would be truer to say that here it receives its most classic presentment. 'Virtue is true philosophy' is not much unlike 'Virtue is knowledge,' especially when philosophy means love of knowledge, entire and real, and knowledge means knowledge of real existence, 'of what is according to nature'. And once more, if virtue is order, harmony, health, it is philosophy which is the great guarantee of its preservation. Indeed, if there was one idea to which Plato clung from first to last, it is the old Socratic maxim, "If you want really to do anything, you must first know how to do it"; or what comes to the same thing, "If you want to do a thing, you must know what it is and what you are about". In the *Republic*, therefore, his most comprehensive treatise, he gives the most thorough-going application of the thesis in his insistence on the rule of the philosopher, although he has by no means relinquished, as Dr. Thompson's words would have us believe, his ordinary manner in using the formula, which he had adopted in the earlier dialogues; for *σωφροσύνη* is defined, quite in the spirit of the Socratic formula,

as "the preservation of right opinion concerning things which are and are not to be feared".

The intimate connexion of virtue and knowledge was, of course, forced upon Socrates and Plato. The Sophist with his cynicism in ethics and his scepticism in metaphysics denied the existence of both. The denial of the one logically involved the denial of the other. For, if the nature of things is such as to make judgments impossible, the most important judgments for man, *viz.*, those which have 'good' as their predicate, are also impossible. Everything is turned upside down and morality shares the general ruin. Plato saw clearly that, if he was to rehabilitate morality, he must not only satisfy the heart but the head, and that, to assert the reality of virtue, he must assert also the reality of knowledge—that is, that he must have recourse to metaphysics. It seems therefore inconceivable that Plato could ever have thought of treating the one apart from the other, as he must inevitably have done, if, as Dr. Thompson suggests, the old Socratic thesis 'Virtue is knowledge' is dropped in the *Republic*, or if, as other critics have suggested, the book consists of two portions originally independent, and afterwards pieced together.

The picture of the truly good state or objective justice properly consists not merely of Books II.-IV., according to the view ordinarily held, but of Books II.-VII., which may be divided into two main parts. (1) Justice or the just state exists by nature and is best, *i.e.* our idea of what is best—the problem put forward for solution by Glaucon and Adeimantus—is justice. (2) Justice or the just state, *i.e.* our idea of what is best, though difficult can be realised by putting philosophy into power. A complete theory of morals and politics such as the *Republic* purports to be—a theory of the best life for the individual—for *all* individuals—could not afford to omit either part.

A corroboration of this view of the relation of the component parts of the work is to be found in Nettleship's lectures. Though he says that Books V.-VII. 'break the continuity of the dialogue and that Book V. *init.* "looks like a fresh start," he says (p. 186): "From this point to the end of Book VII. there is no real break in the argument. It is a continuous development of what is involved in the position just laid down" (*viz.*, that philosophers must rule). Thus he holds that Books V. *med.*-VII. form a continuous section, whereas Jowett says Books V.-VII. do so, and holds that the point of view in Books I.-IV. is different from that of Books V.-X. This is a kind of discrepancy, which is not

infrequent in disintegrating criticism. The stumbling-block is the first part of Book V., which is alleged to constitute a break in the original argument. But this, as we have endeavoured to show, is nothing more than a Platonic device for articulating the plot. The argument is continuous throughout and might be analysed as follows:—

I. Prologue or Introduction to moral philosophy (Book I.).

II. Sketch of the moral ideal (Books II.-V. *med.*).

III. The realisation of the ideal (Books V. *med.*-VII.).

IV. The other side of the picture (Books VIII.-IX.).

V. Epilogue (Book X.).

If this analysis is correct, the key to the work would have been lost if Plato had ever intended to go straight on from Book IV. to Book VIII., and in Plato's words "a whole section of the argument would have been stolen".

The logical connexion of the whole section with the main argument having been indicated, it only remains to show how Plato explicitly affirms the connexion in detail by specific references to portions in the earlier books. One instance occurs on page 497 in Book VI. where Socrates has mentioned that philosophy has no proper environment,—a state of things which is bad both for philosophy and the world. The problem, therefore, is to find the fitting constitution. "Well," says Adeimantus, "is it the state we have described?" "Yes," replies Socrates, "except in one point, which was alluded to during the discussion, when we said that it would be necessary to have constantly present in the state some authority that would view the constitution in the very light in which you and the legislator viewed it, when you framed the laws." This is a direct reference to page 412 A in Book IV., where we read: "Then will not some such overseer be always needed in our state if our commonwealth is to be preserved". A more interesting reference also occurs in the same passage, where Socrates openly acknowledges that he must discuss "in what way and by what studies we shall secure the presence of men capable of preserving the constitution". And it is specially interesting because it has been so grossly misunderstood. Socrates refers expressly to Book III., page 412, where he had described the various tests for selecting the guardians. Now, he says, these tests were insufficient and must be supplemented by others. Previously they had been tested by pleasure and pain—but now they must be further tested in regard to their faculty for philosophic study. "Then," says Socrates, "I shrank from assertions I have since hazarded. Let me venture to say this also, that we must make our most perfect guardians philo-

sophers" (p. 503). And in summing up his previous account of the required tests Socrates remarks: "Such was what we said when the argument (for fear of raising the question now before us) kept turning aside and veiling its face". It would be difficult to imagine a clearer definition of the connexion between two sections of an argument. Yet, strange to say, Davies and Vaughan so far missed the point that they wantonly altered the text, by arbitrarily transposing *φύλακας* and *φιλοσόφους* to support their misconceptions. The result is that they spoil the whole passage by breaking the unity of the argument. Both text and argument alike require the sense, "We must make our most perfect guardians philosophers," and not *vice versa*. For the guardians are to be tried and tested in ways that were formerly omitted, *viz.*, by mental exercise in a variety of studies. But what are the highest subjects? Adeimantus inquires. Whereupon Socrates replies by a direct reference to pages 414 and 435.

"You remember how we separated the soul into three parts and deduced justice, temperance, etc., and also the remark preceding it; that we should take a longer route, but that it would be possible to give a demonstration flowing from previous conclusions. You were satisfied, and then followed these investigations which were to me deficient in exactness (cf. p. 435). We must now go round by the longer route, else we shall not reach the highest sciences." "What," says Adeimantus, "is there anything higher than justice?" "Yes," replies Socrates, "and we must not be content with an outline, but be elaborate" (p. 504, condensed).

When one reads such a passage carefully, it is not easy to understand how it can be imagined that Plato ignored or forgot at the end what he had said at the beginning.

More instances might be given to illustrate the connexion between these books and their predecessors. But the above are perhaps sufficient to show on the one hand the pains taken by Plato to point out the connexion and on the other the reluctance of critics to take him at his word. The only satisfactory conclusion seems to be that these books containing the *τρίτη πόλις* of the philosophers are no less part of the original plan of the dialogue than the *πρώτη πόλις* "of the pigs" or the luxurious *δευτέρα πόλις*, which needed purification. Further, whatever be the correct position which ought to be assigned to the treatment of ideas in the *Republic* in the view of those who are specially interested in the extremely problematic task of finding out the precise chronological sequence of the dialogues in order to trace the development of Plato's metaphysics, there appears to be good reason for holding that Plato has introduced just those aspects of the ideal theory which were necessitated by his profound con-

viction that no treatment of ethics was complete which did not take account also of metaphysics and epistemology—or, in his own terminology, that the question of justice, inquiry into the meaning of knowledge and reality, and of that, which is beyond both, the good.

XII.

The position of Books VIII. and IX. present no difficulty in the consideration of the plot. They have never proved a stumbling-block as they have always been assumed, even by the disintegrators, to form part of the original piece. All that is necessary is to show in regard to them why they occupy the precise position they do occupy, why they should come after the picture of the philosophic state and how they are connected with and dependent on it. It might, however, be pointed out in addition that they also illustrate the inherent 'irony' of the method adopted all through the Socratic exposition. Socrates started with the admission that *both* justice *and* injustice would come to light in the process of building up the state (*ἀρ' οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν*; p. 369), and he was careful to point out at each stage in the development of the state that this was the object of the process. But curiously enough the result, which did not appear at first sight, was that justice only came to light in the development of the *ἀρχή*, and injustice in the first stage of the argument is only recognised abstractly as the opposite of justice, which has come to light. If justice is the health of the state, as has been described in detail, then injustice must be its negation—the principle of disease and corruption, whereby the state goes to rack and ruin. It is just the not-being of justice. In proportion as justice fails to be realised, to that extent you have injustice. In other words, the argument goes to show that an absolutely consistent development of the impulse to seek one's own good (*οἰόμενος αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι*, p. 369) which is the basis of social, i.e. human, activity, leads only to good and its recognised manifestations—justice and the virtues, which rest upon it, and never can lead to anything else, as the sophists maintained. Injustice, therefore, does not come into view in the *γένεσις* of the state, which is according to nature (*κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθείσα*). On the contrary, it can only come into view in the *φθορά* of the state. For it is the principle—if not-being can be called a principle—of its destruction, and is realised through the violation of the state's true nature,

viz. justice. So far from injustice being inherent in the original nature of man and society, as the sophistic theory proclaimed, it is the most unnatural thing in the world, and only reaches its full development when society is in a state of complete dissolution. As therefore justice had been portrayed in the detailed picture of the progress of society according to the natural, ideal order, so it was necessary, if the argument was to be complete, to give by way of contrast the detailed account of society gradually going to pieces through the negation of the social principle—justice. But in order to recognise what injustice really is, it was necessary first of all to show in clear relief the lineaments of the positive principle—justice.

You cannot appreciate the extent of human degradation, unless you first of all know the height from which mankind can fall. Without a knowledge of the ideal, you cannot realise apostasy from the ideal. Justice is thus shown to be the positive principle of society, that which makes it possible, and logically and naturally prior to injustice, which is merely a turning back upon it. Justice accordingly is the first choice and to choose injustice is to turn your back on the natural order. The *Republic*, therefore, preaches in pictorial fashion precisely the same doctrine as the *Theætetus*—that evil is a sub-contrary to good (*ὑπεναντίον τι*). Injustice is the antagonistic principle of justice, but a subordinate one, for though you can and must think out human life on the supposition of justice, you cannot think it out as constituted by injustice—a principle of negation and revolt from nature. The latter may be the dark shadow, which tends to dog the footsteps of its adversary, but the *real* world, Plato seems to say in effect, is not a world of shades.

XIII.

We now come to the Tenth Book—which we have called the epilogue, and which some critics call an ‘appendix’ or an ‘episode’. Nettleship calls the first part a digression on poetry, describes the whole book as the most detached portion of the *Republic* and consisting of two disconnected sections (*Lectures*, p. 13). With regard to the first section he says that, “it is disconnected from the rest of the *Republic* and the transition to the subject of art and poetry is sudden and unnatural”. Though he does trace a certain amount of connexion, “still this section breaks the continuity of the *Republic*. It does not bear in any way on the last section of Book X., which would naturally follow at the end of Book

IX., forming a fitting conclusion to the whole work. . . . Further within each of these two sections it is easy to see the traces of more than one redaction of the same topic." And he mentions that 605 C should follow on 602 B and not on the passage which precedes it, and he describes 611 A as 'fragmentary'. Further "from the very apologetic opening and the nevertheless polemical tone which pervades the whole discussion, one might infer that Plato had been attacked by critics for what he had previously said about poetry and that he therefore returned to the subject with greater animus, prepared to go a good deal farther" (p. 341). And again, "The second part of Book X., like the first, shows symptoms of having been 'left in an unfinished state'. In the opening words, which introduce the subject of immortality, 'And yet nothing has been said of the greatest prizes and rewards of virtue' (608 C), there is no transition from what has gone before. Plato has not, as they imply, been talking of the rewards of justice on earth. He first begins to speak of them in 612 A, and after that there occurs in 614 A another opening similar to that in 608 C, and this time in its proper connexion. Thus the argument about immortality (608 C-612 A) does not seem to be in any organic connexion either with what actually precedes or with what actually follows it. It would seem that Plato had two plans in his mind as to how to finish the *Republic*."

Such criticisms are extremely damaging to the hypothesis of the *Republic* as the expression of an excellent plot or as a work of art, to say nothing of it as a consecutive piece of reasoning, the soundness of which depends entirely on the connexion of ideas. They suggest the idea that the work is bungled at the end and has a very lame and impotent conclusion. Great deference must always be paid to the views of so true an interpreter of Plato as Nettleship, but it seems undesirable to accept the familiar stock-in-trade of the disintegrating theory—redaction, second editions, hesitation between alternative plans, incompleteness,—unless necessity demands. And it is reassuring to read in Adam's *Commentary* a very different view. Adam calls it an 'episode,' it is true, but remarks that "the Platonic dialogue like actual conversation is at liberty to recall, modify, or expand the results of a discussion apparently finished. This is his first, best, and only opportunity to justify his exclusion of *μμητική* by metaphysical and psychological as well as by moral and pedagogical arguments. He must have something behind him to dethrone the Bible of Greece." Nor does Adam find any stumbling-blocks in the text itself. There seems there-

fore to be as strong a case for the connexion as for the disconnexion of the first part of the book. And when we consider the function of an episode in literary composition in ancient Greece, the balance of argument seems to be in favour of the theory of connexion. Aristotle points out in the *Poetics* that more latitude is allowed to the epic than to the tragic poet in the introduction of episodes, and *a fortiori* a similar latitude should be allowed to a different form of composition like a dialogue, which, as Adam points out, is modelled on actual conversation. All that is necessary, according to Aristotle, is that episodes should be relevant (*οἰκεῖα*), and it cannot be denied that this digression on poetry is strictly relevant to the main issue, although opinions may differ as to the validity of Plato's attitude in general to the mimetic arts. But, granted his premises, it is not difficult to see the validity of his expulsion of mimetic poetry from his ideal state. In the earlier part of the work the objections to it had been based on 'moral and pedagogical arguments,' intended to show that unlicensed imitation had the effect of destroying that individuality of function, on which the state was based. In the interval Plato has shown that this individuality of function runs up into something higher—into that form of good, which transcends both existence and knowledge.

Moreover, a lurid picture has been drawn of the fatal consequences of violating the principle of justice, through which the form of good manifests itself in human society. Accordingly at this point he not only brings forward metaphysical and psychological arguments in addition, but also urges the immense importance of not weakening that contact of the soul with reality, the knowledge of which is the foundation of justice. Thus he not merely supplements but deepens and strengthens his argument. It may be fanciful, but it is also interesting to observe that he brings out another aspect of ideas than that which was most prominent in Books V.-VII. In these the emphasis was laid on the contrast between the permanent and the changing, the real and the apparent. Here he dwells on the notion that the idea is in the order of nature (*ἐν τῇ φύσει*) and thereby recalls the associations of what is natural (*κατὰ φύσιν*) on which so much stress was laid in the earlier portions of the argument. The business of man, he seems to say, is to follow the natural order. No sacrifice, therefore, of what, after all, is three removes from nature is too great to secure adherence to the proper path. Not even Homer and the tragic poets must be allowed to stand in the way. And he effects the transition

to the concluding 'episode' or 'epilogue' at the end of the discussion by recalling the greatness of the issue as his excuse for clearing away every obstacle. "For much is at stake, my dear Glaucon," I said, "more than people think, in a man's becoming good or bad; and therefore he must not be reduced by honour or money or any office or even by poetry (οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ) to dare to neglect justice and the rest of virtue" (p. 608). By the mention of poetry as a dangerous influence parallel and in addition to the other sources of corruption, that he had already illustrated, Plato seems quite clearly to hint the connexion of the digression with the main body of the work, and the remark that the issue is 'greater than people think' appropriately leads the mind to the concluding episode and consummation of the work.

The issue, as Socrates goes on to explain, is not confined to any given individual mortal life. Injustice has been shown to be the greatest evil that can affect the soul, but it might be urged the evil is not everlasting—it dies with the soul, and thus death might bring relief. But, says Socrates, this is not the case, for though injustice destroys the health of the soul, it does not destroy its life. The soul's life is not bounded by the narrow limits of birth and death, but goes on for ever, being indestructible and imperishable. The effect, then, of injustice is not to kill the soul but to afflict it with the most terrible diseases, which, if not incurable everlastingly, are not healed without awful torments. Hence the choice which a man has to make, does not affect the present life only, but has far-reaching consequences extending to an endless succession of lives. For man, according to Plato's doctrine, is 'a heavenly plant' (οὐράνιον φυτόν, οὐκ ἔγγειον, *Tim.*, 9, A) and the effects of his actions cannot be bounded by any earthly horizon. Thus man no longer appears merely as an ephemeral inhabitant of earth, as the materialistic sophist regarded him, but as the pilgrim of eternity, 'the spectator of all time and existence'. It thus becomes necessary to deal with the relation of time to eternity, of the individual to the universal. But this is just the problem which it is impossible to state with exact philosophical precision (λίγω), as the subsequent history of philosophy, by its record of repeated failures, abundantly shows; and Plato has not the hardihood to attempt it. He falls back, true to his principles, on the myth, 'the noble lie,' whereby he will make his theory "as like the truth as possible," when the exact truth is beyond us. And so he ends by emphasising the tremendous import of the choice between good and evil, by the introduction of

supernatural machinery which gives a vision of the judgment and the relation of time to eternity.

But first Plato is careful to point out that he has won his case and fought strictly according to the rules of the contest. Even in the earthly contest justice has won a handsome victory. By itself alone, by virtue merely of its power in the soul, by being its own reward, it has turned out to be better and more profitable than its opposite. He has shown also then the soul will act justly even if it have the ring of Gyges and quite regardless of the favour of the gods as of public opinion. His language at this point recalls the very phraseology of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the formulation of the issue in Book II. What the brothers wished to be proved has been proved in set terms.

Having, then, established independently the superiority of justice, Socrates is now in a position to show that after all the gods and public opinion cannot be left out of account altogether in a complete philosophy of life, and that by agreeing to argue on the terms imposed by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the champions of sophistry, he had actually been making them a loan, which he must now take back. For if justice is good, it is nonsense to suppose that the gods who, according to Plato's definition in Book II., are 'authors of good' can be indifferent to the fate of the just man or that his fellow-men will not pay him his meed of recognition and reward. As well expect the victor in the races not to receive applause and the crown. On the contrary, the just man will have his prize of virtue and he will be crowned either in this life or in the life to come. "The true runners run to a finish, receive their prizes and are crowned," and "though the just man live in poverty, in disease or any other seeming evil, things will in the end work out well for him either in life or after death. The gods surely do not neglect him who will bestir himself to become just, and by the practice of virtue to make himself as like God as man may" (p. 613). Thus Plato places himself at the head of all the robust philosophers and endorses the verdict of the world which judges with perfect confidence that it shall be well with the righteous. And so Plato's moral philosophy ends in religion, which indeed it is, as Nettleship points out. The whole duty of man is *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ* and its obligatoriness is emphasised by the vision of a future life and of the controlling forces of the Universe. This vision, being dominated through and through by ethical ideas, is not only a means by which Plato purifies the conceptions of Hades current in contemporary popular thought,

but also expresses in a figure his conviction that morality, goodness, is of the nature of things. At the same time it inevitably suggests the problem of free-will and necessity by bringing the individual into direct and immediate contact with the fates. Man is represented as exercising his choice of good or evil in the immediate presence of the powers which direct the universe. And it might well be asked how far can man determine his own choice, and how far is it determined for him by forces which are too strong for him? Plato is conscious of the difficulty. He is perfectly aware that the moral life cannot be isolated 'on a hill retired,' safeguarded from the intrusion of the ultimate problems of reality, as some moral philosophers would have us believe. And if reality is a cosmos of ordered necessity, how can the individual choose freely? And the most ordinary and patent facts of life—that the individual is born into a lot which he did not choose and which seems to exercise so much influence on him for good or evil—suggest these questions. The problem of freedom then, naturally and logically, comes up into full relief alongside of the other great ideas of philosophy at the end of the dialogue. Of God he had in a manner given an account in the idea of good; of immortality he offers a proof. But freedom is a mystery, which no philosophy has finally solved. Plato is content to treat the matter in a figure or myth, in which he gives a profession of faith. Though he is convinced that all things are ordered by necessity, he is equally convinced that necessity cannot annul man's freedom to choose the good. Otherwise virtue would be under a master and therefore a slave. "But," he says, "Virtue has no master (*ἀδέσποτον*) and as a man honours or despises her, so will he have more of her or less. The responsibility is on him that chooseth. There is none on God." And with characteristic paradox, free choice is described as being exercised under the presiding direction of Necessity, and it is the spokesman of "the daughter of Necessity," that proclaims man's freedom.

IV.—DISCUSSION.

THE EGO-CENTRIC PREDICAMENT.

IN the course of a discussion on realism, Prof. Perry tells us that he reached his own view by discovering 'that the prevailing philosophy, known as idealism, was incorrectly maintaining as its central thesis the necessity and universality for things of their relation to an apprehending, experiencing, or cognising mind. I desire to argue with . . . any philosopher who will do me the honour, the merits of this question.'¹ Several writers have answered the appeal either in support or criticism of Prof. Perry's view; and it may be that further comment is idle. But as I do not feel quite satisfied with the way in which the case has been presented by any one whose statements I have noticed, I venture to take up Prof. Perry's challenge. My interest in the main, however, is not in supporting or confuting Prof. Perry, but in the question itself. The argument which I have to put forward may be divided into three sections. In the first place, I wish to summarise Prof. Perry's contentions as I understand them; in the second, to consider the situation of which these views are an analysis; and in the third, to discuss the bearing of the problem on idealism and realism.

Prof. Perry first stated his view on this topic, so far as I am aware, in the *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., for 1910, in an article entitled 'The Ego-Centric Predicament'. His design there is to consider a closely limited argument, put forward on behalf of a view which he calls ontological idealism. This view is, he tells us, that everything and anything is defined by its relation to a cognitive or experiencing subject. Taking E as the symbol for the ego in a general sense, Rc for the relation of whatever is known to the ego which knows it, and T for anything at all, ontological idealism may be described as the view which asserts that (E) Rc (T) defines T. The relation involved here, Rc, is, Prof. Perry points out, a specific one. It may be said that in the end any two things in the universe have some relation to one another; but ontological idealism is not speaking of any vague relation which may happen to hold between E and T; it has in mind the special and definite relation of being known, experienced, cognised, or how-

¹ MIND, 1915, p. 240.

ever else one likes to call it. And the view which it advances is that this relation to a subject is in some sense necessary to everything.

When ontological idealism attempts to prove this position, a peculiar situation is revealed. It points out that there is nothing that we can adduce which is not a content of experience, *i.e.*, which does not stand in the relation R_c to E . Anything which we mention, or to which we refer, is a content of experience in the wide sense of that term which alone is relevant here, *i.e.*, it is in the relation R_c to E ; for mentioning, referring, and so forth, are cases of R_c . That is to say, when challenged in this way we cannot indicate anything which does not fall under the relation to a knower. If we eliminate the relation in question we cannot see what happens: we have ceased to think. Prof. Perry gives this situation the title of the ego-centric predicament. From this predicament ontological idealism draws the conclusion that there is nothing which does not stand in the relation of a content to knowledge.

Prof. Perry dissents from this result. We are not justified in concluding from the ego-centric predicament that there are no instances of T out of the relation $(E)R_c(T)$: we are faced by a methodological difficulty, and not by a consideration which applies to objects at all. We introduce ourselves when we turn to any object or thing; but it is possible that there are things quite apart from our turning to them and studying them. This is an essential point in Prof. Perry's argument, as I understand; and it deserves prominence. He assumes that there are two alternatives open to us; and apart from evidence neither is more likely than the other. On the one hand, there may be things apart from knowledge— T may be out of the relation $(E)R_c(T)$ as well as in it; on the other hand, things may be necessarily conditioned by knowledge—every T stands in the relation in question. The ego-centric predicament affords no evidence regarding those alternatives, and cannot be used to prove one rather than the other; for if the former alternative were true we could not discover it.¹ It is important to remember that the term E —knowing, experiencing, feeling as a subjective fact—is a general term, referring not to a special subject but to any one at all. And hence it is of no avail to appeal to what happens to anything when it becomes known to some other subject than oneself. 'In making the comparison, I institute the relationship with myself, and so am unable to free T altogether from such relationships.'²

In another article Prof. Perry elaborates the argument.³ The ego-centric predicament conveys no information about things. It

¹ See *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., 1910, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*

³ *MIND*, 1910, 'The Cardinal Principle of Idealism'. See also *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, chap. vi., where the two articles are connected together.

contains a proposition, it is true, namely, that 'every mentioned thing is an idea'—Prof. Perry is using the term 'idea' for contents apprehended—'But this is virtually a redundant proposition to the effect that every mentioned thing is mentioned, or that every idea, object of knowledge, or experience, is an idea, object of knowledge, or experience. And a redundant proposition is no proposition at all. The assertion that an idea is an idea, conveys no knowledge even about ideas.'¹

Finally, if it is argued that the position of ontological idealism—(E)Rc(T) defines, or is necessary to, T—can be made out by an inductive proof, the reply is that, over and above the error of trying to infer anything from a redundancy, the argument uses an inconclusive form of induction. It relies on the method of agreement alone, and forgets that the failure to find negative cases is due to a condition of observation, and not of the cases themselves. Prof. Perry clinches his point by some examples. 'Thus, I cannot conclude that English is the only intelligible form of speech simply because whomsoever I understand speaks English.' Similarly, with the wearing of coloured glasses we have to discount the blueness of the things we see; for we have imported it into them by our manner of observation.² The ego-centric predicament proves nothing: 'it would be as reasonable for me to conclude . . . that a star of the eighth magnitude must be seen through a telescope, or that chromosomes must be stained in order to exist. . . . This leaves open the question as to whether there is or is not a logical or causal connexion between the thing observed and the observing process. The Martian canals *may* be in the telescope, or the staining may create the cell body.'³ But the matter must be settled on other evidence. 'One would have to produce evidence that things in general are caused by the agency or operation called mind, or that they somehow imply it *a priori*.'⁴ We may postpone asking whether this evidence is forthcoming.

Prof. Perry's view has been endorsed by Dr. Wendell Bush. He agrees that 'the idealist commits a logical fallacy in his resolution of the "predicament"'. The situation lends itself quite as consistently to the realist's interpretation as to that of the idealist. It is as though an admirer of negative values were to insist that because $x^2 = 4$, x must = - 2. When all we know about the situation is that $x^2 = 4$, to argue that $x = - 2$ and not + 2, is to commit the same fallacy that the idealist commits in commenting upon perception. Under the assumed conditions $x = \pm 2$, and that would seem to be the end of it.'⁵ This omits the question of further evidence which Prof. Perry raises, but we may waive that for a moment. Dr. Bush concludes thus: 'If the problem of choosing logically between alternatives is extinguished by dis-

¹ MIND, 1910, p. 334; *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 131.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131 f.

³ MIND, 1915, p. 241.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Journal of Philosophy*, 1911, p. 438.

covering that the very logic of the situation prevents the elimination of alternatives, is not the problem solved by that discovery? Just as $x = \pm 2$, the epistemological problem of the ego-centric predicament is solved by taking all the alternatives together. Or if this is not a solution, then the conditions themselves logically prohibit a solution, which is the same as saying that they do not provide a problem of the logical type.¹ This is not quite the conclusion to which Prof. Perry himself comes in the end—it assumes that further evidence is impossible—but, as we shall see, it is not irrelevant to the main point.

I have stated Prof. Perry's argument fairly fully; I propose now to consider the situation itself. The first point which seems to me to deserve mention is the wide sense in which Prof. Perry takes the term E in the relation (E)Re(T); it stands for any knower of any sort. The situation is quite different if we identify E with some individual act of knowledge. There is no difficulty in pointing out things which are not the content of some definite subject's apprehension in some specific circumstance. The challenge which is thrown out by idealism according to Prof. Perry, may be taken in two ways. If it means, Indicate something which is not relative to knowledge at all, it is a demand with which we cannot comply—as Prof. Perry agrees. But if it means, Indicate something which is not relative to your present act of knowing, can I not proceed to acquaint myself with some new fact and then mention it? I do not know what word will end the next line, but I hope to know soon. That is to say, when E stands for a definite and individual knowledge, the predicament which is involved is one from which we can escape by another act of knowledge.

In the second place, a similar point may be made with regard to the relation 'Rc'. If we understand it to mean some one definite method of apprehending or being aware of things, sensing, perceiving, thinking, and so on, then if any other mode of knowing is left open to us, the predicament is not formidable. Thus, I may know the existence of something which is not actually present to me; I may infer it from what is before me or, in general, from some piece of information which is otherwise known to be true. From this it follows that the ego-centric predicament does not justify the inference that things come into existence when they are apprehended, and disappear when the apprehension ceases. An apprehension which comes and goes is not all knowledge, it is a limited case of it; and it is possible by another act of knowledge to compare the fact as known to the first act of knowledge with the same fact as unknown to it.

We may go farther than this. It is possible to know objects which are not bodily present. I may think now of something which is past, or which has not happened yet; and I may be

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, p. 439.

aware now that it is not a present fact. I may even know that the thing whereof I think is not a fact at all, and in the strict sense of the term does not exist; I may think of something which did not take place. 'Suppose Hannibal had taken Rome —.' Hannibal did not take Rome, and I am aware of that as I think of the suggestion.

In short, if we refer to a special subject or act of knowledge, it is possible that objects may exist apart from the relation *Rc* to it; and we may know that they exist. Similarly, if we refer to some special limited form of apprehending, objects may exist apart from it. And, lastly, things known may be known not to co-exist with the act of knowledge which apprehends them.

When we turn to the wider interpretation of the situation, where *E* is any knowledge, and *Rc* any form of knowing, we cannot adopt the same attitude. It is impossible to comply with the challenge to produce something which does not stand in the relation *Rc* to *E*: to attempt to do so is to talk nonsense. From this it would seem to follow that one should refrain from such an attempt in enunciating a theory either of knowledge or reality, and confine one's attention to things which are in the relation *Rc* to *E*. At this point, however, Prof. Perry joins issue; and we must go into the matter more closely.

The conclusion which Dr. Bush draws from Prof. Perry's premises seems to me less directly open to objection than Prof. Perry's own. He tells us that one of three things must be done. Firstly, we may take the alternatives together; secondly, we may say that a solution is impossible; or thirdly, and we are told that this is the same as the second alternative, we may say that there is no problem of the 'logical type'. This result is not satisfactory, but it has the merit of not contradicting the premises; it admits in effect that there is no point in looking for further evidence to decide between $+2$ and -2 , if *all* we know is that $x = \pm 2$. Prof. Perry, if I understand him rightly, supposes that there is; and he offers what he considers relevant evidence. He obtains this by examining the nature of individual acts of thinking; discovering that no constitutive relation holds between things in general and the definite acts of mind which may apprehend them. But Prof. Perry himself has put this argument out of court; for he has carefully pointed out that we cannot obtain any case in which a thing is *altogether* free from the relation to a subject, and that when we compare a thing known to an individual with the same thing when and as unknown to that individual we introduce the relation to our own mind.¹ That is to say, Prof. Perry's evidence applies only to the case where *E* is a particular ego or act of knowledge, and not when it is a general term for knowing as such.

Prof. Perry's illustrations seem to me to be vitiated, if applied to

¹ *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., 1910, p. 8.

the wider interpretation of the situation, by the same confusion. The other predicaments which he places on a level with the ego-centric one differ in that we can escape from them. I *can* know that English is not the only intelligible language, and I can take off coloured glasses. So, too, when he speaks of the existence of a star of the eighth magnitude depending on being *seen* through a telescope, or of a cell on being stained, he takes the relation 'Rc' in a limited sense.

Prof. Perry may protest that I am perverting his argument here; he may refer me to his view of the transcendence of the immanent, and so forth. And I admit that he is concerned to prove another point as well as the merely methodological character of the ego-centric predicament. But he himself connects the two; at any rate it ought to be pointed out that the evidence and illustrations which he offers do not bear on the problem which he has set, *viz.*, the situation (E)Rc(T) where E and Rc are taken in their most general and abstract form.

Assuming then that, as Dr. Bush puts it, we cannot decide on the premises between $+2$ and -2 , can we go any farther? Can we come to any conclusion regarding the alternative solutions which Dr. Bush suggested? It is difficult to see what is meant by the first one, *viz.*, that we should take all the alternatives together. Does it mean that we are to combine the statement that there are reals out of relation to knowledge with the statement that there are none? It may, however, be simply a roundabout way of saying that we cannot decide between the possibilities; just as $x = \pm 2$ is a compressed way of stating that $x = +2$ or -2 and that we do not know which. In any case it contradicts itself by speaking of absolutely unknown reals and making them an element in a theory. I think that Dr. Bush is right when he suspects that this is not a solution. The second suggestion is that the conditions themselves logically prohibit a solution. From this one would infer that the correct thing to do was to give the puzzle up; which would commit us, if we theorised any further, to dealing only with things within the relation (E)Rc(T)—and this, if I understand Prof. Perry, is a form of idealism. But Dr. Bush identifies it with the statement that there is really no problem of the 'logical type' involved. I think this last point is correct, but it must receive another interpretation than that which Dr. Bush gives it. So far as we have gone there is a problem: we have been offered two alternatives either of which, we are told, may be true. But one of these alternatives involves a contradiction, and is not logically open to us. The alternatives are, on the one hand, that everything is relative to knowledge, and, on the other, that some things are not relative to knowledge. Prof. Perry and Dr. Bush both assume that these things beyond the subject-object relation must be as at least possible. But we have no more right to speak of their possibility than of

their actual existence. The term A is a content of knowledge in the judgment 'A is possible' as well as in the judgment 'A is actual,' and the ego-centric predicament makes both judgments untenable where A is a thing out of relation to knowledge. Kant fell into this mistake before Prof. Perry did. After he had asserted that possibility and causality are categories applicable only to the world which could be apprehended by the understanding, Kant still tried to apply them to Things-in-themselves. Now and then he noticed that he was doing this, and corrected himself. The Thing-in-itself is a free cause—No not a cause, but something like a cause! Categories are inapplicable to Things-in-themselves, but they can be applied analogically! Such subterfuges show that Kant is not prepared to face his own conclusions. Similarly here, whatever we say applies only to things known, and never to things utterly unknown and *ex vi termini* unknowable. Fichte's reply to the Kantian position is still in point: 'You are able to *speak* of a reality without *knowing* it, without having it even dimly in your consciousness, and without appealing to the latter? You can do more than I. Lay the book aside: it is not written for you.'¹

The outcome of the argument up to this point is as follows. Prof. Perry has maintained that the ego-centric predicament *may* have to be discounted, and he believes that it *must* be discounted and is prepared to offer evidence for that view; but we have seen that on his own showing no evidence is possible and that the predicament *cannot* be discounted. There is another contention, however, which we have still to examine. The proposition contained in the ego-centric predicament is a tautology, and from a tautology nothing follows. If this statement is true the situation is very tangled, and I confess that I do not see my way through it. It is nonsense to talk of things out of the subject-object relation—Prof. Perry admits it in effect—and yet we cannot draw that conclusion! I doubt this, and I suspect that Prof. Perry has fallen into a very ancient logical error. The statement which he is controverting is that everything is relative to knowledge. He points out that in order to prove this statement we must discover that the 'everything' of which we are speaking is relative to knowledge, and argues that we are dealing not with 'everything' *simpliciter* but only with it as qualified by the phrase 'relative to knowledge'. 'Everything relative to knowledge is relative to knowledge.' Jevons once urged that the predicate should be qualified by the subject, and that the form S is P should give way to S is SP; and if Prof. Perry's reasoning is sound the step seems a necessary one. If it is relevant to argue that in order to know S is P we must qualify S by P—and P by S—*every* judgment, so far as I can see, will be reduced to the form SP is SP; for in order to know that any judg-

¹ *Sonnenklarer Bericht, WW., II., p. 343.*

ment holds we must know that its subject and predicate are related. Of course, the plain man—if there is such in logical matters—will protest that the terms are sufficiently qualified by one another in the judgment itself, and that it is not necessary to crush the whole judgment bodily into each bit of it; and the protest is justified. But in that case Prof. Perry's argument must also give way. If I say that this ink-bottle is perceived by me, I speak of a perceived ink-bottle; but I have done all that can fairly be demanded of me if I put the complex whole into a judgment, and not into a single term. Similarly, if I say, 'Everything is relative to a subject,' I am entitled to take the whole judgment to express myself. I submit, therefore, that this latter judgment, true or untrue, is not a tautology; and for anything yet said may be a step in an argument.

But I have been misrepresenting Prof. Perry; he does not really mean that this proposition is a tautology; he thinks that it is false. The truth is, on his view, that not 'everything,' but only 'some things,' is the proper subject, and the some things in question are to be characterised as things relative to knowledge. We have found, however, that this assumption is untenable; and the proposition which we can state is not merely that some things—*viz.*, known things—are relative to knowledge, but that all things are so. Hence the criticism of tautology applies not to the proposition which we do make, but to the one which we should make if an unsound supposition were accepted. The criticism, therefore, may be disregarded. The judgment we make asserts an identity between 'everything' and 'relative to knowledge'; and the identity is not tautological, for the terms differ. That we have to become aware of the identity in order to make the judgment does not cancel the difference; it is a general consideration relevant (or irrelevant) in the same sense to all judgments.

We may now turn to the bearing of the situation as we have analysed it on the issue between realism and idealism. It is obvious at once, and the point has been made already, that the predicament excludes the conception of the Thing-in-itself in the sense of an 'unknowable reality'. But there is a more important question: How far—if at all—does realism depend on the postulate of such entities. The impression which has been made on me by realistic writers of Prof. Perry's school is that there are two strains in their realism, one of which involves the postulate, while the other, *prima facie* at least, does not. Realism insists that the object of knowledge is independent of being known—this is its cardinal doctrine—and everything turns on the meaning given to independence. According to one interpretation, independence means in this connexion that the object known does not have certain specified relations to the knower: it does not contain the subject, nor imply it, nor is it exclusively caused or implied by it.¹

¹ See Prof. Perry's article on 'A Realistic Theory of Independence' in *The New Realism*.

That is to say, independence is not the same as absence of relation in general; and accordingly it does not come into direct collision with the relation *Rc* which holds between *T* and *E*. Indeed, the analysis of knowing offered by this form of realism attempts to show that the relation *Rc* is not a case of dependence. Against this line of thought the arguments drawn from the ego-centric predicament are by themselves impotent. The realistic doctrine may be true, or it may be false, when taken in this way; but it must be estimated on other grounds than the bare fact that *some* cognitive relation does hold between things and knowledge.

But, on the other hand, there is another tendency in realism which is not free from Things-in-themselves. It is borne witness to by Prof. Perry's attack on the ego-centric predicament in general. If he does not wish to assert Things-in-themselves, why does he offer such strenuous resistance to the effort to shut them out? He objects, too, to a doctrine which 'moves entirely within the limits of experience,'¹ and says that 'there is no reason for limiting "things" even to what can be experienced'.² I admit that these statements are made in close connexion with the first strain of thought which we have just mentioned, nevertheless they seem to me to go beyond it, and imply a conception of a Thing-in-itself which is not merely an element within the subject-object relation, unaffected by being there, but one which is out of the relation altogether. Prof. Perry has himself to thank if critics fasten on the second strain of thought when he would prefer them to discuss the first.

It may be, of course, that the realistic doctrine of independence cannot be carried out without involving statements about purely transcendent 'realities'; and in that case it is excluded. But this question involves a definite discussion of 'external relations,' and is not to be dealt with here.

The bearing on idealism follows from this. In the first place, the ego-centric predicament does not prove the direct dependence of anything for its existence on being known. A thing need not be known when it exists, but at another time. I may know now an event in the past, and, moreover, I may know that it was caused, and given existence, by a set of conditions among which my apprehending it is not included.

Secondly, the relation which things have to knowledge is not to be confused with a relation to any specific individual. The world is not necessarily limited to whatever may be known to some special being. It may be so limited, but the ego-centric predicament will not prove it.

Thirdly, the standpoint of experience is a legitimate one. Everything is in relation to subjectivity, and if we can make anything of that fact we are entitled to do so. The usefulness of the standpoint depends entirely on the nature of experience: if it is a purely

¹ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 314.

² *Ibid.*, p. 316.

external relation of a subject to its contents—as realism believes—nothing regarding the nature of things follows from it. Nevertheless, the fact is there, and one has a right to assume it. Of course, if experience is not the external relation which realism suggests, consequences will follow; and idealism will have a legitimate source of material which realism neglects.

To sum up, we have taken up the ego-centric situation in the sense and within the limits which Prof. Perry suggested in his initial statement. He believed that idealism has misused the predicament by drawing an invalid conclusion from it; the truth being, on his view, that no conclusion whatever follows. I have not questioned his view of the part which the argument plays in idealism, although I must not be taken as agreeing with it; but I have argued that a conclusion does follow, and that the situation is not wholly tautological and barren. Prof. Perry thinks that idealism is disproved by the rejection of the inference that everything is relative to knowledge. The inference, however, is not, and cannot be, disproved; nevertheless, taken by itself, it is not cogent on behalf of idealism. The further issue concerning the nature of experience is the vital one, and Prof. Perry's contributions to it merit closer consideration than they have yet received. I agree with him that the analysis of mind is fundamental, but I suggest that idealism has presented a more detailed and coherent view in that connexion than he is disposed to admit. These questions, however, deserve a separate treatment, and fall beyond the scope of this paper.

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V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Einführung in die Ethik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung. By G. HEYMANS. Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1914. Pp. vii, 319.

PROF. HEYMANS seems to me, in spite of his adhesion to some views which I find strange, to have written a very valuable and fresh *Introduction to Ethics*. His work deserves to the full the commendation given by Martineau to moralists who refuse to sacrifice their science to metaphysics on the one hand, or to psychology on the other. Unlike many treatises with similar titles, it really treats neither of metaphysics nor of psychology but strictly of ethics, and the present writer, at least, has found it always provocative of thought and often illuminating, in spite of its somewhat uninspired literary style.

After an *Introduction* dealing with the general character of the ethical problem and the method appropriate to its solution, Dr. Heymans discusses, in the two principal chapters of the book, the general character of moral judgments and the "criteria" of moral judgments; the volume ends with a comparatively brief, but very interesting chapter on the application of ethical theory to the actual conduct of life.

With the general attitude of the *Introduction* I am glad to find myself in complete agreement on all points of importance, though on one secondary matter which concerns the connexion of ethics with psychology I think Dr. Heymans' own expressions hardly do full justice to his meaning. Ethics is defined as the "Science of the Good (the moral) and Evil (the immoral)"; it "has to tell us what deserves to be called good or evil, whether universally, or under special conditions, or in a given case". Hence two things may be required from a final ethical system: (1) it must give us "clear and sharp distinctions between Good and Evil, i.e. ultimate criteria by which we can always distinguish the two," and (2) "must apply these criteria to the different given or conceivable relations of life". The former problem, Dr. Heymans thinks, is far the more difficult. If we once have really clear notions of good and evil, the application of them to particular cases will hardly give rise to any serious divergence of opinion. I confess I can hardly believe that the second problem is soluble by any science of ethics, and I

am sure that it is a much more difficult one than the author admits. Hedonism, for example, makes a perfectly sharp and clear distinction between what it regards as the good and what it considers evil; but Dr. Heymans surely cannot believe that because two Hedonists agree that the good is pleasure, there can hardly be any serious difference in the views they would take as to the proper course to be pursued in a given set of circumstances. Dr. Heymans' own reason for his assertion strikes me as a bad one. It is simply that however much two philosophers of the same age and civilisation may disagree about the fundamental questions of ethical theory, they commonly do not differ much in their estimates of the morality of particular acts. No doubt the fact is so, but I should say that the explanation is simply that philosophers do not, as a rule, arrive at their opinions about the morality of particular acts by deduction from their theories about the good. Like other men, they for the most part acquiesce in the practical morality of the serious and conscientious members of their society. They are already satisfied, *e.g.* that suicide or adultery is wrong before they have formulated a theory about the good at all, and if their theory, when formed, will not readily square with their moral code, they commonly prefer being illogical to giving up their moral code. (Thus even Mill, who claimed in theory for the Hedonist philosopher a considerable licence of innovation on the existing codes, in practice justifies adhesion to current moral rules by the ridiculously bad analogy of the useful "nautical almanac".)

I think, in fact, that the whole of what Dr. Heymans regards as the second part of a theory of morals, must really be the work not of a science but of common-sense, and I would suggest that he has been led astray by his unfortunate way of regarding the ultimate principles of ethics as "criteria" of the goodness and badness of particular acts. I do not believe in the possibility of such "criteria," and I am confirmed in my disbelief by the parallel with the ultimate principles of logic and aesthetics. Dr. Heymans speaks of these principles also as "criteria," but he must surely know that, to confine one's self to the case of logic, the ultimate principles of logic are not "criteria" of the truth or falsehood of particular propositions. In fact, there are no such "criteria". What all true (or all false) propositions have in common is just their truth (or their falsehood); there is no independent mark by which you may recognise a given proposition as true, other than its truth. And so with "good" or "right" actions. In the end there is nothing common to them all *but* their "goodness" or "rightness," and it seems strange to me that an author who insists so strongly as Dr. Heymans on the point that the ultimate data of the moralist are our own immediate verdicts on the rightness and wrongness of our acts should not have seen this.

The method of ethics—and here I am glad to find myself in complete agreement with Dr. Heymans—is the "Empirical-Analy-

tical". That is, we have to start with the given fact that we do immediately judge some acts to be good in the peculiar and unique way in which we use that term in pronouncing moral verdicts, and others to be bad, just as we judge some assertions to be true and others false, some objects beautiful and others ugly. For ethics this immediate judgment of value is something behind which we cannot go. This does not mean, of course, that every such judgment is infallible, but only that the judgment "this is good" is primitive and unanalysable, and that there would be no meaning in a system of ethics for beings who had not the experience of passing verdicts of this special kind. The true method of ethics is analytical, not in the sense that it tries to analyse such judgments into simpler components, but that it attempts to classify them in groups of which each may be represented by a definite principle (such *media axiomata* as "veracity is good," "dutifulness is good"), and then to compare and classify these principles themselves under still higher principles. The method is, in fact, precisely that which Plato recommends in the *Philebus* as the only way to arrive satisfactorily at the "one" which contributes unity to a given manifold.

Dr. Heymans characterises the "empirical-analytical" method (which is, as I have said, really just the Platonic "analysis") further as "psychological". This I regard as unfortunate since it leads him to speak of ethics as "founded on" psychology, though in point of fact he does not mean by this language what it naturally suggests, that we can base a theory of the way in which we ought to act on mere consideration of the ways in which men do act. No one can be more outspoken than Dr. Heymans on the absurdity of such a procedure, and it is a pity that he should have used a terminology which, as he sees, lays him open to misunderstanding and compels him to repudiate the misconception at considerable length. His only reason for calling his method "psychological" at all appears to be that the passing of a moral judgment is a psychical act. Of course it is, but since what he regards as the material to be analysed is not the process of judging but the proposition asserted when I judge, the analysis is not really a psychological one at all. You might as well call a chemist's analysis of a new compound psychological on the ground that it involves mental processes on the part of the chemist.

I come now to the first of the chapters which make up the body of the book, that on "the moral judgment in general". What distinguishes moral judgments from all others? The combination of three features: (1) they are attended, when we make them, by a unique and specific feeling which is pleasant or painful, according as the judgment is one of approval or blame; (2) they claim to be universally valid (*i.e.* to be admitted by every one); (3) they have a "volitional" side to them; we wish to "reward" or "punish" the agent on whose conduct we pass our verdict, and this is what

distinguishes moral from *e.g.* æsthetic judgments. The objects on which they are passed are exclusively manifestations of the human will. This leads up to a discussion of the old question whether moral verdicts are passed on external acts or on something of which the acts are the mere outward expression. Dr. Heymans begins his examination of the question by defining the terms "inclination" (*Neigung*) and "motive". In his terminology a "motive" is a *Zielvorstellung* which awakens a wish. *I.e.* by "motives" he means the possible ends of action suggested to us by a given situation. "Inclinations" are the "general and permanent psychological dispositions (*Anlagen*) in virtue of which a motive arouses a wish." Thus an "inclination" stands to a "motive" as in the external world a *Naturkraft* (*e.g.* gravitation, electricity, etc.) to a cause. By its appeal to an "inclination" one of the "motives" contained in a given situation arouses a wish, or it may be several "motives," appealing to different "inclinations" arouse conflicting wishes; the finally resulting action is, to borrow a metaphor from mechanics, the resultant of our wishes. Hence to explain a man's behaviour we need to know (1) what "motives" the situation presents to him; (2) the relative strength in him of the "inclinations" corresponding to these "motives". The whole system of a man's "inclinations" in their relative degrees of strength is what we mean by his character when we say that his acts are the product of his motives and his character, and Dr. Heymans thus reaches the conclusion that, in the last resort, it must be "inclinations" which are the specific objects of moral judgments. What we judge cannot be the act, since most acts admit of more than one interpretation, and we judge of their worth according to the interpretation we adopt (*e.g.* we approve or condemn the same action according as we think it prompted by generosity or by vanity). And it cannot, of course, be the "motive," in Dr. Heymans' sense of the word, since this is contributed not by the agent but by the situation. What we judge, then, must be "the measure in which the agent has shown himself sensitive to the different motives presented to him," and that is determined by the "inclinations" which make up his character. In the main this seems a sound and careful piece of analysis, though it is disfigured by the unwarranted assumption that we can make a sharp distinction between "moral" and "egoistic" inclinations. This distinction seems open to both ethical and psychological objections. It cannot be ethically sound unless we are prepared to erase the noble name of *prudentia* from the list of the virtues, and the psychologist may reasonably criticise the assumption that our primitive inclinations admit of being called either egoistic or altruistic. And I may further note that it seems to be assumed that a man's system of "inclinations" is from the first a fixed and determinate thing, like the "unchangeable character" of which Schopenhauer had so much to say. This is, at least, incap-

able of proof, and the tacit treatment of it as beyond question seriously vitiates Dr. Heymans' subsequent discussion of Determinism.

Dr. Heymans next proceeds to consider the objections which a psychological Hedonist might make to his theory of the moral judgment. Such a critic would reject the whole doctrine, as *he* recognises only one primitive *Neigung*, appetite of pleasure and aversion from pain. Dr. Heyman's reply is that (1) even if the psychological Hedonist is right in his assertion that we only desire the pleasant, there is good ground to hold that in many cases "the pleasant" is only felt to be pleasant because it is recognised as morally good, and (2) that experience proves, what *e.g.* J. S. Mill virtually admits, *viz.*, that we may prefer a less pleasant, or even a positively painful, existence to a more pleasant. The objections of the psychological Hedonist are thus, at the very least, irrelevant. The next subject to be discussed is the "conditions of the moral judgment". Under this rubric Dr. Heymans considers at great length and with a good deal of acuteness the various circumstances which may be regarded as rendering a man free from moral responsibility for what he does. In many respects I find his discussion more careful and accurate than those which are usually allotted to the subject in the manuals of ethics. Thus I would especially commend the unusually thoughtful treatment of the question how far insanity relieves from moral accountability. I am quite in sympathy with the author's view that it cannot be laid down as a general rule without qualification that an insane person is *eo ipso* not accountable, *e.g.*, to take his own example, it would be unreasonable to hold that a man is not to be held accountable for an attempted rape on the ground that he is known to suffer from paranoiac illusions of persecution. I am, however, surprised that a writer who is inclined to take a rather rigoristic view in dealing with "ignorance" or intellectual backwardness as an exculpation should be as lax as Dr. Heymans in his treatment of the plea of "moral pressure". He is so ready to make allowance for the plea of provocation or extreme temptation that he seems to me (p. 75, first paragraph) to come very near holding that a man is hardly to be censured at all for what he does under such influences. Thus he says that in judging fairly of the moral guilt attaching to homicide under provocation, what we have to consider is (1) the severity of the provocation, and (2) the degree of "precision and completeness with which the probable consequences of the reaction were present to the agent's mind at the moment of his decision". Hence he would, I suppose, hold that if only the provocation were sufficient to make the homicide for the moment "blind" with rage, little or no blame would be due to his act. Does not Dr. Heymans forget here that, on his own showing, moral verdicts are passed on character, and that a character which can be easily disorganised to the pitch of homicidal

fury is a very poor one? We cannot have an "objective" scale of intensities of provocation: that certain provocations are to me very intense is itself a proof that I have not the right kind of character. On the other hand, I am very glad to see that Dr. Heymans absolutely refuses to allow "moral anæsthesia" to be pleaded in extenuation of wrong-doing. As he says—and it was also the view of Aristotle—"if there is such a thing as a purely moral anæsthesia, *i.e.*, if there are men possessed of normal temperament and intellect, but entirely destitute of consciousness of the value of moral ends, this only means that they have no feeling for such ends, and are thus radically immoral"; it makes absolutely no difference to the case that we may be pleased to call such a degree of immorality "diseased" (p. 79).

Nearly fifty pages are next given to a very detailed discussion of the issue between determinism and indeterminism, both from a psychological and an ethical point of view. Dr. Heymans is a rigid determinist and attaches great ethical importance to the determinist doctrine; consequently his statement of the case is as good and thorough a presentation of the determinist view as can well be made, and I recommend careful study of it to all who are interested in the question. Personally I am doubly opposed to his conclusions. I do not see that it is necessary to raise the issue at all so long as one is dealing with strictly ethical problems, and keeps clear of metaphysics, and I am almost equally sure that determinism, even as presented by Dr. Heymans, evades the real difficulties. I suppose the reason why Dr. Heymans thinks the question ethically important is that he believes, as he says, that we assume rigid determinism as the basis of all our practical conduct. Here I am sure he is mistaken. In practice we do assume that with proper care it is possible to draw inferences about a man's future conduct from our knowledge of his past with considerable probability. We never assume what Dr. Heymans calls determinism, the view that with sufficient data such inferences would become certain. *E.g.*, if I did not think that it is more likely than not that respectable Life Insurance Societies will pay up the claims on them, I should not insure my life. But I need not wait to satisfy myself that "with sufficient data" I could infer as an absolute certainty that a given society will not become insolvent before taking out a policy with it. Or, again, unless it were possible to estimate the probability that a client will live to a given age, Life Insurance business could not be transacted at all, but if it were possible to know for certain how long an individual man will live, there would equally be no Life Insurance Companies. Their very existence depends on the fact that our expectation of life can be estimated with probability—but never with certainty. Now no indeterminist need deny that it is possible to make judgments about men's future conduct with a fair amount of probability if you know enough about their past, and, on the

other side, no reasonable determinist can maintain that we ever do know enough of any man's past to predict his choices before they are made with absolute certainty. On either view it is admitted that judgments with an appreciable degree of probability can be made, and also that no anticipation is so certain that it *may* not be disappointed. Hence for the practical purposes of life there is no necessity to settle the issue in either sense. Nor again need we decide the point for the purposes of ethics, so long as we keep our ethics clear of metaphysics. On Dr. Heymans' own view of the task and the method of ethics what we require from ethical science is simply the organisation and analysis of our moral judgments, and for the execution of this task it is enough to distinguish "responsible" from "non-responsible" action, as he has already done with much surety himself, without raising the "determinist" issue at all.

Again, I do not see that when he comes to the detailed discussion of the issue Dr. Heymans does anything to remove what is for me the deterministic stone of stumbling. Determinism means, he says, the doctrine that from a complete knowledge of the "antecedents" of an act of choice you could infallibly infer what the choice would be, because an act of choice, like any other event, is fully determined by antecedents. Thus he regards the rejection of determinism as equivalent to a denial of the validity of causal laws in the realm of human action and urges that the indeterminist has no real ground for making just this part of the universe an exception to the validity of the causal principle. Now, I cannot in the least follow this argument, which is, of course, not peculiar to Dr. Heymans, though he presents it with unusual lucidity and power. To begin with, I do not see that the principle of causality itself really says as much as Dr. Heymans makes it say. It does not *e.g.* assert that there are no uncaused events, or that every event is "completely determined" by antecedent events. I am sure, for example, that the causal principle by itself, does not exclude the possibility that there may have been a *first* state, or absolute beginning, in the realm of physical nature. This would then be a complex of events not "determined by" antecedents at all. Further, Dr. Heymans has not observed that, apart altogether from the question whether the "world had a beginning," no causal law asserts a relation between individual "antecedents" and "consequents": what they all assert is a relation between *classes* of antecedents and *classes* of consequents. This is a direct consequence of their universality. Since we can attach no meaning to a "law" which is not universal, and since also we have no reason to think that any "state of things" in its concrete entirety ever exists more than once, we must not formulate "causal laws" in such a way as this "*a* is always followed by *b*," but thus, "all states of things which include as one constituent a member of the class of *a*'s are followed by states which include as one constituent

a member of the class of *b*'s". It then becomes a very difficult task indeed to determine the precise boundaries of the "class of *a*'s" and the "class of *b*'s," and to discover what particular member of each class is correlated with a given member of the other. It is not to be lightly assumed that even the fullest knowledge would be enough to warrant the prediction of the whole detail of any natural process. Such prediction would be impossible even to the Laplacean "demon" unless we are prepared to make such gigantic assumptions as the following. The making of the prediction must depend on the solution of a *finite* number of equations, and the number of independent equations must be as great as the number of independent unknowns to be discovered; the process must never depend on the differentiation or integration of a function which cannot be differentiated or integrated. If the Laplacean "demon" found himself confronted in the course of his calculations by a single indeterminate equation, there would be an end of his ability to infer the details of the course of events unambiguously from even his knowledge of "antecedents". Now is it seriously suggested that we are justified in postulating that scientific investigation into nature will never lead to an indeterminate equation or an undifferentiable function? In point of fact, of course, scientific prediction never does aim at determining the concrete detail of a natural process in advance. What it does is always to forecast certain general characteristics of a process, leaving most of the detail indeterminate, and I can therefore see no reason to make the success of natural science a reason for denying the possibility of a thorough-going contingency in physical nature itself. You may assert that nothing would be contingent to the intellect of the "demon," but, for all I can see, your assertion must remain a mere assertion. *A fortiori*, the alleged possibility of completely detailed prediction in natural science affords no presumption in favour of determinism in ethics.

Again, I do not think it accurate to say that on the indeterminist view human life presents us with no such analogue as we should expect to causal laws. There is, as it seems to me, an exact parallel between the causal laws of natural science and the laws obtained by statistical methods in economics and the social sciences generally. In both cases our laws assert a relation between a *class* of antecedents and a *class* of consequents, and in both the method employed to establish the correlation is the same. Hence I do not see that any reasonable expectation that the moral sciences will furnish us with general "causal laws" is in the least affected by the rejection of determinism.

Further, Dr. Heymans, like most writers on his side of the question, seems to me to credit the indeterminist with a gratuitously absurd position which no intelligent indeterminist would take up. He imputes to the indeterminist the view that a man's behaviour is determined by something other than his "character,"

and the "motives" supplied by the situation in which he has to act. Of course Dr. Heymans has an easy task in demolishing a theory of this kind. But, since "determinism" is, by his own definition, the doctrine that our acts are "completely determined" by antecedents, any one who denies *this* doctrine is by definition an Indeterminist. It is not in the least necessary that he should complicate his rejection of determinism, *as thus defined*, by a superfluous absurdity. Thus while I have no quarrel at all with the doctrine that our choices are "determined" by our character, I certainly deny that they are "determined" by antecedents, and that for the simple reason that a man's character is *not* an "antecedent," a fact which exists, and theoretically might be known in its completeness, before he begins to act. Hence my reply to the determinists' claim that adequate knowledge of a man's character would theoretically enable you to say in advance how he would behave in any given situation, is that theoretically, as well as practically, such knowledge is impossible. You cannot tell for certain what a man's "character" is, until he has acted, for the simple reason that there may be features in any situation which prompt him to display some side of his character for the *first time*. Hence, though it may be true that complete knowledge of my character would enable you to say how I should act in a specified situation, you cannot have this complete knowledge unless you already know how I have acted in that special situation. Your predictions, to be certain, must always be predictions after the event. The determinist may possibly rejoin that while it is true that I cannot *know* the full truth about a man's character until I have learned how he has acted, yet this does not prove that the unsuspected strain in his character was not really there, though latent, before the act which first revealed it to me. But to this I should reply that (1) it is a mere *assumption* that every feature of my character as revealed in act at a given moment must have had a latent "pre-existence" as a "disposition". So far as the facts are concerned, it is equally consistent with them to suppose that a new modification of my character may arise for the *first time* in the very choice which reveals its existence, and (2) that I am at least strongly inclined to suspect the pre-formation theory in psychology to be as purely mythological as it admittedly is in biology. I am therefore not convinced that there is any reason to believe that our choices are "completely determined by antecedents". Unless we accept Schopenhauer's metaphysical dogma, we cannot regard our choices as wholly determined by our past character, since character itself is not something fixed once for all, but is itself made in and by the act of choosing. Thus I believe there is no reason at all to accept determinism apart from an unsupported metaphysical dogma, and consequently nothing irrational in not being a determinist. Dr. Heymans does his best to enlist sympathy for the determinist reading of the facts, but to my own mind only

appears to be successful when he is really surrendering the principle. Thus he tells us that all repugnance to the doctrine will vanish if we remember that it does not assert the *mechanical* determination of human choice (though if "determination by antecedents" is not mechanical determination I do not know what the latter phrase means), and that, after all, he only means that our choices are decided by our insight and the "strength" of our inclinations (where the ascription of a fixed "strength" to each "inclination" again introduces just the notion, to which common-sense morality objects, of the once-for-all fixed and unalterable "character"). What he never sees is that the *ethical* objection to determinism arises not from a desire to deny the connexion between character and choice but from this assumption that, having been once sent into the world with a given "character," I am hopelessly fettered to that character "for better or worse until death us depart".

In the end Dr. Heymans actually accepts this piece of Schopenhauerian metaphysics. He does the best he can, and much more than most defenders of determinism do, to meet the strictly ethical difficulties raised by his philosophical assumptions. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that he agrees with all that Martineau has urged on the libertarian side, with one reservation. Unhappily the one reservation is made about the very central issue. Where he parts company with Martineau is in his account of the "personal causality" of which Martineau said that it is "left over when my phenomena have told me the tale of what they are and do" (p. 109).

Martineau, says Dr. Heymans, regards this personal factor as acting *ungesetzlich*, we as acting *gesetzlich*. Of course what this means is precisely that Dr. Heymans regards personal character as something once for all given and unalterable, as, in fact, what Aristotle would have called a *φυσικὴ δύναμις*. Now on this point the evidence of facts is surely all in favour of Martineau. If we look at the history of a man's life with minds free from metaphysical prepossessions, nothing seems plainer than that a character always reacting on fixed lines is something into which we may grow under the discipline of life, something with which we may emerge from the process of "soul-making," but certainly do not take into the process with us. To credit a young child or even a young man with such a ready-made character is on the face of it a paradox—and a paradox for which no reason is given beyond what I have tried to prove a fallacious view of the nature of causal laws. If one is serious with the doctrine, one must clearly be prepared to deny *a priori* not only all possibility of an influence of divine grace on human personality, but even the reality of all growth of character. And I find it significant that in his review of ethical facts Dr. Heymans finds a place for remorse, but none for the genuine repentance which means "change of heart". Yet facts seem to provide plenty of instances of such a change, and it is the merest

dogmatism to assert that the new elements which seem to emerge from the change have really been there all along in a "latent" form. Dr. Heymans, in fact, goes even further with Schopenhauer than merely repeating the doctrine that character is unalterable. He also agrees with the sage of Frankfort that it is directly inherited, though he gives no reason whatever for this assertion beyond the mere pronouncement that it "must" be so (p. 122).

Consequently he has to accept the very cheerless view that if I "inherit" a bad character, I am damned for life to the hateful position of knowing my own moral worthlessness and being unable to remedy it. He tries hard, indeed, to show that there is nothing depressing about such a theory, but I do not think his arguments at all likely to bring much comfort to the man born "bad," especially as Dr. Heymans will not let this unfortunate off from full accountability for his "inherited" badness. But the facts of life seem to me kinder than some philosophers. We have plenty of instances to show that temperament may be congenital, but happily temperament is not character. The very irascibility which makes one man a nuisance to himself and to every one else may help to make his son or grandson the salt of the earth. Dr. Heymans forgets the significance of Aristotle's profound saying that none of our natural endowments is in itself good or bad, but goodness or badness is acquired by "qualifying" our activities. A hot temper, for example, may be "hereditary," but a hot temper is neither a virtue nor a vice; it furnishes the material for either according to the discipline it gets. And discipline is not all from without: if the facts of life are looked at impartially, it cannot be denied that there is such a thing as self-discipline.

Dr. Heymans next proceeds to discuss the notions of inclination, duty, virtue, and merit with special reference to the allegations of Kantian thinkers that moral value belongs only to acts not done "from inclination". I find a certain obscurity in his treatment of the question, caused by his habit of speaking of "moral" (*sittlich*) inclinations as a class which can be sharply contrasted with certain others. At times he makes the opposition one between "moral" and "egoistic," at other times one between "moral" and "sensuous" inclinations. To me it seems obvious that there is a serious defect in logical clarity about these distinctions. They can scarcely be meant to be equivalent, since it is needless to labour the point that, as Butler long ago showed us, the "particular affections" are not identical with "self-love". You may be a thorough-going "egoist" without being specially given to the sensuous satisfactions, and you may have a very great weakness for sensuous gratifications without being an "egoist". And again, it is not self-evident that there is necessarily anything "immoral" about acting either from regard for one's own interests or to obtain a sensuous gratification. On the former point I have said something already; as to the latter I will give one single illustration.

The enjoyment of a hot bath is distinctly a "sensuous" gratification, but it seems unreasonable to hold that it is in any way *unsittlich* to take a hot bath on occasion simply and solely for the sake of this gratification. The whole classification errs from neglect of Aristotle's warning that "feelings," by themselves, apart from the "qualification of the activities" to which they prompt us, are neither good nor bad. And there is really no such connexion as Dr. Heymans fancies (p. 127) between indeterminism and Kantian rigorism. The indeterminist holds that "free" will—in his sense of the word—is exhibited alike in right action and in wrong. Thus he has no logical obligation to hold the doctrine that because right action implies "freedom" only action against inclination can be right. Kant did, as a matter of fact, come very near to this position, but what forced him to it was not "indeterminism" (it will be remembered that he insisted on the rigid determination of man "as phenomenon," *i.e.*, of real action, as strongly as Dr. Heymans himself), but his refusal to admit any but purely formal moral principles. An indeterminism such as I have been pleading for in these pages involves no kind of fundamental opposition between duty and inclination. As against Kant Dr. Heymans scores an easy victory, which does not, however, depend in the least on his metaphysical determinism. Like others before him, he points out that the source of Kant's error lies in the assumption that "inclinations" (the "particular affections" of Butler) are all forms of the desire for pleasure. That Kant's hedonistic psychology of inclination is absurd is patent enough, but it should be equally patent that the confusion it commits is consistent with the completest determinism. Indeed, as the case of Bentham shows, the hedonist psychology is most naturally connected with thoroughgoing determinism. It is just the determinists to whom it has usually seemed most obvious that we *can* only act to get pleasure or to avoid pain.

I think Dr. Heymans, though he is no Hedonist, suffers from the same weakness as the Hedonistic determinists, a desire to simplify the facts of the moral life until they become unrecognisable. It is true enough, as he urges against Kant, that dutifulness involves a *Neigung* towards the doing of your duty, just as pleasure-seeking involves a *Neigung* towards sensuous gratifications. But when Dr. Heymans, in discussing practical problems, talks of what the *Ehrenmensch* or the *Pflichtmensch* or the *Genussmensch* would do in given circumstances, I cannot help feeling a *Neigung* of my own to observe that these abstract types are pure creatures of theory.

Martineau's distinction between the "virtuous" and the "meritorious" is regarded as simply another form of Kant's distinction between inclination and duty, and arising from the same psychological error, the assumption that all "inclinations" are directed towards the getting of pleasure. As a criticism of Martineau this

seems to me unjust. Thus in a passage cited by Dr. Heymans himself Martineau illustrates his point by contrasting the superior merit of the "lie-a-bed girl who sets herself (I presume with imperfect success) never to be late" with the less meritorious though objectively more virtuous behaviour of her sister who cannot sleep after six o'clock. He can hardly have regarded inability to sleep after six o'clock as a form of pleasure-seeking! Thus I think it erroneous to say that when Martineau measures merit by the "strength" of the repressed "motive," he means by "strength" hedonic attractiveness. Dr. Heymans admits that if you drop the supposed hedonistic implication, the facts which Martineau has in mind do raise a serious problem. His own solution avoids the contrast of merit with virtue. If one man does a right act with difficulty which another accomplishes with ease, he says, the explanation may be that the desire to do the duty may be equally strong in both, but the first man has other desires which must be repressed if he is to act dutifully, the second has not. Or again, the first man's desire to do his duty may itself be feebler than the other's. In the first case, the man who does his duty after a struggle is at once both more virtuous and more meritorious than the second; in the second case, he is less meritorious and also less virtuous. Everything thus depends on the relative strength of the inclination to be dutiful as compared with other inclinations, and there is really no divergence between our estimates of virtue and of merit. This seems to me a sound analysis of the cases which Martineau propounds, but I cannot altogether follow Dr. Heymans when he adds that the case in which there is at once least of virtue and of merit is that to which "duty is done without any sacrifice of one's own *interests*" (p. 136; italics mine). There seems to be here a serious confusion of a man's "interests" with his passing desires. I cannot see why the moral worth of a good act should be supposed to be impaired by the fact that the agent believes the doing of his duty to be also his own highest "interest". And it is, of course, a mistake to forget that the pursuit of what I think my true *interest* may call for unremitting self-discipline and control of one's "inclinations". (As e.g., when an invalid or valetudinarian regards it as his highest interest to accomplish a piece of serious scientific work and therefore submits himself to a strict rule of living which compels him to go without many social pleasures which he might otherwise have enjoyed.) I cannot help thinking that Dr. Heymans is here falling into the double error of first setting up a hard and fast distinction between my duty and my interest, and then assuming that every inclination which conflicts with duty is really a form of regard for my "interest"; this is a psychological confusion as serious as any he has noted in Kant or Martineau. Dr. Heymans' second chapter is given to a study of what he calls, by a misapplication of an old *terminus technicus*, the *criteria* (he means the ultimate principles) of moral

valuation. He starts from the assumption, to which I have already taken objection, that the "natural consciousness" intuitively recognises a division of *Neigungen* into *sittlich* and *unsittlich* and judges of the moral worth of a character by the relative strength in it of the two classes. A perfectly good man would be one in whom the "weakest moral motive" always prevailed over the "strongest egoistic motive," a perfectly bad man one in whom the "weakest egoistic motive" always defeated the "strongest moral motive"; every actual man has his fixed place on the scale of worth somewhere between these two ideal limits. (I have already explained why this classification of springs of action into "moral" and "egoistic" seems to me wrong in principle, and I need not enlarge further on the point.) Our current lists of virtues and vices are first crude attempts to generalise our moral judgments by specifying the *kind* of *Neigungen* which are respectively laudable and blameworthy. The business of ethics is to refine on these primitive crude generalisations by making our notions of the various *Neigungen* more precise, and assigning to each its precise degree of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, to determine "not only which *Neigungen* are approved or disapproved by the moral consciousness, but the *degree in which* approbation or disapproval is bestowed" (p. 146). Martineau, whose classification Dr. Heymans subjoins, is commended as the only moralist who has seriously undertaken this necessary task, though his actual classification is rightly rejected as being in the highest degree arbitrary. (I subjoin an illustration of my own to illustrate the kind of arbitrariness of which Martineau can be capable. In Martineau's list "appetites" rank two places below "love of gain". It should follow, therefore, according to Martineau's doctrine, that the moral worth of an act depends on the place of its "spring" in the hierarchy, that it is always immoral *not* to prefer saving sixpence to any gratification of hunger or sexual desire, and again that Jacob proved himself morally superior to his famishing brother by striking so hard a bargain with him. But who really thinks avarice morally superior to even the most primitive kind of sexual love?) Dr. Heymans himself observes that the extraordinary complication of the facts makes it impossible to ascertain or estimate the worth of the actual "springs" of an individual's conduct by direct examination. Hence he proposes to abandon the whole attempt to proceed in ethics, after the Baconian fashion, through *axiomate media*. Our one hope of reaching a tentative arrangement of *Neigungen* according to their moral worth is to examine and compare the various hypotheses which moralists have framed about the ultimate principles of ethics. In the present state of moral science these hypotheses must be regarded as conjectural, but we can use them, as we use a physical or chemical hypothesis which has not yet been finally established. We may compare the ethical valuations demanded by these hypothesis with those which

we do actually make, and thus arrive at a provisional view of the probable worth of any given hypothesis. (Thus Dr. Heymans is, it will be seen, still true, apparently without suspecting it, to the Socratic-Platonic conception of philosophical method.) For purposes of classification he follows Paulsen in dividing ultimate ethical hypothesis into two groups, (1) teleological, (2) intuitionist, explaining that by teleological hypotheses are meant those which treat acts and inclinations as good or bad according to their consequences, and by intuitionist those which judge acts and inclinations by some intrinsic characteristic. The division thus corresponds, though with obvious differences, to Kant's classification of moral systems into heteronomous and autonomous. Two "teleological" theories are then subjected to careful examination, (1) Individualistic Hedonism, (2) Universalistic Hedonism, or Utilitarianism. (1) and (2) are to be examined solely on their ethical merits and independently of the doctrine of "psychological Hedonism," which, as we have seen, Dr. Heymans rejects. (Though, as he points out, the psychological doctrine, even if it were true, would not necessarily carry with it ethical Hedonism. "To will something and to approve of it morally are different things, and it would have to be proved that whatever answers to the end of our will is, or ought to be, morally approved" (p. 154).)

It is odd to find Dr. Heymans incidentally treating the great Greek moralists as Egoistic Hedonists on the ground that they held it to be always a man's highest interest to be virtuous. How many of them would have admitted the implied identification of a man's true interest with *ἡδονή*? I am afraid that Dr. Heymans' reading of the *Gorgias* (which he actually quotes) has been superficial, and I doubt if he can have read the *Philebus* at all.

The general arguments by which Egoistic Hedonism is refuted are of a fairly familiar type, but I may be allowed to quote one or two happy original observations. It is a well-taken point that the ordinary arguments for the doctrine, even if they were satisfactory, only prove that virtuous conduct is the surest means to my own pleasure, not that the pleasure-giving character of the virtuous act is the *reason* why it is morally approved, and that it is this latter proposition which should really be established. And I think Dr. Heymans right also in his observation that too much has been made of the argument based on the hedonic unsatisfactoriness of a life spent in pursuing the "pleasure of the moment". As he says, this argument tells in favour of self-control as against self-abandonment to a medley of discordant passions, but such self-control is not exclusively characteristic of the virtuous man; it may be practised in the pursuit of ends which we pronounce decidedly wicked. "Self-control and steadfastness . . . are no more simply identical with virtue than subjugation by passions with vice" (p. 160). It is an excellent retort to J. S. Mill's appeal to the estimate of "all competent judges" to have remarked that "in a certain sense it is

unfortunate that nearly all those who have tried to find a hedonistic basis for ethics have been rational, reflective, and virtuous persons," and in consequence have "presupposed virtue in their very attempt to give virtue a hedonistic basis" (pp. 165-166). And there is much acuteness in the contention that an Egoistic Hedonist has no right to take into account, in establishing his thesis, the pleasures and pains of the so-called social and political "sanction". For on the theory "good" means what promotes the agent's pleasure, but if, in a given case, this promotion of the agent's pleasure is due to rewards bestowed by society, we must remember that society only gives the reward because it is antecedently of the opinion that the agent's act is a good one. The very giving of the reward proves that society does not mean by a "good" act one which promotes the pleasure of the agent (p. 167).

Utilitarianism is discussed much more minutely in the longest section of the work (pp. 168-220) and with a thoroughness which deserves the highest commendation. Dr. Heymans examines separately the alleged "proofs" of the doctrine, and the worth of the doctrine in itself as a speculation. Mill's unfortunate quasi-proof is dismissed, as it deserves, as being little more than a verbal juggle, but a more careful examination is given to the argument of Sidgwick. Two points are specially considered, (1) the possibility of a psychological derivation of moral verdicts on conduct from awareness of its hedonic consequences, (2) the degree to which our actual moral verdicts on particular types of conduct are what we might expect them to be if they had a hedonistic foundation. As to (1) Dr. Heymans remarks with truth that the feeling-tone which accompanies an approving or disapproving moral judgment is not one of bare pleasure or pain, but has, as introspection will show, a perfectly specific character. It is unthinkable, therefore, that feeling of such specific character should be a mere reproduction of an original pleasure or pain in which this distinguishing character was not to be found. But if we neglect the specific *quality* of ethical feeling and attend only to its general pleasure-pain character, it is highly doubtful whether the utilitarian is right in assuming that there is any universal tendency to feel sympathetic pleasure or pain at the pleasure and pain of others. *E.g.*, the pleasure of another who has won the *grand prix* of a lottery is just as likely to cause me a painful feeling of envy as to give me pleasure, and again, unless I already feel moral disgust at the sight of oppression, it is not clear why I should "sympathise" with the pain of the wronged man rather than with the triumph of his oppressor. Yet again the common assumption of all the "proofs" of utilitarianism that "disinterested" approval of virtuous acts arises from a transference of feelings originally aroused by the hedonic consequences of acts to the acts themselves seems to be equally disputable. For we have no analogous cases to support the belief in such transference of approval from end to means. In all cases,

but the alleged one of our specifically ethical feelings, when the end to which an action was originally employed as a means ceases to be valued, the means ceases to be valued also, unless it has established itself as conducive to some new end. Thus fasting may have been approved originally as a means to the due performance of certain religious rites, but if persons who no longer attach importance to these rites continue to approve of fasting, that is because fasting is now regarded as conducive to some other end, *e.g.*, to the subjugation of sensual appetite. It is equally unintelligible why, if moral approval and censure are based on considerations of utility we should make the distinction we do between vice and intellectual error, which is no less bad in the utilitarian sense than vice, and why we should be most lenient with our censures in cases where there has been great provocation or temptation—*i.e.*, in just those cases where, on grounds of utility, it would seem that the heaviest social censure is called for to counterbalance the incitements to anti-social conduct. Finally, if utility is the source of our moral judgments, it is inexplicable why we should attach the weight that we do to intention and character; it should be the actual outward deed that should be the sole immediate object of moral valuation. Hence James Mill, who systematically refused to recognise any significance in "motives," and treated intellectual dissent from his own theories as moral obliquity was really the most consistent of utilitarians and by his very consistency reduced the utilitarian hypothesis of the derivation of morality to an absurdity.

It would, however, be possible to maintain the utilitarian doctrine of the moral standard independently of the theories of utilitarians about the alleged origin of the moral consciousness. Accordingly Dr. Heymans next proceeds to examine the question how far the deliverances of his own moral judgment, and of other men's as embodied in our current morality, are in accord with the logical consequences of the utilitarian principle. This section of his book seems to me particularly valuable. The general result is that the utilitarian doctrine has to be rejected as quite at variance with the spontaneous verdict of our immediate judgment of moral values. There is, of course, nothing novel about the conclusion, but Dr. Heymans deserves high praise for the freedom of his discussion from any trace of antecedent bias and for its remarkable thoroughness. In the main he is in accord with the classical judgment of Butler on the issue. Where utilitarianism fails is in its inability to give full recognition to our conviction of the ethical worth of justice, veracity, and chastity as intrinsically good independently of their efficiency in increasing the *Lustsaldo* of a community. I cannot doubt that he has made out his case on this point. Thus, to take one of his examples, it is clear, I think, that he is right in saying that, so far as utilitarian consequences are in question, voluntary celibacy and sexual "perversion" stand on

much the same footing, but equally clear that the unsophisticated moral verdict of the *orbis terrarum* makes a discrimination between them which the utilitarian cannot explain and has no right to explain away. The ground chosen here seems to me exceedingly well selected; the case is an absolutely critical one for the utilitarian theory, since the attitude of mankind at large towards "perversity" is only intelligible on the hypothesis that moral purity is directly judged to have an intrinsic worth quite independent of its hedonic results. About one or two minor points in the argument I do not feel so confident. I think, for instance, as against Dr. Heymans, that it would be possible to account on utilitarian grounds for the current conviction that courage is the "point of honour" for men and chastity for women. But on the main issues he seems to me to make a case which cannot be answered.

From the critique of utilitarianism Dr. Heymans turns to the examination of his second type of hypotheses, the "intuitionistic," i.e., all those which regard moral judgments as based not on consideration of consequences but on an immediate conviction of the intrinsic worth of acts or *Neigungen*. He deals first and very satisfactorily with the "duty theories," according to which the only *Neigung* of moral worth is devotion to the dutiful as such; Kant naturally furnishes the typical example of such a doctrine, and Dr. Heymans' criticism is consequently devoted to a proof that the Kantian denial of moral value to all acts done from "inclination" is unsound. The next class of theories to be examined are the "aesthetic," and here I cannot but think the author's classification unhappy. What he wishes to controvert is the view that moral approbation rests exclusively on our aesthetic appreciation of the beauty of a character in which there is an all-round harmony between the *Neigungen*. As representatives of such a view he names Aristotle and Shaftesbury, neither of whom, in my own opinion, held the theory. In fact, I cannot help wondering whether Dr. Heymans has ever read either of these philosophers with any care. He seems quite unaware that the "arts" to the analogy of which Aristotle appeals are not the "fine arts" at all, but the "arts and crafts" of everyday life. In particular, he plainly does not know that the main analogy on which Aristotle relies is a medical one, since he actually appeals to the analogy of medicine to show that the "goodness" of a thing does not mean its "beauty". And a careful reading of the second book of the *Ethics* should have prevented him from urging such a criticism as that a vigorous and well-developed character may appeal to us on aesthetic grounds and yet be morally bad, and again from crediting Aristotle with the doctrine, which Aristotle denies in set words, that every virtue is "*equally* removed" from both of the vices between which it is said to be the "mean". Nor is Shaftesbury much better treated. It is assumed that by the "moral sense" Shaftesbury means something analogous to the sense for beauty,

and no notice whatever is taken of his view that the goodness of the virtuous man consists primarily in the harmony between "self-affections" and "public affections". Hence, open as Shaftesbury's theory is to criticism on other grounds, I cannot feel that it is affected by any of Dr. Heymans' contentions, and I strongly suspect that the author has got his notion of it at second-hand from some very untrustworthy compendium, which in all probability ignored the work of Hume, Hutcheson, and Smith about whom Dr. Heymans is curiously silent.

My suspicions are deepened by the discussion of the "logical" theories which attempt to find the peculiar character of vice in the falsehood of the convictions from which the bad man acts. Dr. Heymans seems to know only one version of this doctrine, that of poor half-crazy Wollaston, against whom he finds it easy to urge that his whole argument is a circular one. For Wollaston holds, *e.g.*, that the only reason why it is wrong to murder a man is that the murderer is implicitly making by his act the false assertion that his victim is not a man. As Dr. Heymans says, this presupposes that the murderer already recognises the wrongfulness of taking human life. If he does not, his act does not amount to a denial of the victim's humanity. It may be a mere assertion in act of the true proposition that the murderer hates the victim or expects to make a profit by killing him. This is obvious enough, but had Dr. Heymans selected for examination the version of the "logical" theory given by Clarke or Price, he would hardly have scored his victory so easily. I am afraid that this also is a case of dependence on some not very satisfactory second-hand source of information. Dr. Heymans finally decides himself in favour of a general type of doctrine which he calls the "objectivity-theory". In principle this doctrine seems to amount to an appeal to the moral verdict of the duly informed "impartial spectator," since the author's main points are (a) that to form a right moral judgment we need first and foremost to cultivate the habit of mental detachment, to view our own "interests" and those of our immediate "circle" as impartially as though we were considering the case of any other being placed in the same situation, and (b) to refuse to give the "moment" an influence on our verdict for which we can find no rational ground. Thus in principle Dr. Heymans comes back after all to the position of Aristotle; his rule of impartiality as between one person and another, or one moment of time and another is virtually just what Aristotle meant when he said that the "right mean" is determined by the rule of the man of "practical goodness of intellect". In this result I fancy most of us would agree with Dr. Heymans, though there are some *obiter dicta* scattered up and down the pages devoted to the "objectivity-theory" with which it is hard to feel altogether content. Thus it does not at any rate follow from acceptance of the theory that we have no right to condemn outrages committed by "fanatics for an

idea, anarchists or suffragettes" (p. 254) as morally wrong. And though it is no doubt true that we often judge the conduct of others hastily and with imperfect knowledge, I think it rash to assert (p. 255) that in almost every case our verdicts of condemnation would be mitigated if we had fuller knowledge. It is at least possible that in many cases fuller knowledge might lead to increased severity of judgment, and I do not see how we can be sure that such cases form a minority. At least I am sure that there is a grave confusion of thought in the identification of suspension of judgment until fuller information can be obtained with the forgiveness of offences commanded in the Gospel. You cannot "forgive" an offence which has not been committed. The command to "forgive" does not mean that we are to reserve our opinion whether an offence has been committed. It presupposes that we have already judged and judged rightly that there has been an offence. To "pardon" only those of whom we do not yet know whether they have offended is no genuine "forgiveness". This is why real forgiveness is always a difficult thing, and why in the Gospel the commandment to forgive is made conditional on the penitence of the offender, whereas the command not to "judge" our brother is unconditioned. Dr. Heymans' forgiveness would be like Rowena's in *Ivanhoe*. "She forgives him as a Christian, that is to say, she does not forgive him at all."

The third and briefest part of Dr. Heymans' work deals with practical applications of moral theory to the conduct of life. As he rightly sees, very little can be won in practice from the attempt to use any speculative ethical hypothesis as a substitute for the immediate verdict of the "man of practical wisdom" on an individual situation. Something can, however, be said in a general way, about (a) the limits within which one man is justified in passing moral judgments on others, (b) the lines on which we may hope to educate ourselves and others into virtue. Much of what Dr. Heymans says about the fallibility of one man's judgments about another is common ground to all moralists; his own way of meeting the difficulty does not seem to me altogether satisfactory. He proposes that, in judging the conduct of others, we should eliminate as lying outside the scope of ethics both the "intellectual" and "temperamental" factors. If we do this, we are left with the "factor of character," and as regards this a judgment on others is as valid as a judgment on ourselves. Of course it is admitted that in actual practice it will usually be a very difficult thing to eliminate all intellectual and temperamental "factors". But is it clear that the elimination is possible even theoretically? Is it so certain that we do not regard certain excellencies of intellect, e.g., a sound insight into the real issues raised by a situation, as themselves valuable *moral* assets? Do we not, e.g., in comparing one age in history with another, regularly regard increased clarity of vision on moral issues as itself an important feature of *moral* pro-

gress? And, again, do we not with Aristotle hold that "ignorance of the universal" in morality is an indication of badness of character? Can it plausibly be held that we never pronounce a man of clearer ethical insight "better" than his more myopic contemporaries, or again that when we do so our verdict has not the specific character which Dr. Heymans finds on analysis peculiar to the moral judgment? And, again, is it possible to draw a hard and fast line between "temperament" and "character"? Can we, *e.g.*, make a sharp distinction between "temperamental" cowardice, which does not, and "moral" cowardice, which does, deserve censure? If you try to make these distinctions absolute, are you not driven to regard mere conscientiousness as the only virtue, a view which Dr. Heymans himself expressly disavows in his treatment of Kant? And what is more, on a rigidly deterministic theory like the author's is there not a fundamental unreason in holding a man "not responsible" for the defects of his intellect or temperament but absolutely responsible for those of his "character," if indeed anything is left of "character" after the elimination of everything which can be put down to "intellect" or "temperament"? On the theory, my "conscientiousness" must be just as much a fixed "inheritance" as any other of my qualities. And all judgments about moral progress seem to me to fall into complete confusion if you insist that any man who acts "up to his lights" must *ipso facto* be considered perfectly virtuous.

More interesting are the author's views on the scope within which moral education is possible and the methods which it should employ. He begins his argument (p. 298) by the usual protest against the popular theory that moral education would be impossible if determinism were true. I agree with him in regarding this assertion, in the sense in which it is commonly made, as mistaken, but I do not think he has exposed the real nature of the mistake. He thinks the popular objection adequately met by saying that determinism is not fatalism. This seems to me a wholly inadequate rejoinder. It is true that determinism is not fatalism, if by "fate" you mean a vaguely imagined being outside the world of events. But it is equally true that a determinism like that of Dr. Heymans, by making my "character" a mere resultant of "heredity" and external circumstance, is just as hostile to all admission that I have anything to do with making my own character as any doctrine of predestination. "Heredity" in Dr. Heymans' system does everything that others have ever supposed "God" or "Fate" to do, and it is really an illusory deliverance from my bondage to be told that my tyrant has changed his name. For all practical purposes a really consistent determinism is fatalism as the common sense of mankind has always understood. The real answer to the criticism that determinism is incompatible with the reality of education in conduct is that, on the theory, the education process is real enough, but like all other processes, is "determined". We

do advance, but it is on lines already laid down for us and towards a goal which, though unseen, is already "determined". So far, the reality of moral education is consistent even with avowed fatalism, though whether such a view of the limits to the possibility of moral education is as consolatory as the determinist thinks is a different question.

It is characteristic of the author that in discussing the question of the means to moral education he begins by denying all vestige of moral value to the "utilitarian" sanctions. Rewards and punishments are not means to moral education, because "so long as a man cares only for his own well-being" it makes no difference to his moral worth in what kind of life he believes his well-being to consist (p. 299). This seems to me far too sweeping a conclusion, and it results, as I think, from a faulty psychology. Surely there is a moral difference between a man who regards the service, *e.g.*, of his King and Country as his *eigenes Wohl*, and one who finds it in amassing a fortune or seducing girls. In fact, it is nonsense to speak of the former man as caring *only* for his own well-being at all, though it may be quite true that he does not regard the discharge of public duty as the pursuit of something which is *not* his *eigenes Wohl*. In the main, however, Dr. Heymans is no doubt right in laying the principal stress on rules of action intended to secure "the fullest possible knowledge and most extended efficacy of moral motives". In developing this conception he attaches great importance to the distinction between two types of men, the *Primärfunktionierende* and the *Sekundärfunktionierende*, *i.e.*, men who act impulsively and men who habitually act from reflection. In the case of the latter he seems to hold that no moral improvement to speak of is possible, on the ground that their conduct is already in the main fully expressive of a fixed character. Hence, though they may recognise that this character is imperfect, the recognition will not lead to any serious change of conduct. The "primary type," on the other hand, are constantly acting on impulses which are not fully expressive of their character, and may consequently be improved by any methods which "replace or complete the missing or inadequate secondary functions by fixed associations" (p. 303). *E.g.*, they may train themselves to delay acting until they have had time for consideration, may consult the advice of trusted friends, may try to make the spirit of a historical or legendary exemplar their own, and the like. Of course Dr. Heymans does not think so crudely as to suppose that any of us is wholly a "primary" or wholly a "secondary". Yet it seems to me that his treatment of the case of the man who is preponderately a "secondary" is vitiated by the arbitrary assumption of the immutability of character. However much reflection may preponderate over impulse in such a man, it strikes me as unduly pessimistic to hold that the knowledge of his own faults will never lead to their amendment. Dr. Heymans himself, in spite of his

determinism, recommends the "primary" to check his faulty impulses by diverting his attention from the "motives" which appeal to them. If this voluntary control of attention is possible at all, I cannot see why it may not equally be practised as a moral discipline by the "secondary". Why is it not open to him to refuse to let his reflection follow certain lines? I certainly believe myself to have done this with some success in relation to certain topics, and I should imagine that others can say the same of themselves.

Another matter in which I find it hard to follow Dr. Heymans is his treatment of the training of children to obedience. He thinks it absolutely wrong in principle ever to tell a child to obey a rule without either giving him a reason or making him comprehend that he is at present too young to understand the reason for the rule. You must never say to a child who asks why he should do as he is told, "because I tell you". To do so is to teach the child to "bow before might as such," and breeds *Sklavensinn* (p. 307). Here again I think the psychology defective and the conclusion too sweeping. In adult life we all have frequently to obey rightful authority without demanding reasons for its commands on many occasions, and it therefore seems to me quite reasonable that we should be inured to such obedience betimes. I do not mean, of course, that children should *never* be told the reasons for the commands given by their elders. But I am sure that a child who always declines to obey until it has been either given a reason or satisfied that the reason is only withheld because it is provisionally "too young to understand it" is receiving a faulty preparation for a life in which the commands of a lawful authority have so often to be obeyed, just because they are commands, as, *e.g.*, when it is our duty to obey the law, so long as it is the law, even though we may be strongly persuaded that it stands in need of improvement. Also I do not believe that the child who obeys his parent or schoolmaster without asking for reasons is "bending before might as such". The truth is children learn very early to distinguish between "might as such" and what appears to them rightful authority. A boy does as he is told by the Head Master or the Captain of the school, not simply because these personages are strong enough to thrash him, but because they are the "Head" and the Captain. A big bully may, so far as "might as such" goes, be much more formidable than a "prefect," but a schoolboy's attitude towards the two is very different. He will defy the bully where he would not think of disputing the orders of the prefect, simply because he accepts it as part of the proper order of things that one should do what the prefects, or "the Sixth" say. And I believe the same thing to be true of obedience to parents. The view that "natural selection" can be trusted to lead to moral improvement is rejected for good and sufficient reasons, but Dr. Heymans bases very high hopes on "artificial" selection. He is

greatly impressed by the danger to morality suggested by the alleged fact that the average number of children in the "families of criminals" is 6.6 as against 5.5 for "normal" families, and regards it as an immediate social necessity to take stringent measures to correct this dangerous anomaly. I think statistics of this kind less trustworthy than Dr. Heymans supposes. Since "criminality" is generally judged of by the number of convictions for breaches of the law, it is, I think clear, that the statistics of "crime" will be swollen by including hosts of persons in poor circumstances whose offences against morality, though not in themselves serious, lead to appearances before the magistrates, while, on the other side, the wealthy scoundrel, whose riches and education enable him to do enormous mischief without actual violation of law, will figure among the morally "normal". Thus, *e.g.*, a thoroughly decent set of fellows may be counted among criminals on the strength of conviction for poaching or for minor assaults in street fights, while the clever rascal who thrives by fraudulent company-promoting will be set down as a law-abiding citizen. Hence I am very doubtful how far statistics of this kind are a really satisfactory indication of the moral condition of a nation. Dr. Heymans' own theory is that the principal source of all moral improvement in the race is to be found in sexual selection. He argues that *ceteris paribus* persons with superior moral qualities are preferred as husbands or wives, and he tries to confirm this view empirically by statistics collected by himself to prove that on the average married persons show a certain superiority to the unmarried in a variety of characteristics ranging from tolerance to punctuality. (I do not know the method by which these figures were obtained, but I should myself have thought it almost a hopeless task to devise a satisfactory experimental measure of tolerance or "harmony between thought and action".) He then argues that, since we have here to deal with a "force which acts continuously," the effect of even a slight sexual preference for persons of good moral character must in the end be to elevate the average of morality in the community beyond all assignable limits, and that the chief problem for social reformers must be to modify existing social conditions in such a way as to prevent differences of rank and means from counteracting the beneficial tendencies inherent in sexual selection. The suggestion is attractive, but I am not sure that Dr. Heymans is not overlooking two rather important considerations. Even if one accepts his statistics, they do not in themselves prove that sexual selection has a moralising tendency. Apart from the dogma of the immutability of character, it would be most natural to suppose that any moral superiority of the married to the unmarried has been simply produced in the individual by the educative discipline of married life. As an acquired characteristic this superiority would presumably not be "heritable". And again, in respect of physical characteristics the general tendency

of "selection" seems to be not to augment a peculiarity indefinitely but to result in the establishment of a relatively fixed mean. Why then should we suppose that sexual selection is any more likely to lead to an indefinite increase in human virtue than to an indefinite increase in human stature or good looks?

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Edited from the original MSS. and Authentic Editions by C. E. VAUGHAN, M.A., Litt.D., Emeritus Professor of English Literature in the University of Leeds. In two Volumes. Cambridge: at the University Press. Vol. I., pp. xix, 516; II., 577. Price 3 guineas.

THE whole body of Rousseau's political writings is here for the first time collected together. Part of them were scattered over four or five volumes of the *Works*; part had been separately issued within the last sixty years. Of the latter are the *Projet de Constitution pour la Corse*, the first draft of the *Contrat Social*, and "a variety of fragments, some of great importance". In addition, these volumes contain some twenty-five pages of fragments which have never before seen the light.

The work of collection and revision has been to Mr. Vaughan a labour of love. He has been prodigal of time and industry in collating editions and manuscripts, in detecting errors of previous editors, and in reproducing variants. He modestly hopes that he has made some progress towards placing before the reader what Rousseau actually wrote. His long general Introduction, together with the numerous special Introductions to particular works, give full information as to the ascertainable date of each and the conditions of its production and preservation, and also take us deep into Rousseau's political philosophy, of which Mr. Vaughan is a profound though not uncritical admirer.

The labour which he has expended seems to me to be thoroughly repaid. It is not that hitherto the student could find no single book that indicated the compass of Rousseau's political work. Even the little popular volume, with the two *Discours*, the *Contrat*, some letters, and the *Gouvernement de Pologne*, bore witness to its comprehensiveness. And M. Dreyfus-Brisac's fine volume,¹ the *Contrat Social*, with its eleven Appendices, furnished in the shape of extracts a great part of the material which Mr. Vaughan has here presented more completely.

Nevertheless the present edition produces a new effect. Seeing the whole of the work together, all the variants, all the fragments,

¹ It should be borne in mind that the price of this volume is only 12 francs.

all the alternatives, considerations, and reconsiderations, which the author's mind was continually traversing, we acquire I think almost insensibly a new conception of Rousseau. New epithets force themselves upon our mind; we are no longer satisfied with "original," "imaginative," "penetrating," "rhetorical". We are compelled to add unexpected qualifications such as "persevering," "industrious in study," "sagacious," "sane," "adaptive". Setting Plato aside, I do not think it would be easy to produce a mass of political writing by a single author of more comprehensive and substantial value. Mr. Vaughan comes to him from Burke, yet particularly for considerateness and concreteness he gives Rousseau the palm.

No doubt the circumstances of to-day incline us to read him more sympathetically and I should add more justly, than we used. Our mood is more akin than in ordinary times to the intensity of feeling in which he lived.¹ Also, his treatment of the rights of war and his attention to the conditions of securing permanent peace bring him very near to us. The brilliant fragment "*L'État de guerre*," in which Mr. Vaughan has effected an important rearrangement of the text, maintains the doctrine afterwards embodied in the *Contrat Social*, that war is a trial of strength between States (and not, as *e.g.* in Hobbes, a hostile relation of individuals). The present writer remembers to have seen it laid down *totidem verbis* in an order of a Japanese general during the Russo-Japanese war.

His treatment of the Abbé de St. Pierre's project of a league of peace is an essential step in the development of this conception. It is remarkable to us that he held it necessary for the League to guarantee the internal constitution of States as well as their external security. I think there is a good deal of truth in this. Rousseau was greatly attracted by the idea that as long as communities were isolated, man's social task was only begun. I shall return to this point.

In the general Introduction Mr. Vaughan approaches the question of Rousseau's position in the history of Political Philosophy. He views him principally as the first modern supporter of Collectivism against the individualism of Locke and his followers, a supporter who was in fact, so wholly were the great Greeks for-

¹ Here is a passage from the "*Économie Politique*," on graduated taxation, which, I take it, chimes in with our feeling to-day, though at other times it might have seemed extravagant. "Celui qui n'a que le simple nécessaire ne doit rien payer du tout; la taxe de celui qui a du superflu peut aller au besoin jusqu'à la concurrence de tout qui excède son nécessaire. A cela il dira qu'en égard à son rang ce qui serait superflu pour un homme inférieur est nécessaire pour lui. Mais c'est un mensonge; car un grand a deux jambes ainsi qu'un bouvier, et n'a qu'un ventre non plus de lui. De plus, ce prétendu nécessaire est si peu nécessaire à son rang, que s'il savait y renoncer pour un sujet louable, il n'en serait que plus respecté. Le peuple se prosternerait devant un Ministre qui irait au Conseil à pied, pour avoir vendu ses carrosses dans un pressant besoin de l'État."

gotten, a true originator. Also he is concerned to point out how great was Rousseau's persistence and achievement, contrary to common opinion, in the reconciliation of abstract principle and concrete adaptation, and sketches his phases of development, as corresponding, on the whole, to the successive influences of Locke, Plato and Montesquieu, from crude individualism—I presume—to abstract collectivism, and from abstract collectivism, again, to expediency and concrete adaptation. More particularly he holds that the state of Nature and the formal Contract are alien elements in Rousseau's attitude, which he came very near to casting away. Without them, allowing something to force and a great deal to time, and admitting instead of rejecting the conception of progress, he might have thrown off altogether his Lockean individualism, and have presented to the world an unambiguous political collectivism¹ as a single coherent doctrine.

In the main, and as against all who claim Rousseau as an individualist—as a champion of pre-social rights in the individual—I hold this estimate to be true. If we do not count the Greeks, Rousseau was the originator of what is sound in modern political philosophy; and their influence was exercised largely through him. I hope that Mr. Vaughan's great edition will bring this home to many generations of students.

Yet there is much in the Introductions which in my opinion might be better formulated. It is hopeless in a review to deal with a hundredth part of the problems which Rousseau has raised and Mr. Vaughan has emphasised. I will state one question of central interest, and attach some comments to it.

Why did Rousseau omit from the definitive edition of the *Contrat Social* the chapter "De la société générale du genre humain," which forms ch. ii. of Book I. in the draft version of earlier date? The chapter is an answer to Diderot's article on "Droit Naturel"² in the *Encyclopédie*, citing it at some length and adopting its phraseology. It is directed to show the absurdity of conceiving a "general society" after Locke's fashion, in a state of nature; in which, prior to political union, rights are recognised, and a Law of Nature rules. Mr. Vaughan attaches great importance³ to this and other but minor differences between the draft and the definitive version. For he holds Rousseau's reason for the omission to have been that he saw his own destructive criticism of Natural Law to be fatal to the sanction of the Social Contract, and therefore to cut away the foundation of his entire theory of civil society. At the same time, he considers Rousseau would have done better to

¹ Collectivism, I gather from a remark of Mr. Vaughan's, is not used by him in its economic reference; although he is able to show decided anticipations of socialism in Rousseau's ideas.

² Mr. Vaughan greatly assists the reader by printing Diderot's article *in extenso*.

³ Herein differing from M. Dreyfus-Brisac.

hold to his criticism, to banish the state of nature and the contract from his theory, and supply their place as indicated above.

It occurs to me as a sufficient reason for the omission that the chapter would be unintelligible to a reader without reference to Diderot's article. But some further points of interest arise.

Diderot's article represents natural right as the dictate of the Law of Nature through "*the general will*" of the human race and the instinct of the animal world. It is an extraordinary thing that so far as the texts reveal we have here in this alien argument the first usage of Rousseau's famous phrase. But for the references which show the article to be prior not only to the *Contrat Social*, but to Rousseau's paper "*Économie Politique*" in which the same expression occurs, one would naturally have supposed that Rousseau, who in the last-named article uses *volonté générale* and *volonté publique* indifferently, was simply developing his expression out of Locke's "public will". As it is, unless Diderot borrowed previously from Rousseau in some way we cannot trace, the paternity of the famous formula belongs to Diderot in speaking of the general society of the human race.

But this suggests a further reason for Rousseau's omission of the chapter. There are indications that he was uncertain which way to deal with the "general society" of the human race. In the chapter in question there are two cancelled paragraphs which suggest, though they reject, the possibility of treating the human race as a community with a general will.¹ The same idea occurs in the "*Économie Politique*" expressly as a development of Diderot's article. "The great city of the world becomes the body politic, of which the law of nature remains the general will." A further sentence² in the first draft of the Contract accents the same possibility. It is obvious that in face of such a suggestion Locke's conception of princes as in a state of nature towards each other acquires quite a new significance. No doubt, as Rousseau points out, such a development though outside municipal units would not be prior to them. Yet it is a development of the Law of Nature which coheres with his subsequent interest in Peace Leagues and Federation. And he might not care decisively to exclude it. It is, I presume, of the highest interest to us to-day.

And I think it is a pity to convey the impression that Rousseau in the chapter in question "refuted the idea of natural law". What he refuted was the conception that man in a very early state could be conscious of the Law of Nature, except perhaps through his feelings. But to the Law of Nature Rousseau appeals, for instance, in the famous four words of the Contract, "Man is born

¹ I hold strongly, what Rousseau seems here to affirm, that if the human race is to have a general will, it must develop the character of a real community.

² Cited by Mr. Vaughan, i., 107; this sentence, like the draft chapter, was omitted from the definitive edition.

free"—that is, as Locke explained of children, born to freedom freedom is the "quality of man," practically the same, as again Locke had explained, with his "equality," his capacity for ordered self-government, which makes arbitrary rule in his case always precarious and unwelcome. Rousseau is faithful to the Law of Nature through his whole career from the second discourse to the "Government of Poland".

This leads to a further point. Is it the case, as Mr. Vaughan holds, that the famous sentences just referred to are a call to revolution; that they pronounce illegitimate nearly every existing government? This would be the case if the Contract were held to be a historical event which must have happened in order to the legitimate derivation of any state, or even to imply a constitution with perfectly rigid and determinate marks, such as those laid down in the following chapters. It does not seem to me to have either of these features. It seems to me to be the analysis of the character by which a community is a community, in virtue of the "quality of man". If so, though Rousseau might have dropped the state of nature and the contract, he could not have dropped the analysis of man's social character; and the width of the application of his analysis, though veiled under the form of the contract, is proved by the fact that he extends it to all civilisation in which man's moral nature is revealed. I think therefore that Rousseau represents himself truly when he says that he "has justified all governments". And yet it is obvious that he is ready, as a rule, to condemn any one of them.

The solution of this paradox takes us to Mr. Vaughan's reiterated affirmation that Rousseau did not believe in progress. Space will not permit me to argue the point in detail; but I am clear that out of his own mouth he can be shown to believe in progress as under many conditions inevitable (see *e.g.* the Second Discourse), but to believe in deterioration as inevitable also. The two opinions can be shown side by side throughout the whole of his thought. And is he not right? Is not progress in good a necessity of man's nature, if conditions permit it at all to develop, and is not progress in evil a necessity which accompanies it? I do not believe that Rousseau changed his mind from six months to six months on such questions as the merits of private property.¹ I believe he saw it to be a contrivance by which certain advantages were bought at the cost of certain abuses, that the two aspects were continually together in his mind, and that either might be expressed according to context.

Many interesting questions arise before me, but I must break off. I will, however, express a regret that Mr. Vaughan should have veiled his valuable discussions under the modernised phrases of "collectivism" and "individualism". So far from an antithesis, these terms rather suggest an identity. A collection means a col-

¹ I., 104.

lection of individuals.¹ And this is important, because it affects the conception of Rousseau's relation to his predecessors and his successors. He should not, I venture to suggest, be set against Locke or Fichte, as Mr. Vaughan tends to set him. It is a question of passing from a phase in which *both* whole and members are loosely conceived as in Locke, and still in part in Rousseau, to a more intense unity in which both whole and individuals are conceived at a higher pitch of fusion and both, therefore, with heightened powers and qualities. Locke and Rousseau are on an ascending slope, and Locke is in Rousseau miraculously transformed, though the latter has hardly a phrase that does not come from the former. But the great Germans are, so to speak, over the watershed, beyond the point of fusion. They have seized the "quality of man" and founded their community upon it, and their "individuality" is not opposed to unity, nor their absoluteness to liberty and humanity. I do not deny that much seems harsh and hard in Fichte's views. But I do think that on the whole he is misconceived by Mr. Vaughan; and I especially regret the disparaging treatment of what is to my mind the noblest exhortation ever addressed to a community in the hour of its disaster, the "Reden an die Deutsche Nation," which calls upon them to create a spiritual world, in order to redress the balance of the material one; and that spiritual world was to be rooted in an education akin to the ideas of Rousseau.

To conclude, as an instance of Rousseau's profound insight, I will mention a remark from one of the fragments, "An action to be good, must be good in all its relations; to be bad, it only needs to be vicious in a single respect".² This I take to be the real point of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.

I ought to add that Mr. Vaughan explains in a careful study Mrs. Macdonald's rehabilitation of Rousseau's personal character, which he accepts in the main. Am I wrong in thinking that Mrs. Macdonald threw doubt on the story of Rousseau's children, about which Mr. Vaughan shows no sign of scepticism? I wish he would take an opportunity of dealing with the matter.

I take leave of his excellent book with a strong feeling of gratitude and respect.

¹So Rousseau, i., 449, "Idée purement collective, qui ne suppose aucune union réelle entre les individus qui le constituent".

²L., 336.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research. Part 71. December, 1915. Pp. xix, 657. 12s. net.

THE whole of this bulky volume is occupied by a monumental *Contribution to the Study of the Psychology of Mrs. Piper's Trance Phenomena*, by Mrs. Henry Sidgwick, which may be regarded as the final 'clean-up' of this remarkable case of what we must still, for lack of a better name, call 'mediumship'. When Mrs. Piper's trances came to an end in 1911 and she retired on a pension very properly voted to her by the Society for Psychical Research, she had been under scientific investigation far longer and more thoroughly than any other 'medium,' had given an enormous number of sittings and had been observed, reported on and discussed by investigators of the eminence of William James, Richard Hodgson, Andrew Lang, Sir Oliver Lodge, Professors W. R. Newbold and J. H. Hyslop, Mr. J. G. Piddington, and last but not least Mrs. Sidgwick herself. It might have been supposed, therefore, from the long list of papers cited in the preface to the present Study that not much remained to be said about Mrs. Piper's phenomena. But the published papers had been concerned primarily with describing and testing the apparently supernatural knowledge exhibited in the Piper trances, and secondarily with the question whether it should be ascribed to communications from the dead. The multitudinous questions of a psychological order which arose alike whether the phenomena were ascribed to communications from 'spirits' through Mrs. Piper's body or to interactions between different strata of her personality *inter se* and with the minds of the sitters, had only come up incidentally. It was known also that Richard Hodgson, who had after prolonged and intimate study convinced himself of the greater probability of the spiritist interpretation, had accumulated a great mass of records of sittings which had aimed at elucidating scientifically the nature and conditions of spirit-communication. After his sudden and untimely death in 1905 no one was found capable of carrying on his work, and no account of this material was consequently published. Mrs. Sidgwick, therefore, both in undertaking a critical examination of the unpublished records and in discussing the whole material from a psychological point of view has performed a plain but difficult and laborious duty which was incumbent on the Society for Psychical Research, and has done a great service to science.

For her Study is a very fine piece of work, and by reason of its thoroughness, candour, calm and open-mindedness a model for all inquirers into these perplexing phenomena. Its conclusions will not indeed please the extremists on either side, or satisfy the hasty and superficial who desire a final pronouncement on problems which true science is only just learning to approach. If psychology is really to become a science on a par with the rest, it cannot for ever remain a game for professors who merely amuse themselves by describing some of the superficial aspects of mental life in technical and arbitrary jargons of their own invention, without subjecting the claims of their 'psy-

chologies' to any serious test by seeing whether they can predict and control the course of any actual mind. Psychology, therefore, cannot continue to shirk much longer the test of application to the actual phenomena of mental life, and all who perceive this will find that they have much to learn from Mrs. Sidgwick, as from the other students of individual psychology.

It should be understood, therefore, at the outset that the interest and importance of Mrs. Sidgwick's work is essentially psychological, and not 'teratological'. Not that she denies the occurrence in Mrs. Piper's trances of supernormal knowledge: on the contrary she declares emphatically (p. 6) that "*I have no doubt whatever that knowledge is often exhibited in the course of Mrs. Piper's trance utterances which can only have reached her by some supernormal means,*" and that her "supernormal powers are very important". Neither does she deny that "evidence tending decidedly to support the hypothesis of communication from the dead has been obtained through automatists other than Mrs. Piper" and through 'cross-correspondences' in which Mrs. Piper has had a share. But in her selections she excludes "the evidence for telepathy either with the living or the dead, partly because I am unable to agree with Hodgson as to the extent to which Mrs. Piper's trance utterances are independent of her, and partly because I must dwell on the absurd elements in these utterances" (p. 7), the seamy side consisting of "obviously false personations and false claims, of ignorance and misapprehensions shown by the trance-personages" (p. 6). We learn also (p. 5) that in the judgment of Mrs. Sidgwick, Mr. Gerald Balfour and Mr. Piddington the unpublished Hodgson records "do not on the whole afford evidence different in kind from that which we already have" and that "it is not worth while to attempt to present more evidence" of supernormal knowledge from them.

On the other hand Mrs. Sidgwick's selections must be pronounced very damaging to the claims of some of the trance-personalities. This applies especially to the 'Imperator Band,' who professed to be a company of exalted spirits who had inspired W. Stainton Moses, and after his death claimed and obtained the chief control of Mrs. Piper's trances in 1897. Their impressiveness as spiritual advisers (which it is fair to say is attested also by William James, though he himself "favoured the idea of their all being dream-creations of Mrs. Piper") induced Hodgson to submit to their methods; this involved a great reduction in the evidential part of the output, without leading to the coherent and systematic account of the spirit-world and its modes of communicating which he was promised. Yet from the first 'Imperator,' 'Rector,' 'Doctor,' etc., had failed to give credentials of their identity with the characters so-named in Moses's *Spirit Teachings*, and it is difficult to see that their performances at any time were superior in quality or content to those of the earlier 'controls' like 'Phinuit' and 'G. P.'. Hence one cannot but endorse Mrs. Sidgwick's judgment that 'Imperator' in particular produced an "unpleasant effect of pretentious inadequacy" by communications not only "incoherent and contradictory but altogether on a lower level of culture than what we find in *Spirit Teachings*" (p. 101), i.e. in Moses's 'Imperator'. His excursions into science and Biblical History were surely enough to discredit him, and in his discredit it would seem that all the other 'spirits' must be involved, even those who like 'G. P.' and Hodgson himself were life-like impersonations and had given real evidence of authenticity. For all the rest testified to the reality of 'Imperator' and acknowledged his superiority. 'Rector' also gave himself away hopelessly from a scientific point of view, by losing his temper when an alleged cross-correspondence had

been convicted of failure (p. 514), and by his anxiety to reserve the medium for sermonising purposes (p. 490).

It is not astonishing then that Mrs. Sidgwick sums up *against* the spiritist interpretation (pp. 315-331), and thinks Mrs. Piper's trance "is probably a state of self-induced hypnosis in which her hypnotic self personates different characters either consciously and deliberately, or unconsciously and believing herself to be the person she represents, and sometimes probably in a state of consciousness between the two". But she is well aware that this conclusion does not close the inquiry. The supernormal knowledge shown has still to be accounted for. 'Telepathy' is a problem, not an explanation. Our knowledge of hypnotic and other 'dissociated' states of personality is woefully inadequate. We have so much to learn about "the way the consciousness works in all of us, but in automatists in particular". So she very rightly reserves to herself the right of revising her conclusions.

Mrs. Sidgwick's attitude seems sound and truly scientific, and those who prefer to experiment with the spiritist interpretation of the phenomena would be well advised to treat it with respect. They should recognise that even though their theory may be right, it can hardly be right in the simple forms first given to it and that it is incumbent on them to probe much deeper into its possibilities and complexities. As so often in the progress of a science, we have here a case of alternatives, to either of which such 'facts' as are known can be accommodated, and which appeal differently to different people.

But the most pathetic feature about the situation, perhaps, is the helplessness of 'orthodox' psychology. It has nothing authoritative, nothing even *relevant*, to say about the practical difficulties of the psychological researcher. What can it tell us about the constitution of a personality, about the forces that weld it together or 'dissociate' it? How can it either justify the working assumption that personalities are impervious to each other or determine how under certain conditions they appear to interpenetrate? Can it explain even the most elementary facts about any actual self, how *e.g.* it remembers, and why it forgets, the simplest thing? Must it not admit that the collective wisdom of all the psychologists in the world would probably fail to foresee the next thought of any member of their conclave? Assuredly the psychological researcher is grievously hampered by the backwardness of a science he would be glad to use if only it could be put in an applicable shape. Like the psychiatrist, the psycho-analyst, the educationist, he finds that psychology leaves him in the lurch, because its professors have been too busy building castles in the air to dream of applying their doctrines to the facts that would test them. Until the psychologists have grasped that they too cannot escape the pragmatic test, it will not be possible to discover either how much of the theories tested is true or how many of the facts alleged are real.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

A Text-book of Logic. By ARTHUR ERNEST DAVIES, Professor of Philosophy in the Ohio State University. R. G. Adams & Co, 1915. Pp. xxviii, 601.

This book is meant for beginners, and as regards choice of topics and general method of treatment, it follows in the main, though by no means slavishly, "the classical tradition of which Aristotle and Mill are the two fountain heads". Allowing for the limits prescribed by its modest aim, the work is in many respects worthy of high praise. The selection and

arrangement of topics is good. The exposition is throughout lucid and easy and yet not cut and dried; it is such as to awaken interest and to stimulate thought in the elementary student without unduly taxing his powers. Further, Prof. Davies has succeeded in adapting his book not only to the requirements of the student but to those of the teacher. He has, I think, succeeded, as he intended to do in making it, so far as its general method of treatment is concerned, "an instrument in the hands of the teacher which facilitates the task of teaching and adapts itself to the purposes that he may hold before himself and the class".

On the whole I should be prepared to recommend the work both to students and teachers as a book for beginners if it were not marred at some important points by doctrines which seem to me in part very dubious and in part clearly erroneous. As an example of a clearly erroneous statement, likely seriously to mislead the student, I may refer to the account of the distribution of terms. "A term is distributed when from the form of the proposition in which it occurs, it is known to refer to a determined number of individuals of the class denoted by the term" (p. 115). Together with this view of distribution, Prof. Davies continues to hold that a proposition is universal when its subject is distributed and particular when it is not. It must follow that in "some one (or only one) of the crew fell overboard," the subject is distributed and the proposition universal. But if this were so, we ought to be able to infer that whoever did not fall overboard was not a member of the crew. Plainly this is fallacious unless we in some way identify the particular member of the crew referred to; but the original proposition does not enable us to do this. In general, the proposed definition of distribution breaks down in its application to the doctrine of immediate inference and of the syllogism. Prof. Davies' treatment of the important subject of Connotation and Denotation is unsatisfactory. He fails to distinguish between two vitally different senses of Connotation, according as it is taken to include all qualities of a thing or only those qualities which are necessary and sufficient to constitute the thing a member of a certain class. Hence his discussion of the question whether Proper Names, as such, are connotative is vague and inconclusive. He also repeats an error, traceable, I believe, to Jevons. He says (p. 115): "The denotation of a term may be increased greatly without any change in its connotation, as actually happened for example when the British Government annexed some millions of Africans at the close of the Boer war, without making thereby any change at all in the connotation of the term 'British subject'". There should be no need to point out that the distinction between past, present, and future existence is logically irrelevant unless it is included in connotation as in the class name "British subjects existing previously to the annexation which followed the Boer war". But if the time reference is included in the connotation there is no relevant difference in Denotation which does not involve difference in connotation. In distinguishing Categorical, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive propositions, Prof. Davies attempts to bring them all under the common formula " S is P " (pp. 88-89). Yet in some passages he seems to recognise that in "if S is P , it is M ," what we really assert is a connexion between " S being P " and " S being M "; without asserting or implying either that " S is P " or that " S is M ". It is worth noting that Prof. Davies always gives, as the formula for the Hypothetical, "If S is P , it is M ," never "If S is P , Q is M ". Similarly his formula for the Disjunctive is always " S is either P or Q ," never "Either S is M or P is Q ". The book contains a thoughtful discussion of "Abstract terms" which is in many ways deserving of praise. But the conclusion reached is likely to puzzle the intelligent student. "Greenness," we are told, "is that

which belongs as an attribute to all greens whatsoever." What, we may ask, can this greenness be besides the particular greens to which it is said to belong? Turning to Induction, we find that Prof. Davies condemns the plurality of causes as "a quite misleading, if not mischievous conception". He may be right. But he entirely fails to bring out the obvious and *prima facie* impressive reasons for the opposite view, and in general he does not indicate in any way the difficulty of the question. The student is not likely to discover in the book any cogent reason for denying the plurality of causes except Prof. Morgan's apparently arbitrary assertion that it is untenable. In dealing with Mill's experimental methods, it is premised at the outset that these methods are "a statement of the processes which have been found useful in the establishment of those causal relations in which the antecedent and consequent reciprocally imply each other"; "we should be putting an unnecessary strain upon these methods if we did not regard them as applying, in the strict sense, only to those special cases in which a relation of the kind in question had been determined" (p. 473). Now I do not know what may be in Prof. Morgan's mind when he makes this statement. In some recondite sense, his position may be defensible. But on the face of it, it is quite indefensible. The view which Mill himself took of his methods is quite irreconcilable with it; and there is nothing in Mill's detailed exposition which can be shown to presuppose logically the reciprocal relation of cause and effect. In this respect, Prof. Morgan's detailed account of the methods does not differ from Mill's. Thus the student will be confronted with what must appear to him as an arbitrary statement difficult to reconcile with the obvious facts of the case.

Prof. Davies in his initial definition of Logic seems to me to assign no adequate distinction between it and Psychology. "Logic," we are told, "arises when the thought factor present in all knowledge is set before the mind as a subject of investigation" (p. 11). This "thought factor" is distinctly asserted to be a "mental factor". In order to keep Logic separate from Psychology, Prof. Davies finds it necessary to add that in Logic we consider only the conditions of *correct* thinking. But what are the conditions of correct thinking? Are they to be found in the thought process itself as a "mental factor"? If they are, there seems to be no reason why psychology should not investigate them. If they are not, then it is essentially untrue that Logic deals only with the thought process. Prof. Davies has of course weighty authority for his position. None the less, I wish he would reconsider it.

There are a few minor mistakes and slips of a glaring kind. The distinction between Knowledge by acquaintance is ascribed to George Grote "the English Historian" instead of his brother, John Grote, the Cambridge Professor (p. 63). It is quite misleading to couple Aquinas with Anselm as a "realist". Indeed the passage (pp. 92-93) on the scholastic doctrine of universals is so inexact that it would be an improvement to omit it altogether. Similarly the reference to Pythagoras (p. 393) is quite out of place. Nothing was further from his thoughts than the use of statistical methods. There is a curious slip of the pen on p. 453, where the discovery of the "planet Neptune in 1846" is twice ascribed to Galileo.

I repeat in conclusion that so far as adaptation to the needs of beginners is concerned this book has considerable merit. Careful revision might make it into a satisfactory introduction to Logic. But careful revision is required.

G. F. S.

Outlines of Moral Philosophy. Designed to be adapted to the Syllabus on Ethics fixed for the B.A. Examinations of the Calcutta University. By ABHOY KUMAR MAZUMDAR, Senior Professor of Philosophy, Krishnath College, Berhampore, formerly Senior Professor of Philosophy, Ripon College, Calcutta. Calcutta : J. K. Mazumdar, 1915. Pp. ix, 164, 201, 278.

This book is primarily intended by Prof. Mazumdar to meet the requirements of his own students and the similar requirements of Indian students in general. As regards the topics dealt with it confessedly follows the Examination Syllabus of Calcutta University. But it is by no means a mere cram-book. The exposition is throughout as full as is compatible with the conditions of a book for beginners, and it is also well thought out. The author "writing from view-point of Ideal-realism as expounded by Vedantism and Hegelianism" has "accepted the view that the real standpoint of morality should be that which takes into account and explains all the sides of human nature and is therefore the perfection of that nature"; he has "consequently tried to show that all other forms of the moral standpoint are based upon a one-sided conception of the self, each of which conceptions evokes its opposite by the inherent necessity of its nature, and is, therefore, a step in the process of a dialectic which finally leads to a conception that reconciles them all and unifies them in a system of which they are only partial forms" (Preface). Prof. Mazumdar shows himself, on the whole, a competent representative of this position. His account of the views of other writers including those most opposed to his own, is for the most part sufficiently full and accurate and his criticisms relevant and pointed. The book seems well adapted to its purpose, and it may perhaps be found useful by others as well as students at Indian Universities.

G. F. S.

Reflections on Violence. By GEORGES SORREL. Translated with an Introduction and Bibliography by T. E. Hume. London : Allen & Unwin, 1916. Pp. xv, 299.

When one divests the polemic of Mr. Sorrel of adventitious elements such as references to Pessimism and to Bergson, there remains a striking development of Socialism in the direction of Syndicalism and the general strike. Sorrel's exposition suffers from the form of the present volume which is a translation of a series of articles, in which various aspects of the main theme have been developed separately. There is in fact only one central idea, namely, that the revolution in social order, instead of being the outcome of a historical process as predicted by Marx, is to be brought about by violence as a phase of a general strike. Sorrel, like other Syndicalists, is remarkably silent as to what would happen on the supposition that this violent upheaval takes place and is successful. Failing anything constructive, one might wonder before reading the volume, why a book of fair size is required to explain this principle. In the main the answer is that the original articles were much more an attack upon French political Socialism than upon the existing system of social order. Sorrel speaks with pitying contempt of the middle classes, he inveighs with the most bitter sarcasm against the intellect, the common sense and the morals of rival socialists. Thus to cull a few specimens at random, it is hinted that Sudekum may have had a financial interest in the elopement of a certain Princess (p. 55 note). Jaurès is distinguished by remarkable suppleness of mind and of peasant duplicity (p. 81), the policy of French Parliamentary Socialists is "a

dictatorship of incapacity" (p. 83) "filled with contradictory, comical and quack arguments," "aiming at reconciling contradictories by means of nonsense" (p. 129). "It amuses buffoons and is admired by decadents" (p. 130). Sorrel quotes with enjoyment Tarde's description of Mr. Sidney Webb as "a worthless scribber". His own character sketch is that Mr. Webb has "a mind of the narrowest description which could only impress people unaccustomed to reflection" (p. 132). These few quotations show how Socialists love each other!

It is not a little remarkable that, though *Reflexions sur la Violence* only appeared in 1908, it is already out of date, and is rather of historical than of practical interest. Sorrel emphasises that there are limitations to the efficacy of industrial violence. He shows that two "accidents" alone would stop revolutionary Syndicalism, namely, "a great foreign war, which might renew lost energies, and which in any case would doubtless bring into power men with the will to govern; or a great extension of proletarian violence, which would make the revolutionary reality evident to the middle classes" (p. 83). Elsewhere he indicates another limitation, namely, that Revolution is not likely to succeed in a period of economic decadence—such as may follow the present war. Thus, whatever economic and social disturbances may follow the declaration of peace—and they are likely to be more considerable than at present anticipated—these are expressly ruled out on Sorrel's principles. Nor is he more fortunate in his prediction as to the attitude of British politicians in a national crisis. Even more than the middle class, he despises politicians whose "wits are singularly sharpened by their voracious appetites and in whom the hunt for fat jobs develops the cunning of Apaches" (p. 168). The English Liberal party was pilloried by Sorrel as the fitting counterpart of the middle class. "Middle-class cowardice much resembles the cowardice of the English Liberal party, which constantly proclaims its absolute confidence in arbitration between nations: arbitration nearly always gives disastrous results for England. But these worthy progressives prefer to pay or even to compromise the future of their country, rather than face the horrors of war" (p. 73). The events of July and early August, 1914, afford a significant commentary on this dictum, just as the roll of honour since then is a silent, sad irony upon the alleged decadence of the middle classes.

The translation is generally well done, and it preserves as much of the nervous and hectic brilliancy of parts of the original as is possible in another language.

W. R. SCOTT.

Université de Louvain—Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie.
Tome III. Année 1914. Louvain and Paris. Pp. 628.

This is a belated notice of the last issue of these Annals, which appeared in the earlier part of the year which was to see, before its close, the memorable crime that has made Louvain a name to conjure with to Englishmen, who have vowed not to lay aside the sword until those who have ruthlessly trampled on so much that should have been sacred to all civilised men, have been driven from the lands they have violated. The number before us contains ten articles written by scholars connected with the School or Institute of St. Thomas Aquinas, a foundation within the University of Louvain devoted to the advanced study of philosophy on 'neo-scholastic' lines.

The first is by M. Defourny and deals at considerable length with the economic and political theories of Aristotle. Especial attention is called

to the result of such advocacy of the restriction of families as we find in Aristotle in the *ὀλιγανθρωπία* lamented a century later by Polybius; and the writer invokes on the opposite side the Old Testament precept to 'increase and multiply' along with the New Testament counsel to 'take no thought for the morrow'. One may observe, by the way, in respect of the remark on p. 112 that any agreement between Aristotle and Plato should be emphasised, because so rare, that M. Defourny has not sufficiently realised the fundamental Platonism which continued to characterise the most illustrious of Plato's pupils amid all his criticism of his master—which indeed is directed throughout to justifying his divergence in certain definite points from those with whom he would naturally be in sympathy, his fellow-disciples of the Academy.

M. Diès has a good account of the idea of science in Plato, in which he shows himself thoroughly familiar with English work on his subject. M. Becker writes on St. Thomas's theory of God's influence on the operation of his creatures. He is stricter than St. Thomas himself in separating the sphere of nature from that of grace. He describes the Angelic Doctor as having, under the influence of the Aristotelian physics, put the divine causality too much in the same rank with that of the heavenly bodies. This may be granted, but the problem of the relation of God's causality to physical causes is none the less difficult because we do not speak of the forces of nature as stellar influences. M. Becker seems to relegate providential action to the supernatural order. The usual consequence however of such a dualism seems to follow; namely, a real danger to the interests of religion in the guise of a fancied security for them.

M. Grabmann's study of St. Thomas's Aristotelian commentaries is learned and on the whole judicious. (A foreigner will easily be excused for speaking of 'Peterhouse College' without perceiving the tautology.)

M. Lebbe gives an account of Chinese philosophy. He appears to believe in a 'primitive tradition of the Trinity'. It is noticeable that he remarks on an excessive saint-worship as characteristic both of China and of Catholic countries.

M. Lottin's criticism of the French sociologists—the group who conduct *L'Année Sociologique*—is valuable. He points out that, despite their apparent solidarity, there are considerable differences of view among them. Thus M. Durkheim attempts a real ideal; M. Lèvy-Bruhl says nothing of this (p. 395). M. Lèvy-Bruhl does, however, postulate the foundation of moral science; but, according to M. Bayet, the ideas of responsibility and duty are doomed (pp. 390, 400). The principle (M. Lottin quotes the last-named writer as saying) of the moral act is that which the common consciousness (or conscience) judges to be good. But the unity of this *conscience commune* turns out to be purely apparent (p. 408), and eventually M. Bayet gives up his 'amended utilitarianism'. He finds it too general to be practical. The moral art cannot choose between ideas. One must in practice choose freely according to what appeals to oneself. Science can tell one what the result will be, but in doing this it plays a *rôle purement informatif nullement normatif* (p. 410). M. Bayet has, we learn, been disowned by MM. Durkheim and Lèvy-Bruhl as the *enfant terrible* of their school (p. 412). All three alike, however, have failed to resolve what M. Lottin calls the problem of Ends by *la science*, as they understand that term (p. 420). Other French writers are then discussed and found wanting. The ethics of Kant also M. Lottin judges to be unsatisfactory; and what in this critic's eyes is their main defect, their 'formalism,' he connects (p. 486) with the fact that they are not derived from the Catholic ethics but inspired by those of the Jansenists and Protestants. The eclectic ethics of Cousin, he goes on (p. 487) to

observe, are also Jansenist by descent; and this is especially seen in their theory of intention, which is near akin to Kant's. Both escape the Kantian formalism by 'founding duty on le bien objectif'. This M. Lottin defines as *ce qui est conforme à la nature de l'être*; and he adds the somewhat surprising statement that this judgment is immediate and has nothing mysterious about it. The judgment of morality is, he tells us (p. 465), an analytic judgment and immediately evident. M. Lottin seems to hold that it would only be synthetic on the 'purely positive' or 'authoritative' view. This view cannot be ultimately correct, because to explain the prohibitive will of God one is compelled to recur to the notion of *la moralité intrinsèque*. The weak point of the Aristotelian and scholastic ethics which M. Lottin defends is seen in a remark (p. 471 n.) that you may *engage* the will to act morally by a hedonistic consideration, though this does not give you the true reason. Despite the justice of M. Lottin's criticism of M. Lévy Bruhl's views, his own view is vitiated by the fallacy contained in the Aristotelian attempt to explain morality by equating the good with the natural, an equation which leaves on one side the real problem of morality altogether; and it is just here, in the full realisation of what this problem is, that the strength of the Kantian ethics lies.

M. Valléry-Radot follows with an article on Contemporary Catholic Literature. Then come two others dealing with certain questions in psychophysics, and the volume concludes with a chronicle of the work done in the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie during the preceding year. It is interesting to note that special distinction was won by an Englishman, Mr. F. Aveling, a lecturer of University College, London, with a thesis to which he had already owed his election as Carpenter Medallist in the University of London. Prof. Noel (who after the devastation of his University was for a time a welcome guest at Oxford) presents a *bilan de l'école de Louvain*, in which he tells us that in that School, though founded for the study of St. Thomas, that teacher is to be *un phase, non pas une borne* (p. 604), and his words are not to be repeated as dogmas. He notes (on p. 607) that in 1891 Louvain was becoming a University of the German rather than of the Napoleonic type; by which he appears to mean that it was becoming one in which science is to be regarded, not as *une chose faite et achevée*, but as progressive and still in the making. At this juncture the School of St. Thomas was founded. The pronouncements to which it owed its origin, the *Encyclical Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII. and a report by Mgr. (now Cardinal) Mercier, echoed, we are told, Comte's conception of philosophy as the ultimate synthesis of the sciences. We may be permitted to doubt whether the influence of this conception has been altogether favourable to the subsequent development of philosophical studies in the School. What one finds missing there is a full appreciation of the movement of modern philosophy as distinct from that of the natural sciences. The study of the latter has been alive in the School, but that of philosophy has seemed to tend towards preoccupation on the one hand with the history of mediæval speculation, on the other with empirical psychology. As Prof. Noel himself puts it (p. 626), 'Placing ourselves in the midst of modern currents of thought'—and, in speaking of modern currents of thought, he is thinking mainly of the natural sciences and of empirical psychology—'we have ascended towards the ideas of St. Thomas, to find there the solutions' of the problems raised by the world of to-day.

May we at no distant time see resumed in a resuscitated Louvain the activities of which this interesting volume is a record!

C. C. J. W.

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VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxv., No. 1. **J. W. Scott.** 'On the Competence of Thought in the Sphere of the Higher Life.' [Thought, for which the real universe discloses itself as a real-ourselves, has been the instrument of man's advance in morals, art and religion.] **T. de Laguna.** 'On Certain Logical Paradoxes.' [Discusses three typical paradoxes from the *Principia Mathematica*: those of the liar, of the constant relation of object to its class, and of the constant relation of object to its property. The two last rest upon an error as regards the nature of the logical copula; the first turns on the possibility of elimination of 'true' and 'false' as applied to propositions.] **W. K. Wright.** 'Instinct and Sentiment in Religion.' [The religious attitude is neither instinct nor artificial construct but sentiment. At first it is vague; the differentiation of values and agencies is imperfect; moral group-values are not necessarily connected with religious. Next it splits into a variety of sentiments, one for every fetic, spirit, god. Finally the various agencies are synthesised into a higher and more concrete unity: monotheism.] **C. A. Bennett.** 'Bergson's Doctrine of Intuition.' [If analytical knowledge is to be possible, another kind of knowledge must provide the framework within which predicate-connexion may take place; and since a predicate may claim to exhaust the nature of a subject, we must have a corrective knowledge of that subject in its simple entirety. Full knowledge implies the interplay of both processes.] **Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.**—Vol. xxv., No. 2. **A. C. Armstrong.** 'Philosophy and Common Sense.' [Common sense grows, and philosophy is among the main conditions of this growth (uniformity of nature, mind and body, evolution). In thus fulfilling one of its principal functions, philosophy enlarges its own borders and is prompted to constructive work.] **P. E. More.** 'The Parmenides of Plato.' [The rationalism which brings out the contradictions involved in positing the existence of Ideas is to be met by pointing out the contradictions involved in positing their non-existence; the reality of Ideas may then be accepted as a necessity of inner experience.] **A. K. Rogers.** 'Reason and Feeling in Ethics.' [As the objective content of truth (correspondence) is to the feeling of belief, so is the objective content of good (capacity for satisfaction of desire) to the feeling of approval. The strictly moral quality 'better' appears only when our attitude toward the alternative choice is that of actual disapproval. It follows, from this interplay of interest and desire in ethics, that the personal ideal is not the *Summum Bonum*.] **E. G. Spaulding.** 'Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association: the Fifteenth Annual Meeting, University of Pennsylvania, December 28-30, 1915.' **Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.** [**R. B. C. Johnson** on **A. T. Ormond**.]

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. xxiii., No. 1. **R. MacDougall.** 'The Self and Mental Phenomena.' [The psychologist deals neither with the assessment of immediate values in life nor with the metaphysical interpretation of experience. Self concerns him (1) in the specific mental

fact of 'sense of self,' (2) as a name for the totality of mental characteristics and activities ('mind' is here the better term), and remotely (3) as the logical limit of reference postulated in the definition of the science itself.] **J. A. Harris.** 'On the Influence of Previous Experience on Personal Equation and Steadiness of Judgment in the Estimation of the Number of Objects in Moderately Large Samples.' [Personal equation is very little, steadiness of judgment is unmistakably influenced by previous experience.] **K. Dunlap.** 'Thought-content and Feeling.' [Against Lovejoy and Bode. Emotion is bodily state, and thought-content is muscle-contraction content.] **P. W. Cobb.** 'Photometric Considerations Pertaining to Visual Stimuli.' [A condensed statement of the fundamental physical conceptions which apply to visual stimuli. Photometric conceptions; visual objects; the relations of light to energy.]—Vol. xxiii., No. 2. **J. B. Watson.** 'The Place of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology.' [Discusses the technique of Bechterew's conditioned motor reflex. The method, for the present used mainly in work upon the lower animals (dog, bird), is applicable to the human adult, probably to children, perhaps to pathological cases. It is adequate to normal sensory problems, and promises well for memory, the association-reaction, and the sensory life of those who are unable to use words.] **E. S. Abbot.** 'The Biological Point of View in Psychology.' [Biologically, man is a biological unit reacting to his environment; every psychical event is a reaction; the psychiatrist must study his patient's total reaction to total environment.] **A. S. Otis.** 'Some Logical Aspects of the Binet Scale, i.' [Shows how to determine the percentage of children who should pass a test at the age for which it is to be considered standard. Tests may be standardised more accurately than at present by consideration of the percentages of children who pass it at several different ages.] **J. Peterson.** 'Completeness of Response as an Explanation Principle in Learning.' [In every response there is overlapping of tendencies; mutual reinforcements and inhibitions are at work. Certain acts are, on the whole, chosen because they are, on the whole, the most natural. Illustration from maze-experiments.] **L. J. Martin.** 'A Case of Pseudoprophecy.' [A forecast of the earthquake of 1906 due to scientific inference.]

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xxvii., No. 1. **J. N. Curtis.** 'Duration and the Temporal Judgment.' [Experiments on the discrimination of filled and empty intervals, auditory, visual and electrical-cutaneous, with accompanying introspection, enable the writer to reconcile conflicting results of earlier workers, and also throw light on the psychological nature of duration. Time may be taken perceptually, as static length, or attributively, as progression-experience; duration is thus a true sensory attribute.] **F. L. Wells.** 'On the Psychomotor Mechanisms of Typewriting.' [An objective study, made with a view to vocational guidance: time (rate of strokes, effect of back-spacer, margin-release, carriage-return, etc.), accuracy, experimental and non-experimental conditions, nature of errors (omissions, transpositions, substitutions, additions), are considered in some detail. Typewriting generally is better done toward noon than at the opening of the working day.] **W. B. Swift.** 'Some Developmental Psychology in Lower Animals and in Man and Its Contribution to Certain Theories of Adult Mental Tests.' [Traces the development of control-centres in the conditioned reflex (dog), in the visual training of stutterers, in the vocal drill of a mental defective; argues from these facts, and from other neurological data, that "mental tests should relate all sensorial content, all interpretative reaction, all forms of collaboration, all controlled methods of expressive output, according to the correlations laid down in the theory of the whole (type, individual) and the parts".] **H. E. Burt.** 'Factors which

Influence the Arousal of the Primary Visual Memory Image.' [The image is favoured by complexity of contour, size, long exposure, interest, motor reinforcement; is inhibited by mental and motor distraction. The factors appear to converge toward one: the direction of attention to the stimulus-object.] **L. Dooley.** 'A Study in Correlation of Normal Complexes by Means of the Association Method.' [Complexes are found; twelve indicators are mentioned. The unconscious is dynamic in nature, and is a potent factor in conscious activity. Freud's sexualism and infantilism cannot be tested by the method.] Book Notes.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS. xiii., 3. **H. C. Warren.** 'A Study of Purpose,' III. [Deals with purpose in nature, and concludes that "purpose is not a fundamental category in the scientific explanation of cosmic evolution". A 'trend' or "tendency toward greater complexity and harmonious interworking" is, however, admitted.] **H. L. Hollingworth.** 'The Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association'.—xiii., 4. **H. J. Laski.** 'The Sovereignty of the State.' [Protests against the Hegelian notion of supra-moral, absolute, Sovereign State, suggests that the retired colonels in their clubs are aping Bernhardt, and prefers a pragmatic, pluralistic, individualist conception for which "the State, like every association, must prove itself by what it achieves" and is based on "consent to disagreement".] **T. de Laguna.** 'The Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association'.—xiii., 5. **E. B. Titchener.** 'A Note on the Sensory Character of Black.' [Contests James Ward's denial (in the *British Journal of Psychology*, 1905) that 'black' is a sensation, and urges against the argument from a comparison of 'black' with 'silence' that silence also may be 'felt' and is not mere absence of sensation.] **J. A. Leighton.** 'Percepts, Sense Data and Things.' [Defends a naïve realism, "modified only by insistence on the organic and functional interdependence and correlation of percepts and perceived objects". 'Sensations' are dismissed as artificial constructions, 'sense data' are superfluous and 'things' are to be explained pragmatically as practical constructions relative to a desire and a purpose.] **A. T. Poffenberger.** 'New York Branch of the American Psychological Association'.—xiii., 6. **H. F. Adams.** 'The Relative Memory Values of Duplication and Variation in Advertising.' ["Increasing size gives higher memory value than increasing the number of repetitions," and "variation is about twice as effective as duplication".] **E. Guthrie.** 'The Field of Logic.' [A sort of review of Windelband's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, coming to the conclusion "in entire agreement with Russell . . . that truth is quite accidental to propositions as far as logic is concerned. Logic is not concerned with the truth or validity of ideas as Windelband (*sic*) would have us believe." It is also asserted that the thinking of a man marooned on a desert island with his dog "need not have the structure of logic".] **J. S. Moore.** 'Purpose and Causality.' [A note on H. C. Warren's article in xiii., 2.]—xiii., 7. **A. K. Rogers.** 'A Statement of Epistemological Dualism.' [An attempted defence of the 'copy' notion of truth. It is urged that "there do undoubtedly exist strong beliefs which involve the assumption," *e.g.*, that in the existence of an inner life in others. The belief, however, "that our ideas correspond to reality is not to be regarded as a result of comparison but as an assumption or postulate" and "tested indirectly by the consequences which we do experience" (*i.e.*, by the pragmatic test). As for the difficulty about the self-transcendence of ideas, such transcendence may be a fact though philosophy cannot understand it. If memory can transcend (present) experience why not

meaning? The question as to how we may know *when* our ideas correspond with realities is reserved.] **H. L. Hollingworth.** 'The Psychophysical Continuum.' [Argues that the separation of experiences into a 'natural' and a 'mental' order is an artifice with a practical motive. "The physical world . . . for which are developed the various shorthand symbols by which we designate the objects as independent of experience consists of those experiences which are statistically common." "The dependence, the subjectivity, the personal character of other experiences, the so-called mental order, are merely literary terms which express their statistical limitations and their consequent vagueness and complex conditions of appearance." The 'gulf' between the two orders is due to neglect by classifiers of "the intermediate zone, comprising those experiences with only average statistical possibilities—the diseases, the communistic sentiments . . . such experiences as panic, ague, beauty, warmth, etc." Experience, moreover, is full of correlations and "the correlation of what we call a mental fact with what we call a physical fact is no more mysterious than, and is the same in kind as, any correlation between two physical or between two mental facts".]—xiii., 8. **E. L. Thorndike.** 'The Technique of Combining Incomplete Judgments of the Relative Positions of *N* Facts made by *N* Judges.' [The 'general intellect' of thirty-four college freshmen was judged by eighteen judges (whether all undergraduates or also professors is not stated) who knew from fourteen to twenty-nine of them. With the exception of one humble-minded individual the judges all awarded to themselves 84.99 per cent.] **G. C. Cox.** 'Ethics as a Science and as Art.' [A clear-headed and incisive paper, which urges (1) that "ethics can be and will be treated as a natural science"; (2) that "to insist upon its normative character is to keep it from being studied in any fruitful way. If normative in the absolutist and aprioristic sense, it is impossible to study it as a science at all"; (3) that "the case method, which is in the social sciences the analogue of the laboratory method, must be used for the discovery of ethical laws. It is not casuistical, since it does not assume a knowledge of these laws *ab initio*"; (4) that "the results already attained by many sciences . . . will be used for the purpose of discovering what man *can do*"; (5) "the influence of *social heredity*, through racial, national and religious traditions" will be studied as well as casuistry proper.]—xiii., 9. **J. Peterson.** 'Illusions of Direction Orientation.' [To which, apparently, dwellers in American cities, with their geometrically laid out streets, are peculiarly liable. It is suggested that "there are a number of similarities between the development and maintenance of a sense of direction and the development and continuity of personality".] **T. L. Davis.** 'Theory as Truth: A Study of the Logical Status of Scientific Theory.' [Proposes that the term 'theory' should be restricted to "a class of opinions which are logically different from laws and hypotheses" which are "the surest thing that science knows". A 'theory' is, apparently, an interpretation of an experiment to which no alternative has presented itself, and which is therefore held to be the *only possible* explanation of the fact and "as true as a fact". Examples are given of scientific opinions for which this status is claimed, but it is admitted that scientific usage of the term 'theory' does not support the proposal, while no attempt is made to meet the logical objection that in principle an alternative to an only interpretation must always be reckoned with and that the difference between the only interpretation and the best up to date is only a psychological one. No amount of present scientific consensus can go bail for the future.]

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Tome xv., No. 4. **A. Leclère.** 'La psychologie des graffiti.' [Distinguishes the various impulses to self-

expression which lead to scribbling on walls; concludes that *grafittisme* is a psychical syndrome either of degeneration or of neuropathy.] **H. Delacroix.** 'Remarques sur "une mystique moderne".' [Comments on the case described by Flournoy. The contest between the mystical and the moral-religious tendencies is settled by the subject's rejection of ecstasy and return to actual life; the conflict between the impersonal divinity of the ecstasy and the personal God of history is fundamentally unresolved.] **E. Molnár.** 'Une nouvelle méthode en psychologie religieuse.' [Describes a method of personal graphs which, accompanied by a diary, show the course and fluctuations of the religious experience. Three cases are given.] **P. Kennel.** 'Essai de classification des odeurs par la méthode des majorités.' [Preliminary trials indicate that, apart from one or two great groups, classification is uncertain; Zwaardemaker's groups, however, serve their purpose.] **Recueil de Faits: Documents et Discussions.** **V. de Morsier.** 'Que deviennent les élèves qui sont sortis des classes d'anormaux?' [Only 10 to 20 per cent. can earn their own living.] **C. Werner.** 'Xe Réunion des philosophes de la Suisse romande.' Bibliographie. Notes diverses. [Necrology 1901-1915; experimental psychology at the University of Geneva.]

ZEITSCHRIFT F. PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. lxxiii., Heft 1 u. 2. **L. V. Viqueira.** 'Lokalisation und einfaches Wiedererkennen.' [Meaningless syllables, exposed together in certain positions, and re-exposed singly after an interval of time, are better and more quickly recognised if shown in their original positions.] **K. Koffka.** 'Beiträge zur Psychologie der Gestalt- und Bewegungserlebnisse. iii. Zur Grundlegung der Wahrnehmungstheorie: eine Auseinandersetzung mit V. Benussi.' [An elaborate and on the whole effective critique, from the standpoint of Wertheimer and the author, of the theory of perception worked out by the Graz school.] **H. J. und W. A. Pannenberg.** 'Die Psychologie des Musikers.' [A study based on the questionnaires of Heymans and Wiersma and on biographical data. The musician belongs to the nervous-choleric type.] **A. Meinong.** 'Stephan Witasek zum Gedächtnis.' Literaturbericht.—Bd. lxxiii., Heft 3 u. 4. **H. Henning.** 'Der Geruch, i.' [First part of a strictly psychological study of olfactory qualities. There are six fundamental sensations of smell: flowery, putrid, fruity, and spicy, burned, resinous. These qualities lie at the angles of a regular trigonal prism.] **G. E. Mueller.** 'Ein Beitrag über die Elberfelder Pferde.' [Prints the report of a Danish prestidigitator; differential experiments point to trickery on the part of the groom.] Literaturbericht.—Bd. lxxiii., Heft 5 u. 6. **A. Gelb und H. C. Warren.** 'Bibliographie der deutschen und ausländischen Literatur des Jahres 1914 über Psychologie, ihre Hilfswissenschaften und Grenzgebiete.' [2642 titles, as in the corresponding Index; 1913 had 2740.]—Bd. lxxiv., Heft 1 u. 2. **O. Leeser.** 'Ueber Linien- und Flächenvergleichung: ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Augenmass.' [Experiments on lines and squares by the methods (modified) of limits and of constant differences. Judgment of squares by side or diagonal is not more accurate than judgment by area. If Weber's Law is assumed, there is a fixed relation between limen and mean variable error; if this relation is assumed, Weber's Law is valid. Various modes of average or absolute impression play their part; there is no effect of practice.] **E. Becher.** 'Gefühlsbegriff und Lust-Unlustelemente.' [Discusses Wundt, Lipps, James-Lange, Stumpf, Ziehen. Pleasantness and unpleasantness are founded elements of consciousness; other 'feelings' are fused sensations, formal characters of consciousness, intellectual part-processes, etc.] Literaturbericht.—Bd. lxxiv., Heft 3 u. 4. **H. Henning.** 'Künstliche Geruchsfährte und Reaktionsstruktur der Ameise.' [Experiments in the field on *Formica rufa*. Paths are

formed simply and solely by deposition of formic acid ; they may be laid down artificially. The olfactory limen of ants is certainly not lower than that of man. Ants react, on the all-or-none principle, to the familiarity or unfamiliarity of psychological complexes or total situations.] **H. Henning.** 'Die Qualitätsreihe des Geschmacks.' [The four taste-qualities are not isolated ; they lie at the angles of a tetrahedron, whose surface is composed of lines of intermediate taste-qualities.] **O. Abraham.** 'Töne und Vokale der Mundhöhle.' [Range and vocality of percussion tones, whistling tones, whisper tones, and tones obtained by blowing across the mouth. The relations of tonal quality, brightness and vocality are briefly stated ; a discussion of Köhler's results is promised.] **C. M. Giessler.** 'Analyse des Schreckphänomenes.' [Illustrations, with running analysis, of the experience of sudden alarm : first come surprise and illusions, sensory or ideational, and then a rush of more or less accidental explanatory ideas. In physiological basis, and in the preponderance of assimilation over apperception, the experience is like the dream.] **Literaturbericht.** **A. Gruenbaum.** 'Berichtigung.' **H. Henning.** 'Zur vorstehenden Bemerkung.' [Apropos of illusory stereoscopic movements.]

ARCHIV F. D. GES. PSYCHOLOGIE. Bd. xxxv., Heft 1. **W. Baade.** 'Ueber psychologische Darstellungsexperimente.' [A terminological paper, distinguishing experiments designed to 'exhibit' a mental process from those which illustrate a causal sequence and from those which combine both purposes.] **F. Boden.** 'Ethische Studien, ii.' [(1) The practical moralist must come to terms with the historical conditions of morality ; if he seeks to improve things, he must learn from history and experiment where the fulcrum for his lever is to be found. (2) A working ideal of personal happiness, as dependent upon personal exertion, may be set up by the combination of experimental pedagogy and ethics. (3) Hate is useful as incentive to activity. Hate becomes morally valuable only when it has a natural term (at which it gives place to love) and is intelligently entertained.] **O. Sterzinger.** 'Rhythmische Ausgeprägtheit und Gefälligkeit musikalischer Sukzessivintervalle.' [Under the conditions used, the higher tone carries the accent. The neutral interval is 0.55 sec. ; shorter intervals give iambic, longer give trochaic (and spondaic) rhythms. The individual intervals have a definite rhythmical stamp and a definite degree of agreeableness ; the curve of agreeableness culminates in the major third (simultaneous) or the fourth (successive intervals).] **E. Becher.** 'Ueber physiologische und psychistische Gedächtnishypothesen.' [The physiological theories of memory will not hold water (*Gehirn und Seele*, 1911). All the facts of memory and association are more naturally and more adequately explained if we assume unconscious psychological residues, and allow the psyche a directive influence upon nervous excitation (Stumpf's double-cause and double-effect form of interactionism).] **Krass.** 'Ueber neue Tastäusungen.' [Active illusions of form and magnitude.] **O. Kuelpe, G. Stoerring, W. Wirth.** 'Zur Richtigstellung : Erklärung : Bemerkung des Herausgebers.' [Apropos of Meumann's work in aesthetics.]

"SCIENTIA" (RIVISTA DA SCIENZA). Vol. xviii. Part 3. September, 1915. **G. Peano.** 'Importanza dei simboli in matematica.' [Inspired by Rignano's articles in vol. xvii. of *Scientia*, Peano considers the analogous question of the function that symbols have in mathematics. One advantage of the Hindu-Arabic numerals is brevity ; but they also constitute a new classification of ideas. Thus, to such words as 'ten' or 'a hundred' do not correspond simple symbols but compound ones. The use of these numerals makes arithmetical calculations easier, and renders

some calculations possible which could not be attained without them. As for the well-known symbols of algebraic operations, apart from the fact that they give brevity to mathematical language, they represent ideas and not words. Thus 'the sum of a and b ' is translated by ' $a + b$,' although the former expression does not contain the word 'plus'. There are far fewer algebraic symbols than the words they allow us to represent. The evolution of algebraic symbolism is: Ordinary language; a technical language (Euclid's) in which is established a one-to-one correspondence between words and ideas; abbreviation of the words of this technical language, begun in the sixteenth century. The symbolism of the infinitesimal calculus is a continuation of algebraic symbolism, and calculations are made much easier because integrals have the fundamental properties of the ordinary sum. Geometry lends itself less to symbolism. The modern theory of vectors allows us to treat geometrical questions by a direct calculus, similar to algebra. The theory of vectors does not presuppose any knowledge of analytical geometry or even elementary geometry. The symbolism of mathematical logic was the last to appear, but it is in no way inferior to the above symbolisms. In any mathematical book, there are symbols which represent logical ideas. Mathematical logic classifies these ideas and represents them by combinations of a small number (about ten) of symbols. These symbols facilitate reasoning and the representation of complex ideas. It has been found that many forms of syllogism considered in scholastic logic lack one condition: that the rules for the definitions given in treatises on scholastic logic do not apply to mathematical definitions, and the latter are subject to other rules than those of ordinary treatises on logic. Rignano's criticisms hold against those who consider mathematical logic as a science in itself, but not against those who consider it as an instrument for solving mathematical problems which resist the ordinary methods.] **The. Svedberg.** 'Structure et forme des molécules. Hypothèse et réalité.' [Nernst and von Laue have shown that the concept of molecule is only applicable without restriction to gaseous and liquid bodies. But in this domain there are hardly any concepts which have shown themselves so fruitful, and of the reality of which we have such convincing proofs, as the concept of molecule. This valuable article can hardly be abstracted, as it is very technical.] **E. H. Starling.** 'The animal machine and its automatic regulation.' [The animal machine for the production of work is one in which there is a direct conversion of chemical potential energy into surface energy which is utilised for the production of contractile stress by the regular arrangement of the surfaces in muscle and their enormous multiplication. By histological differentiation the molecular forces so set free are summated to such an extent that, weight for weight, no man-made machine can be compared in efficiency with the numberless mechanical engines met with throughout the animal kingdom. A surface tension machine of this character presents moreover many admirable features. It is practically isothermal in its working. It has a theoretical efficiency of 100 per cent. when its regeneration has not to be provided for. It has a rapidity of action, which is seen in its highest extent in the wing muscles of a fly, giving 300 complete contractions and relaxations per second. But above all it is responsible for the ability of the heart to respond to changing loads and conditions in a manner which must always arouse our wonder and admiration.] **A. Meillet.** 'Les langues et les nationalités.' [The only allies of the Germans are groups who live by oppressing other nations. Whatever may be the origin of the war in the politics of the distant past, the essential part of the conflict is the wish on the part of Germany and Austria to increase their dominant rôle, and the refusal on the part of many nations to submit to this hegemony. Thus the war

appears as the consequence of the long conflicts which had the end of imposing the Indo-European language on a great part of the world, and of those conflicts which followed. The German pretension to hegemony has compelled the alliance of three powers so different as Great Britain, France, and Russia, of which the first two have no desire to extend their European domain and the third has no present wish for European aggrandisement.] **R. Michels.** 'Cittadinanza e nazionalità.' [The possession or not of rights of citizenship only gives a very superficial criterion of the nationality of him who possesses it. The result of fears, not on the whole unjustified, of the results of this fact has given rise to great sufferings in the case of foreigners unjustly suspected and persecuted. To avoid such suffering immigration will, after the war, be reduced and a sort of wall of China will be raised between one nation and another. 'This is a lugubrious vision, but what is the good of being silent about a peril which has already become almost a reality?'] *Book Reviews.* [The most interesting one is a review of the French translation of 1913 of M. Tougan-Baranowsky's book on industrial crises in England.] *General Review.* **C. Acqua.** 'De la libération d'énergie dans les processus respiratoires des plantes.' [Short *résumé* of what we know at present about the mechanism of the respiratory process.] *French translations of the Italian and English articles.*—Vol. xviii. Part 4. October, 1915. **A. Miel.** 'La Scienza greca e le caratteristiche del suo sviluppo.' [People who have to do with deductive sciences usually have a different opinion on Greek science to those who have to do with inductive sciences. However, the author maintains that a general and impartial examination leads us to admit that, at each epoch of Greek thought, there was a very strict identity of method in science. The unity in the scientific character of the ancient world has as consequence that the development of the different sciences was due, not to the mentality of those who applied themselves to them, but to the special characteristics of the subject treated.] **P. Puiseux.** 'L'avenir des planètes.' [Takes account of the relations of geology, astronomy, biology, and thermology. 'The actual tendency of the sun is not to contract and be extinguished, but to dilate and be dissolved. . . . It seems probable that earthquakes are tending to die out or at least to stop before they have seriously compromised the solid envelope on which we live. The generating force of the seas and mountains will only wake up at a signal from the sun. But this signal will inevitably come. The sun, more instable than any planet, will bring about a great transformation of the whole solar system after having undergone it himself. . . . The security of our solar system usually believed in is only provisory and relative. . . . The intelligence which exerts itself to view possible catastrophes with calmness is a better support for a moral life than passive enjoyment of the present course of things.' This concluding sentence of the author's seems capable of other applications.] **C. Lloyd Morgan.** 'Mind and body in their relations to each other and to external things.' [A logically arranged discussion of the various possible points of view with regard to this relation. On the question whether prior awareness arises in the course of individual life or whether it may have arisen in the course of ancestral experience, we need more definite evidence.] **R. Muir.** 'The antipathy between Germany and England.' [An inquiry into the possible causes of this antipathy. The author is forced to the conclusion that the British have two qualities in a pre-eminent degree, sportsmanship and the instinct of self-government, 'both bred into our bones through centuries'. The Germans have not these qualities, and 'Science over against sportsmanship; discipline over against self-government. Could there be a sharper antithesis? It is not surprising that these contrasted qualities and interests should produce a difference of *moral* in the nations which

cultivate them.'] Book Reviews. [Among them books on the theory of relativity, the constitution of matter, and seismology.] Review of Reviews. French translations of the articles in Italian and English. —Vol. xviii. Part 5. November, 1915. **A. S. Eddington.** 'The stellar universe as a dynamical system.' [For the solar system a dynamical treatment has long been successful; but the study of dynamics has found but little application as yet in the outside system of stars which comprehends all, so far as present knowledge extends. However the progress of observational knowledge of the stellar system has in recent years been rapid; and it may now fairly be claimed that some attempt to understand the dynamics of the system is justified by the facts that have been brought to light. The author reviews some applications of the conception of the stellar universe as a dynamical system, and concludes with a remark which is of great philosophical interest in connexion with the validity of the traditional dynamics: 'The development of a theory of stellar dynamics must necessarily proceed by advanced mathematical methods beyond the scope of the present article. Moreover, the steps which have as yet been taken must be regarded as tentative. We have here only attempted to bring together the various considerations—some of them well known—which must determine our view of the general nature of the forces acting on the stars. We have seen that at one point in particular a parting of the ways lies ahead. The one path leads to a system of dynamics familiar in its application to the theory of gas-molecules. We believe that the evidence is now conclusive that this must be rejected, and the other path taken. By that we arrive at a system novel to dynamics, but apparently presenting no greater mathematical difficulty than the more familiar molecular theory.'] **Ch. Fabry.** 'Les atomes lumineux et leurs mouvements. 1^{ère} Partie: Les mouvements des particules lumineuses.' [An account of the services rendered by the molecular theory to the study of luminous gases. The atomic theory leads us to regard such gases as formed of a finite number of distinct and free particles: without concerning itself with the nature of these luminous particles and the cause of their radiation, the study of the light emitted gives a direct means for the study of their motions, which is the same as that which astronomers use to measure the velocities of the most distant stars. In this first part the motions of the free luminous particles in a gas are studied without seeking to explain the mechanism of their radiation. In a second part, the author will try to give an idea of the hypotheses invented to explain the mechanism of radiation,—a problem which is directly connected with that of the constitution of the atom, that is to say, of all material bodies.] **M. Vallauri.** 'La medicina indiana.' [In India as elsewhere medical doctrines were a consequence of religious theories, and those of these doctrines which appeared in the most ancient period of Hindu literature (the Vedic age) have a special value for us because they mark the historical and natural origin of the study of medicine in India. Vedic medicine; Mythical origin of Indian medicine; Buddhism and Medicine; Medicine as a particular science; Principal classical sources; Historical evolution of medicine; Medicine in practice; The form of composition of texts; Foundations of Indian medicine; Pathology; Method of exposition of the treatises; Hygiene and gynecology; Intrinsic and extrinsic value of Indian medicine.] **P. Bonfante.** 'Verso la confederazione europea.' [The coalitions which are formed owing to the necessity of carrying on a great war are always markedly inferior to Unions. The least Utopian of Unions is a Franco-Italian Union, as a prelude to a Latin Union and as a preparation for a European Union.] Book Reviews. Review of Reviews. Chronicle. French translations of articles in English and Italian.

VIII.—CORRESPONDENCE.¹

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,

In his notice of my *Introduction to the Science of Ethics*, Mr. A. E. Taylor writes: "And it is more than hazardous, it is appallingly false to say that Plato tells the philosopher to put himself 'in a sphere where courage, temperance, and even justice have no place'. One wonders if Mr. De Laguna looked up the description of the philosophic character in *Republic* II. [sic], before writing this amazing sentence."

In my text the sentence in question reads: "But so far as he can he puts himself in a sphere where courage, temperance, and even justice have no place—the realm of pure theory" (p. 142). I venture to say that so far from being amazing this is a commonplace of Platonism. What is amazing is that the sentence should have been quoted without the qualifying clause which I had italicised, and the significance and importance of which I had emphasised throughout the paragraph.

Mr. Taylor quotes me as crediting Plato "with a 'boundless contempt for the mass of mankind,'—a judgment probably inspired by popular misconceptions about the politics of Plato's family". I did ascribe to him "an unmixed contempt for the masses of mankind" (p. 134); which is apparent enough throughout the dialogues from the *Gorgias* to the *Laws*. Pertinent illustration is given (pp. 137, 155). Perhaps, however, what to a thorough-going democrat seems contempt for the masses, is to Mr. Taylor only a fair and sympathetic estimate. But have inverted commas no meaning?

Mr. Taylor mentions as "significant" the fact that I apparently made no use of the *Philebus* or *Laws*. He did not observe that the account is purposely limited to the ethics of Plato's middle period, and that the reader is expressly warned that it will not hold without modification for the later period. Why, in an elementary work, this limit should have been set, any good pedagogue will understand. The further statement, that I gave no evidence of having used any part of the *Republic* except Book IV., is not only false but wantonly careless. On page 144, for example (under the caption, "Qualitative Differences Between Pleasures"), the use of *Republic* IX. is unmistakable. Here, as elsewhere, the vigour of Mr. Taylor's criticism is in striking contrast with the slipshod character of his reading. As a matter of fact, short as my treatment is, nearly every book of the *Republic* is drawn upon in some slight measure.

The remarks upon the constructive portion of my work are equally at variance with fact.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE,
20th October, 1915.

¹ A letter from Mr. H. S. Shelton has reached us too late for insertion in the present number. It refers to the editorial note on Dr. Mercier's Discussion which appeared in the January MIND. It will be published in the next October number.

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